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ABSTRACT 
The present study contributes to an understanding of the 
professional accounting standards setting processes in the UK. 
These processes are in need of exploration and elaboration 
because they have an impact on wealth generation and allocation 
decisions; yet their complexity, and associated criticisms, 
suggest that their management is problematic. Earlier 
characterisations of these processes as strictly technical have 
recently given way to a partially political characterisation; 
this has increased their apparent complexity. 
The study starts by reviewing previous research in accounting and 
economics. That research-iuggests that individuals possessing 
private accounting information have substantial economic 
incentives to seek to control the release of that information. 
These individuals will seek to participate in any process by 
which the information release process is regulated; professional 
accounting standards setting processes in the UK are just such a 
regulation process. 
Previous research suggests that insights can be gained by 
adopting theoretical constructs from disciplines other than 
accounting and economics;. but these constructs have been adopted 
so far in an unsatisfactory piecemeal manner. The present study 
contributes to, the generation of new insight by proposing a 
framework which integrates the frameworks of political science, 
organisation theory and sociology of- professions. The 
integration specifically excludes a framework based on the 
methods of natural scientists because these, are founded on 
determinate criteria which are not available in the accounting 
environment. 
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Previous research shows that only two empirical studies of the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes have been 
published; in both cases the results were indeterminate and 
conclusions speculative. A substantial body of unexplored data 
is available in the form of letters of comment to the Accounting 
Standards Committee. The present study draws together the 
emergent interest in the political dimension of professional 
accounting standards setting processes; the integrated framework 
generated from disciplines other than accounting and economics; 
and the availability of data in the UK. This provides a basis 
for modelling the professional accounting standards setting 
processes as a political process. 
In the empirical studys the professional accounting standards 
setting processes are characterised as a simple majority voting 
process in which the letters of comment are characterised as 
collections of votes on proposals put forward by the Accounting 
Standards Committee in an Exposure Draft. It is hypothesised 
that a simple majority of votes would be sufficient to determine 
the outcome for a proposal. The outcome is characterised as the 
change between : an Exposure Draft and its related Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice. The model develops two interesting 
measures, of "influence" and "sensitivity", which enable 
differences between classes of participants to be detected. 
The results of statistical analysis, of data generated by content 
analysis of the letters of comment, demonstrate that the model 
is 
a reasonably good fit. We can make the statements that UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes are political 
in the sense that votes count; and that they demonstrate a 
significantly greater sensitivity to the votes of professional 
firms of accountants, and to the votes of representative bodies 
of accountants, than to the votes of companies* These results 
are interesting and further research needs to be conducted to 
establish any causal mechanism which may be operating. Several 
other suggestions for further research are made. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
Professional accounting standards, in the sense of standard 
practices rather than standards of competence or of ethics, come 
to public attention infrequently. As with many issues that only 
rarely come to public attentions- the occasions are usually ones 
involving some controversy. For examples in 1931, standards of 
professional accounting practice were called into question in the 
trial, on charges of fraudulent accounting, of the chairman of 
the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company; after the 1964 collapse of 
Rolls Razor, its chairman, John Bloom, blamed the failure on 
misleading professional accounting practices; in 1973, the 
Government of the day appointed a committee to advise on how 
companies should account for inflation, a problem then being 
separately addressed by the profession's own Accounting Standards 
Committee and still being debated at the time of writing in 1983. 
Professional accounting standards are important to the business 
community and to the rest of society. It is the standard of 
professional accounting which determines part of the information 
process on which depend many decisions made about the economy. 
Professional accounting standards contribute to the determination 
0f which enterprises, 'public or private, report profits and which 
report losses. Changes in professional accounting standards can 
change the amount of profits or losses reported; and even change 
marginal cases from profit to loss, or v_ice versa,. 
These issues are important. The level of investment in 
individual enterprises can depend on the accountingý information 
reflected in their accounts; business decisions about whether or 
not to close down, or start ups. can depend in part on that 
information; the very theories which we construct to explain the 
behaviour of the corporate sector depends to some extent on 
accounting information. Changes in professional accounting 
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standards can change those decisions and theories; they can 
change the rate at which wealth and welfare is created and they 
can change the distribution of existing wealth and welfare. 
Professional accounting standards are said by some to be 
technical, and often highly technical. Debates about 
professional accounting standards are complex and the issues 
often beyond the, understanding of the layman. Professional 
accounting standards are said by others to be political. Some 
proposals for changes in professional accounting standards are 
fiercely debated in the professional press; some proposals are 
ignored; and at least one UK professional accounting standards 
the case of accounting for inflation, has received national 
television coverage. The involvement of Government in these 
debates is not unknown. 
The present study of professional accounting standards setting 
processes in the UK is organised as follows 
Firstly, the introductory material, which includes a description 
of the Accounting Standards Committee, is presented in the 
chapters which are collected together as Part I "Introduction". 
Secondly, previous research is reviewed in the chapters which are 
collected together as Part II "Review of previous research in 
accounting and economics". 
Thirdly, previous research suggests that 
frameworks in natural science, political 
theory and sociology of professions is 
undertaken in the chapters collected toget: 
of literature from disciplines other 
economics". 
a review of research 
science, organisation 
important. This is 
her as Part III "Review 
than accounting and 
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Fourthly, previous 
which models the 
accounting standard 
of its complexity. 
together as Part 
data". 
research suggests that new empirical work, 
political dimension of the UK professional 
a setting processs would help to reduce some 
This is undertaken in the chapters collected 
IV "Evidence from the empirical study of UK 
Finally, the study is concluded in Part V "Conclusions", 
following which are presented an extended bibliography and 
several appendices based on the empirical study. 
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1.2 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study contributes to the construction of an explanation of 
how UK professional accounting standards are determined. This 
general context can be represented by the question 
"What factors, when viewed together, might be used to explain 
the processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined? " 
More specifically, the purpose of the present study is to 
contribute to the development of that explanation by addressing 
two areas left open by previous research in the area. 
Firstly, previous research suggests that the theoretical 
constructs of disciplines other than accounting and economics can 
offer new insights or analyses for the study of professional 
accounting standards setting processes in the UK. That previous 
research has nots however, attempted any broad review of the 
literature of those disciplines both to identify those constructs 
and to set them in their own contexts to ascertain their 
limitations. Rather, previous research has uncritically and 
selectively transferred constructs to the problem of professional 
accounting standards setting processes in an unsatisfactory 
piecemeal fashion. The present study both seeks to demonstrate 
that those other disciplines can. offer a substantial and rich 
insight i, nto the complexity of professional accounting standards 
setting processes; and to propose a framework which can integrate 
these theoretical constructs as a basis for future research. The 
review of these literatures is undertaken below in Part III 
"Review of literature from disciplines other than accounting and 
economics". 
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Secondly, previous research also suggests that a political 
dimension is important to any explanation of professional 
accounting standards setting processes. The empirical part of 
the present study tests that suggestion by adopting a simple, 
naive, voting characterisation of political choice and then 
asking the question "Do votes count? ". For participants other 
than the Accounting Standards Committee itself, and for votes 
represented in letters of comment to the Accounting Standards 
Committee on Exposure Drafts, and for those issues selected, the 
present study seeks to demonstrate that votes do count. In other 
words# the UK professional accounting standards setting processes 
are demonstrably political. From this finding the study goes-on 
to explore the relative sensitivity of the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes to the. votes, or 
preferences, of different classes of participants. The present 
study seeks to demonstrate that there is a differential 
sensitivity, with some groups' votes counting more than other 
groups. The tests and their results are set out below in Part IV 
"Evidence from the empirical study of the UK data". 
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1.3 CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE STUDY 
The present 6tudy makes a number of contributions to the study of 
UK professional a, ccounting standards setting- processes. These 
contributions can be classified under three headings as follows. 
Review Of literature from discivIines other than 
accountigm and economics 
1 The complexity of the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes is elaborated by documenting the different 
models which could be used as frameworks for their analysis. 
The complexity of the models themselves is also elaborated. It is 
quite clear that professional accounting standards setting 
processes are not susceptible to simple explanations; to use the 
term "political" to describe the complexity is overly simplistic. 
The models are presented in Part III "Review of literature from 
disciplines other than accounting and economics". 
2 The different frameworks from political science, organisation 
theory and sociology of professions are integrated into a 
single framework for the benefit of future research into 
professional accounting standards setting processes. 
The integration adopts the professionalisation process framework 
as the primary framework within which political choice analysis 
operates as a sub-framework. Both an organisation framework and a 
committee structure framework offer themselves as alternative 
sub-sub-frameworks 'of analysis within political choice. The 
integrated framework is presented in Chapter 15 "Summary and 
conclusions drawn from reviews of literature from disciplines 
other than accounting and 'economics". The committee structure, 
framework is especially interesting and is presented in Section 
12.3 "Political institutions". 
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I 
Evidence from the emvirical-study of UK-data 
1 The professional accounting standards setting processes are 
modelled using an abstract formulation of the political 
dimension based on a simple majority voting model. 
This is the first algebraic model of the public comment stage of 
the professional accounting standards setting processes to be 
found in the literature. It is presented in Chapter 17 "A naive 
voting model". 
2 Hypotheses are systematically tested over a broad range of 
issues. 
A criticism of the previous research is that there has been a 
systematic bias to results-based on the inflation accounting 
issue. 
3 Rigorous analysis of an available, but hitherto substantially 
unexplored, body of data is conducted. 
The letters of co=ent received by the Accounting Standards 
Committee are filed on public-record. No research study has 
explored these data to the same extent as the present study. 
4 Analysis is based on a novel definition of a proposal as an 
"irreducible statement of accounting definition or 
requirement". 
Previous research suggests that subjectivity in classifying 
letters of comment is a problem. The definition adopted 
virtually eliminates the subjectivity in that area. It is 
presented in Section 18.2.2 "Proposal" of Chapter 18 "Research 
approach and method". 
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5 Measures of "influence" and "sensitivity" are developed and 
tested which enable differences between classes of participants 
to be detected and quantified. 
The algebraic model has enabled two measures to be defined which 
permit quantification of subtle features of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes. They are presented in 
Section 17.2.3 "Stage two: A probabilistic model of influence" 
and Section 17.2.4 "Stage three: A sensitivity extension of the 
probabilistic model of influence" both of Chapter 17 "A naive 
voting model". 
6 Evidence has been generated that is consistent with the 
statement that the UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes are political. I 
The UK professional accounting standards setting processes have 
been demonstrated to be political in the sense that votes count. 
The preferences of participants have had a measurable impact on 
the outcome of the issues investigated. These results are 
presented in Chapter 19 "The data and their analysis". 
7 Evidence has been generated that the UK professional accounting 
standards setting processes are significantly more sensitive to 
the preferences of professional firms of accountants and 
representative bodies of accountants than to the preferences of 
companies. 
This finding is important in the sense that it suggests that 
future research studies should address the question of an 
underlying causal mechanism. The identification and elaboration 
of such 
,a 
causal mechanism is a necessary condition for the 
demonstration of a "power" relation. The evidence is presented 
in Section 19.5.3 "Sumary regression results" Of Chapter 19 "The 
data and their analysis"; the argument linking "power" and 
causal mechanisms is discussed in Section 12.4 "Power" of Chapter 
12 "Political choice processes". 
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8A microcomputer programme was written which enables researchers 
to use microcomputers to create computqr data files relatively 
speedily. 
The programme will automatically write the data file and 
simultaneously create the format control statements required by 
the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SSPS). The source 
listing for this microcomputer programme is set out at the end of 
t he study in Appendix 10 "SPSSGEN: A programme written in BASIC 
to simplify creation of SPSS raw data files". 
Re 
-tiu viev 2f igrevious research 
in accown -% and ecoucmics 
An extension of the review of the literature of social choice 
theory suggests that there might be conditions under which 
conflict minimisation is a meaningful surrogate for social 
welfare maximisation. In view of the fact that much criticism of 
the ASC suggests that it behaves in a conflict minimising manners 
this idea is presented in Section 7.4.3 "Social welfare 
maximisation and a conflict minimisation hypothesis" and an 
initial exploration of those conditions is presented in Appendix 
7.1 "A conflict minimisation hypothesis". The criticisms are 
reviewed in Section 3.10 "Criticisms of the Accounting Standards 
Committee". 
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1.4 SCOPE AMD LIMITATIONS 
Introduction 
The study is concerned with the professional accounting standards 
setting processes in the UK. These processes are focused on The 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) which is a constituted as a 
committee of the six large UK professional accounting bodies. As 
such, the ASC does not set standards of-accounting practice which 
originate from sources such as legislation, industrial and 
commercial organisations or any other groupings not formally 
organised within the UK a: ccounting profession. The two main 
purposes of the study, set out above in Section 1.2 "Purposes of 
the study", differ in the degree to which they each focus on the 
ASC. The first abstracts away from the ASC and considers 
decision-making bodies generally; while the second focusses 
narrowly on one stage of the ASC's operation. Both are preceded 
by a review of the history and operation of the ASC; and by a 
review of the previous research by accountants and economists. 
1.4.2 Scope 
The ASC came into existence in 1970 and, 'apart from the need to 
consider an historical perspective, this study is not concerned 
with standards of accounting practice prior to that date. The 
ASC's activities are restricted to financial accounts intended to 
give a true and fair view of financial position and profit or 
loss. This implies that this study is only concerned with such 
financial statements as conform to that restriction. In general 
terms, this includes external financial reports of most corporate 
bodies in the UK, but does not include any internal$ or 
management, accounting reports. 
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Two important and general assumptions can be identified. 
Firstly, it is assumed that the existing body of literature 
concerning the analogous problem in the USA is capable of 
generating an analytic framework applicable to the UK. Secondly, 
it is-assumed that the professional accounting standards setting 
processes are in some sense systematic and so capable of 
discovery and explanation. It is possible that the processes are 
strictly unsystematic. 
The review in Part III "Review of literature from disciplines 
other than accounting and economics" abstracts away from the ASC 
and adopts the characterisation of a generalised decision-making 
or choice-making entity. The differing perspectives used in 
these other disciplines for the analysis of choice are explored. 
The disciplines reviewed are 
1 natural science, as represented by formal decision theory and 
measurement theory; 
2 political science; 
3 organisation theory; and 
4 sociology of professions. 
Conclusions are drawn from this exploration about the relative 
usefulness of each framework and possibilities for futher 
research adopting their theoretical constructs* 
The analysis in Part IV "Evidence from the empirical study of 
, 
UK 
data" focusses narrowly on the ASC. The empirical study tests 
the proposition that the political dimension is important to an 
explanation of the UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes. This test is implemented by modelling the' political 
dimension in terms of a naive voting model. The one-man, one- 
vote, simple-majority model is adopted. It is used as a basis 
for hypothesising relationships between the votes, or stated 
preferences, of participants and the outcome as reflected in 
accounting standards. More specifically, an Exposure Draft is 
characterised as a set of proposals on each of which votes are 
cast in the form of letters of comment to the ASC- The outcome 
of the ýprocess is characterised as the change between the 
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Exposure Draft and the accounting standard. In other words, 
votes count to the extent that they are associated with a change 
in the ASC's position between Exposure Draft and accounting 
standard. 
It follows from the above that the study makes no underlying 
assumptions about which proposals are, in some sense, important 
and which are not important. Such an assumption would be 
problematic in the sense that the importance criterion would. be 
selected arbitrarily ort at leasts subjectively. Three possible 
criteria are 
1 the impact on the numbers disclosed in financial statements (a 
measurement criterion); 
2 the impact on an individual's wealth (an economic consequences 
criterion); or 
3 the number of other proposals which are dependent on the 
proposal being considered (an interdependancy criterion). 
By adopting an "equal importance" assumption, the present study 
develops a research method by which the relative importance 
imputed by the ASC can be determined. Arguably, this is a much 
more interesting approach. It is implemented by the use of a 
measure of the sensitivity of the professional accounting 
standards setting processes in the UK to participants' 
preferences. 
Tests are conducted on a selection of issues, namely those based 
on exposure drafts published after mid-1977 but excluding the 
inflation accounting issue. The issues used are 
1 accounting for associated companies; 
2 accounting for investment properties; 
3 accounting for foreign currencies; 
4 group accounts; and 
5 accounting for contingencies and events occurring after the 
balance sheet date. 
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The results were computed at different levels of aggregation, 
namely 
1 for all participants across all issues; 
2 fo; all participants disaggregated by issue; 
3 for all issues disaggregated by participant; and 
4 disaggregated by both issue and participant. 
The disaggregations across participant were based on the ASC's 
own classification into 
companies; firms of accountants; representative bodies of 
accountants; other representative bodies; and others. 
The data were generated by the technique of content analysis and 
implementation of the tests was undertaken on a large mainframe 
computer* 
1.4.3 Limitations 
As with all research, the present study has its limitations. The 
study does not address I substantive accounting problems except 
insofar as they are the subject matter of specifically 
investigated isýýies. In particular, the study is not concerned 
with deducing normative frameworks which support any one 
particular accounting method as a basis of measurement of some 
perceived attribute of accounting- entities. The subject of 
interest rests with the processes by which, such measurements are 
legitimised by adoption in the Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice published by the Councils of the six principal UK 
accountancy bodies. 
The review of the literature presented in Part III "Review of 
literature from disciplines other than accounting and-economics" 
is necessarily only a brief overview. No special expertise is 
claimed in any of these disciplines and so the conclusions are to 
be treated with caution. It is possible that, although care was 
exercised, -substantive criticisms or new developments have been 
overlooked. .ý 
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Limitations of Part IV "Evidence from the empirical study of UK 
data" are more specific. The empirical study concentrates on 
only one stage of the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes, that of soliciting public comment. The 
processes involve other stages, such as issue definition; agenda 
formulation; proposal definition by technical drafting and 
consultation; review of public comment and redrafting; and 
approval by governing bodies of ASC. Of all the stages only 
three systematically generate publicly available data. These are 
publication of the Exposure Draft; publication of the accounting 
standard; and filing of the letters of comment in the libraries 
of the six governing bodies of the ASC. The study is restricted 
to utilisation of these publicly available data. 
The empirical study is based on issues on which the ASC chose to 
initiate a public process; there might be issues which were 
either ignored, suppressed or resolved privately. It is based on 
participation by individuals who chose to allow their comments to 
be made available publicly; there might be participants whose 
preferences were expressed privately. 
The empirical study makes exploratory use of a naive voting model 
to represent the political dimension of professional accounting 
standards setting processes. Future research will demonstrate 
whether or not this is an efficient characterisation. It does not 
investigate the operation of the ASC itself. The participants 
whose preferences are being characterised as votes exclude the 
members of the ASC. ' 
The limitations both of archival data sources and of content 
analysis flow through into the empirical study. In the case of 
archival sources, this applies to selectivity of archiving which 
is noted above as the possibility of participants not wishing 
their comments to be made available publicly. In the case of 
content analysis, this applies to subjectivity of interpretation. 
Subjectivity has been minimised by a novel definition of a 
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of proposal" based on an irreducible statement of proposed 
accounting definition or practice. An Exposure Draft typically 
contains 20-50 such proposals. 
The results of the empirical study are descriptive only of the 
data to hand. No attempt has been made to construct a normative 
or predictive model at this stage. Such possibilities are left 
open for future research studies. 
More detailed discussion of the limitations of the empirical part 
of this study is provided below in each chapter of Part IV 
"Evidence from the empirical study of UK data". 
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1.5 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
1.5.1 Professional accounting standards and the political dmension 
In the field of external financial reporting by corporate 
management, there has been much interest in the role of the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASO in the UK and the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in the US. The stated role of 
each body is broadly to enhance the usefulness of external 
financial reports by reducing the variety of reporting practices 
["Statement of intent", ICAEW i970]. In the UK, this variety has 
been the cause of public criticism [Stamp & Marley 19701. Both 
bodies have chosen the professional accounting standard as the 
instrument for the implementation of their objectives. The term 
"accounting standard" has now become sufficiently widespread in 
its application to these instruments, both in the UK and the US, 
that no confusion is caused by its use. However, they are 
standards in the sense of standard practices rather than 
standards of competence or of ethics. 
Professional accounting standards are published by the standards 
setting bodies after public debate and have subsequent mandatory 
effect. Although detailed arrangements differ between the UK and 
the US, comparison with the US is important because it has an 
accounting profession which sets its own accounting and auditing 
standards with somewhat analogous institutional structures to 
those in the UK. There are distinctions between the UK and the 
US; for example, the business environments are different, both 
culturally and institutionally. In particulars the US government 
agency known as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has 
no direct equivalent in the UK. The SEC is charged by 
legislation with the responsibility for establishing accounting 
standards in the securities markets ands for the time being, it 
has chosen to delegate this reponsibility to the FASB. The 
latter, although constitutionally autonomous* is dependent on the 
US accounting profession for its expertise and legitimation and 
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so iss in several respects, analogous to the UK's own ASC. 
The accounting literature has long been characterised by a search 
for, or discussion of, better accounting practices and the 
external financial reporting practice of corporate management is 
the natural empirical domain of this literature; for examples 
Ijiri [19751, AAA [19661, Chambers [1966], Sprouse & Moonitz 
[1962]p Edwards & Bell [19611, Moonitz [19611, Littleton [19531, 
Alexander [1950], Paton & Littleton [19401, Gilman [19391., 
MacNeal [19391, Sweeney (19361, Canning [19291, Hatfield [19271j. 
Paton [19221 and Sprague [19071. 
There is a noticeable trend in the more recent accounting 
literature toward discussion of what is often termed the 
political dimension of professional accounting standards; for 
example, Burggr)(aaf (19831, Solomons [1983; 1980 & 19781, 
Henderson & Peirson [19781, Kirk [19781, Standish [19781, Zeff 
[19781, Watts [19771, Armstrong [19761, Horngren [1976,1973 & 
19721, Moonitz [19741 and Gerboth [1973A; 1973B & 19721. The 
history of this trend in the USA precedes that in the UK perhaps 
because the former has both a longer experience of published 
professional accounting standards and an institutionalised focus 
for the political dimension, that is, the SEC. Nevertheless, any 
study of professional accounting standards setting processes is 
now incomplete without some consideration of this political 
dimension. 
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An explanation for the existence of the political dimension is to 
be found in the economic consequences literature in accounting, 
for example, Carter [19811, Hakansson [19811, Zeff [19781, 
Rappaport [19771 and Demski [19741. The economic consequences 
argument can be summarised as follows: 
Accounting information is used by various classes of 
individuals, such as investors, employees, central and local 
governments, trade creditors, bankers and other organisational 
participants. A change in the accounting information available 
to these classes of individuals may result in a change in 
either their own decisions; or the outcomes of existing 
financial contracts. Each has consequent wealth and welfare 
generation and redistribution effects. In either cases the 
self-interest of the individual participants is incentive for 
them to lobby for or against specific proposals to the extent 
that their interests are perceived to be affected. 
1.5.2 The studv of Professional accountinst standArds setting 
lerocesses 
Hussein 11981, p. 281 has argued that there are two fundamental 
approaches to investigating professional accounting standards 
setting processes, namely 
1 the results approachs that is to treat as a black box the 
processes by which the professional accounting standa ' 
rds 
setting body seeks to satisfy objectives. This approach 
explores the outputs, that is the accounting standards, as 
instruments for satisfying objectives; and 
2 the process approach, that is to explore the processes by which 
the professional accounting standards setting body seeks to 
satisfy objectives. 
The present study adopts the'second approach. In so doing it 
does not address the objectives themselves but assumes them to be 
held constant. 
Many writers have adopted the first approach and the accounting 
literature is replete with examples. In pursuing their enquiries 
these writers often call upon criteria drawn from different 
disciplines. Examples include the following 
1 do accounting standards increase information useful for making 
- decisions? 
[Revsine 1973; Feltham 19721; 
2 do accounting standards have any detectable effect on the 
market price of securities? [Watts & Zimmerman 1980; Gonedes & 
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Dopuch 197 41; 
3 do accounting standards have any effect on the day to day 
decisions of corporate management? [Horwitz & Kolodny 1981; 
Prakash & Rappaport 19751; 
4 do accounting standards require the disclosure of information 
which is cost-effective to generate? (Benston 1981; 1980 & 
19761; and 
5 do accounting standards conflict with existing legislation, 
such as the requirement to disclose a true and fair view in 
financial statements of UK companies [Jack 19781. 
All these questions, and more, are reflected in the literature. 
As a result, a wealth of material is being generated which will 
benefit our understanding of the relationship between accounting 
information, accounting standards and assumed objectives. 
It is also clear is that few writers have explored the black box 
of the professional accounting standards setting processes. 
I Consequently, there is only a small body of literature which aims 
to investigate by this approach the effectiveness of accounting 
standards in meeting objectives. 
In Part II "Review of previous research in accounting and 
economics"s the present study considers that literature. For 
example, in the USs Carter [19811, Hussein [1981], Buckley 
[19801, Kelly-Newton [19801, Solomons [19781, Watts & Zimmerman 
[19781, Zeff [19781, Watts [19771, Moonitz [1974]l Demski 
[197319 Gerboth (1973A] and Horngren 
_[19731 
each represent 
partial descriptions of the US process. A wide diversity of 
approach is apparent and this arguably reflects unstated 
assumptions about objectives. 
In the UK literature, Hopwood [19821# Bromwich [1981 & 19801$ 
ICAEW [19801, Westwick [19801, Hope [19791, ASC [19781, Barrett 
[19781, Slimmings [19781, Standish [19781, Edey [19771, and Lee 
[19751 again represent partial descriptions of the UK process. 
To a lesser degree, there is some European literature which may 
be of use in a comparative study for example, Bromwich & Hopwood 
(Eds) (19831, Klaassen [19801, Schoonderbeek et (19801, Volten 
[19791 and Muis [19771. 
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The observation that only a small body of literature is concerned 
with the study of professional accounting standards setting 
processes is in need of some exploration and perhaps explanation. 
On the one hand, it could be that the processes are of no 
substantial interest$ in the same way that the workings of 
computer hardware may be of no substantial interest to the users 
of computers. On the other hand, it could be that the processes 
are of interest but no researcher has investigated them due to 
lack of either resources or opportunity. This study assumes the 
latter to be the case. It seeks to explore the possibility that 
a greater understanding of how professional accounting standards 
setting processes generate specific outputs will enhance our 
understanding and critical awareness of those outputs themselves. 
Such work would necessarily complement the existing literature 
concerning the outputs of these processes* It would contribute 
to the construction of descriptive statements concerning the 
processes and be of help to those beneficiaries identified below 
in Section 1.5.5 "Beneficiaries of the study". 
1.5.3 Definition-of the Problema 
This study brings together the subject matter of the two 
preceding sections; namely a consideration of the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards and an exploration 
of the professional accounting standards setting processes in the 
UK. 
The study contributes to an answer to the question 
"What factors, when viewed together, might be used to explain the 
processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined? " 
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More specifically, the problem is twofold. 
Firstly, to explore the complexity of the political dimension of 
the professional accounting standards setting processes and 
propose a framework which can integrate the analyses of 
disciplines such as political science, organisation theory and 
sociology of professions for the benefit of future research 
studies. 
Secondly, to test the proposition that the political dimension is 
important to any explanation of the UK professional accounting 
standards setting processes by modelling those processes as a 
simple voting process. 
1.5.4 The importance of the Problem 
The problem of modelling and reducing the complexity of the 
processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined is important for several reasons. 
I External financial reports of complex organisations appear to 
have an important role within society, yet that role is little 
understood [AAA 1977 and ASC 19751. 
There is evidence that the UK-accounting professions through the 
ASC, has had a significant impact on UK external financial 
reports during the last decade. For example, the annual "Survey 
of published accounts", published by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), presents much of this 
evidence; some of which is summarised below in Section 3.5 "The 
1970" s". 
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2 The professional accounting standards setting processes have 
been characterised as a policy-making social choice mechanism 
[May & Sundem 1061. 
Bauer [19681 argues that policy-making processes can be 
characterised as a single, complex, social process in which an 
intellectual process is embedded. As such, they exhibit 
characteristics attributed to professional occupationst to 
political decision making, to ambiguous organisational choice 
processes and to scientific enquiry. Reduction of the apparent 
complexity would render professional accounting standards setting 
processes more susceptible to effective management* There is 
evidence that the UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes have proved to be difficult to manage [Leach & Stamp 
(Eds) 19811. 
3 Following Arrow [1963 & 19511, Riker [19801 argues that social 
choice is only possible if individual preferences are severely 
constrained. 
A study of the institutional structure of social choice 
mechanisms is important to our understanding of both how choices 
are made under such constraints and the nature of those 
constraints. Evidence of the preference constraint structure in 
UK professional accounting standards setting processes is not yet 
available. 
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1.5.5 Benificiaries of the-studl 
Amongst those who will benefit from this study will be 
researchers and others who wish to gain a deeper understanding of 
debates in accounting [Leach & Stamp (Eds) 19811. These will 
include policy-makers at government level who will wish to 
monitor the effectiveness of professional self-regulation in 
general and professional accounting standards setting in 
particular. There will be members of the UK accounting 
profession, which may have embarked on a formal professional 
accounting standards programme unwillingly [Zeff 1972, p. 401 and 
which appears to be divided about the continued desirability of 
the programme [Accountancy Age, 6 Harch 1981, p. 11. Last, but 
not least, there will be the past, present and future 
participants in the professional accounting standards setting 
processes, whose understanding of the processes may well be 
imperfect [Hyde 19831. 
1.5.6 Research approach and method 
The 
-study adopts complementary research methods as a means of 
supplementing the contribution of each individual method. The 
methods are identified below in summary form 
I Review of previous research, which has been conducted primarily 
in the fields of 
' 
accounting and of economics* 
2 Review of literature from disciplines, other than accounting 
and economics, of 
(a) scientific decision; 
(b) political science; 
(c) organisation theory; and 
(d) sociology of professions. 
3 Content analysis, using a naive voting model framework, of 
(a) draft accounting standards; 
(b) letters of submission on those drafts; and 
(c) the final accounting standards. 
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The outcome of the literature review is the generation of 
alternative frameworks from disciplines other than accounting and 
economics. These frameworks complement those developed in the 
review of the previous research in accounting and economics and 
provide alternatives within which to explain and interpret the 
evidence from the empirical part of the study. The alternatives 
are integrated into a single framework for the benefit of future 
research studies. 
With the exception of the inflation accounting issue, 'all of the 
issues that have been publicly aýdressed by the ASC during the 
period since mid-1977 are investigated. Data gathering* is 
performed by content analysis of documents which provide evidence 
of one stage of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes in the UK. Bauer [19681 emphasises the importance of 
taking a broad view of the processes and their context, and then 
of identifying a particular stage, or leverage point, for closer 
study. The stage selected for investigaton is that of the public 
comment on Exposure Drafts. There are two main arguments in 
support of this selection. 
1 visibility of this stage. Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards 
Committee" below shows that many of the stages in the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes are not 
visible in the sense that much work is conducted as committee 
work. The public comment stage is the most visible stage of 
all; and 
2 availability of data. As a matter of policy, the ASC files the 
letters of comment which it has received on each Exposure 
Draft. This filing is on public view in the library of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. The 
data has been virtually unexplored and so such an exploration 
would, of itself, be an important contribution. 
Data analysis concentrates on an investigation of the 
relationship between the stated preferences of participants and 
the outcome of the process. In particular, there are developed 
two measures of the strength of association between these stated 
preferences and the change from the original proposal to the 
final accounting standard. These measures, called "influence" and 
"sensitivity", enable distinctions to be made between the 
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various classes of individual participants to assess their impact 
on the UK professional accounting standards setting processes. 
0 
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CHAPTER 2 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY AND SUMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
2.1 Outline of the study 
2.2 Summary of previous research 
2.3 Conclusions drawn from previous research 
I 
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CHAPTER 2 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY AND SUNMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
2.1 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The. study starts with the premise that professional accounting 
standards setting processes in the UK are little understood. Yet 
professional accounting standards setting processes appear to 
play an important role in the information processes upon which 
wealth generation and distribution decisions are made. The 
effects of these decisions are known as the "economic 
consequences" of professional accounting standards setting 
processes. They give rise to a political dimension reflecting 
the underlying conflict of interests inherent in any wealth 
distribution decision. It is clearly important to develop our 
understanding of these processes in order that they can be 
managed effectively. 
In the UK, the professional accounting standards setting 
processes are focussed on the Accounting Standards Committee of 
the six major professional accountancy bodies. The historical 
context which led to the creation of the ASC and the history of 
the ASC itself lends support to the above explanation of a 
political dimension. The history is one of debate# controversy 
and difference of opinion between many different elements of the 
business community. The focus of debate being the particular 
accounting practices adopted, or to be adopted, by companies and 
other economic agents. The function of the ASC is, thens to 
reduce that conflict by standardising accounting practice. The 
context and function are not unique to the UK accounting 
profession. Accountancy professions throughout the developed 
nations are. experiencing the same phenomena and, even within the 
UK, the engineering profession experienced a similar phenomenon 
when it created the Engineering Standards Committee in 1901; that 
committee is now constituted as the British Standards 
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Institution. The review of the historical context and comparison 
is set out in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards Committee". 
2.1.2 Review of Previous research in accounting and economics 
As yet, there exists no substantial body of research which 
addresses, directly, the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes. It is observed, in Section 3.8 "International 
comparisons", that the ASC is not unique as a mechanism by which 
a national accounting profession seeks to narrow areas of 
difference and variety in practice by -publishing authoritative 
statements. This study draws on a body of research that has been 
conducted, in particular, in the USA. For example, Bromwich 
[19811, discussing the role of research in the process of setting 
UK professional accounting standards, also aknowledges the debt 
due to US research. 
The review of previous research starts by describing the 
development of the literature as from a technical orientation, 
through an economic'theory orientation to a relatively recent 
interest in the political dimension. The chapters in Part II 
"Review of previous research in accounting and economics" follow 
the sequence of the development of the literature. 
In view of the importance attached by US studies to the economic 
dimension, Chapter 6 "Information economics" and Chapter 7 "Other 
economic processes" explore the extent to which economic theory 
can explain professional accounting standards setting processes. 
After that review, the research studies which explicitly address 
the political dimension are reviewed in Chapter 8 "Empirical 
studies of the political dimension in professional accounting 
standards setting processes". 
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Chapter 5 "Professional accounting standards, the political 
dimension and economic consequences" demonstrates the underlying 
reasons for the importance of both professional accounting 
standards and the processes by which they are determined. It is 
shown that characterisations of the professional accounting 
standards setting processes have recently changed from a purely 
"technical" description to a newly emerging political 
description. Changes in professional accounting standards have 
economic consequences to which can be attributed wealth and 
welfare generation and redistribution effects. The evidence for 
this is discussed. The problem of where the benefits- or 
redistributions fall is the issue which gives rise to a political 
dimension in the sense that individuals will seek to influence 
the incidence of the costs and benefits. 
Recognition of a political dimension in the research literature 
is a relatively recent phenomenon dating back to the early 1970's 
in the US literature and, arguably, not appearing in the UK 
literature until the early 1980's. This political orientation 
leads into a body of literature which adopts a policy-making 
characterisation of professional accounting standards setting 
processes with an implied objective of social welfare 
maximisation. 
Chapter 6 "Information economics" sets out some of the mechanisms 
by which economic consequences are generated. 
Information economics is concerned with, on the one hand, the 
analysis of the impact of information on markets, and on the 
other hand, the analysis of the conditions for a market in which 
information itself is traded. In the present study these two 
frameworks are labelled "supply-side" and "demand-side" 
respectively to distinguish between the underlying assumptions 
being made about the information generation process. These two 
frameworks are then compared. 
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In concentrating on a field of economic theory, the chapter 
explores some common economic assumptions. In particular, the 
Pareto-optimality criterion is seen to be fundamental as a goal 
in which it is not possible to increase the utility of any one 
person without decreasing that of one or more others; and the 
economic agent is assumed to behave as if he is rational, self- 
interested and expected-utility maximising. 
A review of information economics is important in the context of 
the present study because it adds insight into incentives which 
might influence the behaviour of individuals in processes by 
which the flow of accounting information is regulated. 
Chapter 7 "Other economic processes" sets out additional 
mechanisms by which economic consequences are generated. Three 
separate subsets of this literature are reviewed. 
1 Rational choice theory is concerned with the analysis of 
information and its use by an individual. The focus of interest 
is the maximisation of expected utility for an individual. This 
literature suggests that a multi-person setting, where 
preferences are heterogeneous, will not provide a unique 
solution to the problem of selection of preferred accounting 
information. 
2 Agency theory is concerned with the analysis of both the role 
of management as agent of the owners of the firm; and with the 
information requirements of both agents and owners. This 
literature suggests that management has incentives to enter 
into contracts to publish audited accounting information. 
Further that, having entered into such contracts, management 
has incentives to prefer specific classes of accounting 
information over others. 
3 Social choice theory is concerned with the analysis of 
conditions under which heterogeneous preferences might be 
aggregated to generate stable choices. This literature suggests 
that stable choices are only possible when individual 
preferences are constrained in some way. The structure of 
constraints on preferences provides an important focus for the 
present study. Further$ the criterion embedded in social 
choices can be modelled as maximisation of social welfare. 
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Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes" reviews 
empirical studies in which the political dimension is the primary 
focus. of interest. The context is characterised as one of 
heterogeneous interest groups, collectively known as the 
constituency. An important feature of the studies reviewed is 
shown to be their interest in the nature and preferences of the 
constituency. 
The study of the political dimension in professional accounting 
standards setting processes is shown to be at an early stage of 
development. Promise is held out for the use of some theoretical 
constructs from disciplines other than accounting and economics 
and potential ap plicability of US studies to the UK is 
demonstrated. 
In summary, Part II "Review of previous research in accounting 
and economics" shows that the problem of investigating UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes has been 
substantially illuminated by the changing perspective of previous 
research studies. The description of the UK ASC provided in 
Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards Committee" encompasses not 
only an accounting activity of specific technical matters being 
resolved by a profession's own committee of expertal but also an 
accounting activity with economic, political and professional 
dimensions. 
The economic rationale for participation is not sufficient to 
explain the resultant choices of professional accounting 
standards. Firstly, the aggregation of individual preferences is 
indeterminate and, secondly, there exists no unique social 
preference function-by which that indeterminacy can be resolved. 
It follows that an exploration of factors which might be used to 
explain the processes by which UK professional accounting 
standards are determined can be characterised as an investigation 
of a social choice process in which non-economiC criteria play an 
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important part. An important focus for the present study is the 
structure of constraints on preferences. Such is the rationale 
for the existence of a political dimension to professional 
accounting standards setting processes* 
The empirical studies have provided a valuable introduction to 
the political dimension, but a substantial contribution to theory 
construction is, as yet, undeveloped. In particular, the 
contributions of other disciplines, from which some explanatory 
concepts have been adopted, have been inadequately explored. 
Rather, isolated concepts have been introduced with limited 
discussion of their origins. The present study seeks to redress 
that defect in the review of literature from disciplines other 
than accounting*and economics. 
2.1.3 Review of literature from disciplines other than accounting 
and economics 
Scientific choice Processes 
Two analyses lead to a consideration of the literature of 
scientific choice processes in Chapter 11 "Scientific choice 
processes". Firstly, in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the 
political dimension in professional accounting standards setting 
processes", is found the distinction between scientific and 
political styles of decision making; and the argument that 
professional accounting standards setting processes are both 
scientific and political. Secondly, in Chapter 12 "Political 
choice processes", is found the distinction between ýrational 
policy, organisational process and bureaucratic politics as three 
different models of political decisibn making; and the argument 
that the rational policy model is the rational selection of an 
alternative from among a number of alternatives in order * 
to 
maximise the objectives, or criteriak of a "decision unit". This 
latter is the scientific choice model. 
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In the review it is shown that the literature on scientific 
choice processes is well developed. It is founded on a basic 
assumption concerning the nature of preferences, or criteria, 
namely that there exists a unique and determinable criterion. 
This assumption makes problematic its application to social 
sciences in general, and*to professional accounting standards 
setting processes in particular. So then, formal decision 
theoretic choice processes are seen to be insufficient to explain 
professional accounting standards setting choice processes 
because of ambiguity of choice criterion inherent in the 
heterogeneous preference structure of the social environment. 
political choice Processes 
A consideration of the literature of political choice processes 
in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes" stems from the 
increasing recognition being given to the political dimension in 
the literature on the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. Although this increasing recognition is clear, the 
accounting literature is limited in as much as it does not 
address the nature of ýodels implied by such a characterisation. 
One or two constructs, such as "power" and "coalition formation", 
have been identified but only in isolation from their underlying 
frameworks. The review of political choice processes seeks to 
redress the resulting imbalance. 
For the purposes of the review, the political science literature 
is characterised as being subdivided into three separately 
identifiable schools, namely those on decision making, political 
institutions and power respectively. Political choice processes 
are seen to offer an interesting duality of approach to social 
choice. On the one hand preference structures are assumed to be 
given and then an analysis of consititutional rules and 
procedures throws light on the nature of social equilibria. On 
the other hand, analysis of models of choice found in the 
organisational choice process literature throws light on the 
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dynamic nature of preference structures. 
Orstanisational choice Processes 
Two analyses lead to a consideration of the literature of 
organisational choice processes in Chapter 13 "Organisational 
choice processes". Firstly, in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of 
the political dimension in professional accounting standards 
setting processes", is found the characterisation of the US 
professional accounting standards setting processes as being, in 
parts an organisational choice process. Secondly, in Chapter 12 
"Political choice processes", is found the argument that the 
organisational process model is implied in much political 
analysis. Additionally, authors such as Hopwood 11983 & 19781, 
Coopers Hayes & Wolf [19811 and Hofstede [19811 argue for an 
organisational perspective for the study of accounting. 
The review shows that the literature on organisational choice 
processes is both well developed and undergoing a process of 
change to models which attempt to cope with ambiguity of outcome 
and of preference. Such models offer considerable promise for 
the investigation of the professional accounting standard. s 
setting processes. 
Organisational choice processes are seen to be insufficient to 
explain professional accounting standards setting processes 
completely because of the ambiguity both of choice criteria and 
of causal relationship. A*partial explanation may be available in 
as much as the choice opportunity is an occasion in which 
preference structures themselves may be changed; the outcome 
being a new preference structure rather than a new action, or any 
one or both of these. 
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Professionalisation Processes 
Three analyses lead to a consideration of the literature of 
professionalisation processes in Chapter 14 "Professionalisation 
processes". Firstly, in the Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the 
political dimension in professional accounting standards setting 
processes"s is found the argument that ptofessionalisation 
processes encourage professions to strive to keep technical, or 
scientific, decisions away from intervention by outsiders. Such 
decisions are said to be subject to intervention by veto. 
Secondly, in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes", is found 
the argument that the concept of morality has permeated much 
political analysis. The subsequent review suggests that the 
concept is implied in partial structurings of preferences such as 
is the case in the process of professionalisation. Thirdly, in 
Chapter 13 "Organisational choice processes"s is found the 
argument that four such choice processes can be distinguished. Of 
these, the "judgemental" choice process is seen to be linked to 
the professionalisation literature to the extent that judgements 
are made by individuals in the roles of professionals in 
organisations. 
The review explores the framework implied by the notion of 
professionalisation. Professional accounting standards setting 
processes are in part an integral component of the 
professionalisation, process attributable to many occupational 
groups. The literature of the sociology of professions helps 
understand that process. Professionalisation processes are seen 
to impose a strong structuring on the preferences of the members 
of a profession and on the preferences of individuals outside*the 
profession. 
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In summaryl Part III "Review of literature from disciplines other 
than accounting and economics" shows that there are different 
frameworks from which it is possible to investigate the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes. Further, the 
literature does not present any rational basis by which any one 
such framework may be selected in preference to any other. In the 
concluding sections, an integration of these frameworks is 
proposed within which future research studies might usefully be 
conducted. The proposal puts forward the professionalisation 
process framework as 'the primary framework within which the 
political choice sub-framework is embedded. The political choice 
framework is itself divided into two sub-sub-frameworks, namely 
the Shepsle committee structure framework and the organisational 
process framework. 
2.1.4 Uidence from the emvirical stud3E of UK data 
-The empirical part of the present study f ocusses narrowly on a 
single element within the framework proposed in the concluding 
sections of Part III "Review of literature from disciplines other 
than accounting and economics". The study contributes to the 
trend of increasing recognition being given to the political 
dimension by developing a formal model of one stage of the 
professional accounting standards setting processes. As such$ it 
can be viewed as a contribution to an elaboration of the Shepsle 
committee structure analysis. This is in the sense that the 
study is a description of an equilibrium outcome of a committee 
in operation. Alternatively, it can be viewed as an elaboration 
of the organisational process frameworkin the sense that it is a 
description of one of the stages of a multi-staged process. 
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The model presented is based on a political choice process, 
namely, that of the simple majority voting system. This is used 
as a framework for the empirical investigation. The model 
follows from the adoption of a naive political framework in which 
the professional accounting standards setting processes are 
characterised by a simple majority, one-man one-vote, voting 
model. Within this model, primary hypotheses are deduced which 
are concerned with the relationship between the stated 
preferences of participants and the outcome of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes. In summary these are 
R, there exists a relationship between the probability of a 
CHANGE and the direction of the absolute majority vote (AMV) 
on any particular proposal; and 
H2 there exists a relationship between the probability of a 
CHANGE and the size of the absolute majority vote (AMV) on any 
particular proposal; and 
H3 there exists a relationship between the class to which a 
participant belongs and the response of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes to that participant's 
preferences. I 
At a very elementary level, the model addresses the questions 
"Are the UK professional accounting standards setting processes 
in any sense political? "; "Do votes count? "; and "If so, how? ". 
The presentation of the model seeks to achieve a rigorous 
analysis and an algebraic formulation is adopted. This is 
supplemented by tables, graphs and verbal statements of the 
central points. * Two contributions of the model are the 
development of the concepts of "influence" and "Sensitivity" each 
of which, necessarily, are given precise meanings within the 
context of this particular model. The research approach and 
method sections describe how the testing of the hypotheses 
developed in the naive voting model has been implemented. In 
particular, working definitions of the variables issue, proposal, 
CHANGE, and Absolute Majority Vote (AMV) are presented; and the 
criteria for the selection of data are discussed. The underlying 
technique for data generation was that of content analysis the 
steps used are set out in some detail. 
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The primary hypotheses are tested by implementing a series of 
tests each based on a separate null hypothesis. These tests 
ensure an orderly and systematic approach to the subsequent data 
analysis. The treatment of outliers in the data is discussed and 
it is seen that some of the outliers offer opportunities for 
further research. 
A brief note is provided describing the implementation of data 
generation, the use of a pilot study and implementation of 
analysis on a large mainframe computer with an "unfriendly" 
operating system. The role of microcomputers in this study is 
described. 
The Tesults -sections set out the results obtained from the 
application of the model to data obtained from the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes. 
The data base is described first in terms of elementary aggregate 
statistics such as total numbers of data cases; of ORIGINAL and 
AMENDMENT proposals; of written comments on Exposure Drafts; and 
of votes cast. Each of these being broken down by Issue and 
Exposure Draft. 
Also are set out in some detail the contingency tables which 
describe the data. In very general terms, tests address the 
questions "Do votes count? " and "If so, how? ". The detailed 
formulation of the tests is set out in the research approach and 
method sections. The results distinguish between ORIGINAL and 
AMENDMENT proposals. 
The contingency tables are followed by scattergraph an4 linear 
regression results, but only to the extent that the contingency 
tables themselves suggest the existence of a significant 
relationship. The regression results, in very general terms, ask 
the question "If votes count, do they have an increasing linear 
influence? ". 
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Each of the above results is presented for the data base as a 
complete set* A more interesting analysis follows in which the 
data are disaggregated across differing classes. These results, 
in very general terms, ask the question "Are there any 
differences between classes of participant? ". The results for 
these tests are presented conveniently in summary tables. The 
main disaggregation classes are 
by Issue: accounting for associated companies; accounting for 
investment properties; accounting for foreign currency 
translations; group accounts; and accounting for 
contingencies and events occurring after the balance 
sheet date (IAS14); and 
by Group: companies; professional firms of accountants; 
representative bodies of accountants; other 
representative bodies; and others 
The results are interesting. Votes do count; and they have an 
increasing linear influence. There are small differences 
between the influence of any class of participants; but there are 
significant differences between the sensitivity of the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes to marginal 
changes in the absolute majority vote of some classes of 
participants. In particulars the measure of sensitivity is some 
three times greater for professional firms of accountants and 
representative bodies of accountants than for companies. 
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2.2 SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AMD ECONOMICS 
2.2.1 Introduction 
As yet, there exists no substantial body of research which 
addresses the factors which might be used to explain the 
processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined. This study draws on a body of research that has been 
conducted in the USA, and a small, but growing, body of 
UK literature addressing the UK processes directly. 
2.2.2 The political dimension and economic consequences 
Over the period from the early 1970's to the early 1980's, the US 
research studies which are concerned with professional accounting 
standards setting processes have moved away from a conventional, 
technicals characterisation of those processes. That 
characterisation concerned the resolution of technical issues 
using well established criteria which apply to accounting 
information ver se. The processes are coming to be seen as 
possessing a political dimension and that dimension is explained, 
at least, as being generated by the economic consequences of a 
change in professional accounting practice. A change in the 
measurement or disclosure of accounting information results in 
economic agents changing their decisions. This has consequent 
wealth and welfare generation and redistribution effects. 
Thus a new perspective is evident in these studies. The 
professional accounting standards setting processes have been 
characterised as 
1 an accounting policy-making process; and 
2a political process; and 
3a diffusion of innovation process; and 
4a social choice process. 
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Professional accounting standards setting processes are 
acknowledged as possessing not only a technical dimension but 
also a political dimension. The technical dimension can be said 
to focus on the rational selection of accounting practices based 
on the established body of knowledge available to accountants* 
As such the technical dimension is analogous to scientific 
enquiry whereby new practices or knowledge are sought within the 
framework of existing theoretical understanding, implied or 
otherwise. 
The political dimension can be said 
accounting practices based on the 
The general processes, by which 
translated into selections, are 
researchers in a number of di 
sciences. 





the selection of 
of individuals. 
pref erences are 
of interest tc 
ithin the social 
The underlying importance of professional accounting standards 
setting processes is attributable to the economic consequences of 
changes in professional accounting standards. These changes 
generate economic consequences which have subsequent wealth and 
welfare generation and redistribution effects and which in some 
cases can be significant. Individuals have preferences concerning 
where the benefits or redistributions are to fall. The 
expression of these preferences in a forum which had hitherto 
been regarded as an exclusively technical forum caused some 
debate in the US accounting profession. In the UK accounting 
profession, there is evidence that these preferences may well 
underly the technical debate. 
Chapter 2 Page 16 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
Given that wealth and welfare generation and redistribution 
properties exist, then professional accounting standards setting 
processes can be characterised as a policy-making process in 
which it is impossible to meet individual preferences by using 
solely technical criteria. Intentional wealth and welfare 
redistributions might be made using professional accounting 
standards setting processes as processes of social engineering in 
which the adoption of a new professional standard accounting 
practice is characterised as a diffusion of innovation process. 
2.2.3 Under1ling economic-processes 
The information economics literature, which is essentially 
analytic in nature, suggests that the very subject matter of 
professional accounting standards setting proces 
* 
ses, namely 
corporate information, is a resource the possession of which 
enables economic agents to realise gains at the expense of 
others. That is, it has. inherent economic consequences. It is 
concerned both with the effects of changes in the information set 
on the underlying capital and product markets; and with the 
possible properties of a market for information itself. ' 
In the first case, individuals are seen to stand to gain 
significantly from the possession of private information. In the 
absence of regulation, some sort of audited, financial statements 
would be expected because accounting information is generated 
privately. Speculative gains can be realised by subsequent 
publication of the information in a form in which it is credible. 
There is evidence of such published accounting information iv 
unregulated markets in the form of audited financial statements. 
The trading activities of individuals with private information 
are essentially highly de-stabilising, and any resultant 
equilibria are not likely to be Pareto-optimal. Such an analysis 
is generating a reconsideration of the nature of general 
equilibrium economics. 
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In the second case, the properties of a market for information 
are explored in order to determine its possible equilibrium 
properties and, in particular, the conditions under which such a 
market would be Pareto-optimal. 
These two analyses are seen to be mutually inconsistent, the 
primary distinction being the extent to which information is 
assumed not to possess consumption externalities and so support a 
clear demand for information as a tradeable good. Under the 
existing institutional structure, accounting information clearly 
possesses externalities and so the characterisation of a market 
for information is of little relevance to the present study. 
Comparison of market and non-market based information allocation 
processes suggests that there is no rational economic basis for 
selecting between processes. Some are Pareto-optimal, others 
only approximate Pareto-optimality and, in each, some sort of 
constitutional safeguard is required to protect the "public 
interest". The economic analysis leaves unanswered the problem of 
identifying the public interest. 
A review of the proposals for differing institutional 
arrangements for selecting professional accounting standards 
highlights the fundamental distinction between the two 
information economic perspectives. Some institutional 
arrangements assume the existence of consumption externalities 
and attempt to overcome the related problem of "market failure" 
by adopting non-market solutions. These arrangements include 
expert opinion, voting schemes and taxation regimes. On the 
other hand, other institutional arrangements assume that 
consumption externalities can be el2. Mlnated by appropriate 
changes to the system of property rights. These latter 
arrangements are essentially free market solutions. ' From the 
var . iety of different possible institutional arrangements can be 
drawn two observations 
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1 the "expert opinion" arrangement most closely matches the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes; and 
2 the different arrangements possess different properties and 
objectives. Future studies might be able to address themselves 
to the problem of discovering to what extent the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes reflect any 
or all of those properties and objectives. 
Previous research, other than information economics, has been 
considered under the headings of rational choice theory; agency 
theory; and social choice theory. 
An understanding of these other economic processes underlying the 
incidence of the economic consequences of changes in professional 
accounting standards is important. It facilitates an 
understanding of the factors which determine the preferences of 
individuals and so their participation in the professional 
accounting standards setting, processes. I 
The rational choice theoretic research is essentially analytic in 
nature. It has demonstrated, on the basis of a reasonable 
individual expected utility maximisatiou criterion, that it is 
not possible to construct any set of professional accounting 
standards selection criteria which would guarantee maximisation 
of an individual's expected utility without that set of criteria, 
in some way, taking account of that individual's preferences. 
This result has been criticised on the grounds that its 
assumptions are unnecessarily restrictive. If the even more 
restrictive assumption is made that the individual's preference 
function is additively separable, then it is sufficient to select 
professional accounting standards sequentially without 
considering the effects of interaction with existing professional 
standards. Recognition of heterogeneity of preferences in a 
multi-person context immediately establishes a conflict ýetween 
individuals, or classes of individuals, with no subsequent 
agreement on the desirability of any given accounting information 
set. 
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The agency theoretic research is also analytic in nature, but 
empirical work has been conducted based on the analytic 
framework. Managements own wealth is seen to. be dependent upon 
professional accounting standards through such factors as non- 
pecuniary benefits and remuneration contracts which are based on 
the firm's income. In particular, managements are characterised 
as having incentives to enter into contracts to publish audited 
accounting information. Having entered into these contractst 
management then has incentives to either support or oppose 
proposals to change professional accounting standards. These 
incentives are dependent on characteristics of the firms. It is 
an open question' whether or not the agency framework can 
adequately predict managements' position in relation to specific 
proposals. In the case of inflation accounting, the behaviour of 
management in the US professional accounting standards setting 
processes has been shown to be consistent with agency theoretic 
predictions but a replication in the UK failed to generate 
unambiguous evidence. 
In brief then, under the existing institutional arrangements, 
public accounting information is essentially a' supply-side 
phenomenon, with strong economic incentives for individuals to 
supply, but no economic incentives for individuals to demand. 
Having contracted to supply accounting information, managements 
have additional incentives to prefer some accounting information 
over other accounting information. In a multi-person, utility- 
maximising setting, there is no set of criteria by which a unique 
solution can be determined to the problem of choice among 
alternatives, for accounting information. 
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The social choice theoretic research seeks to analyse the 
structurq of choices which are made under these conditions of 
indeterminacy. Arrow first identified a minimum set of conditions 
under which this indeterminacy would hold and so implicitly 
identified the need for additional constraints. One such 
constraint, the "single-peakeduess" of preferences, had already 
been identified. In general terms, Arrow's first condition, that 
all logically possible orderings of the alternative social states 
are admissible, is the one condition subject to violation by 
additional constraint. The inadmissibility of some alternative 
social states can be illustrated simply by drawing attention to 
the existence of laws prohibiting some alternative behaviours. 
Embedded in the social choice theoretic research is the social. 
welfare maximisation criterion. It can be. argued that social 
welfare maximisation is related to social conflict minimisation 
and that evidence of increasing social conflict is Prima facie 
evidence of non-optimality of social welfare. The equity (or 
fairness or justice) criterion can be equated with the conflict 
minimisation criterion and there is evidence. that such a 
criterion is institutionalised in the UK Civil Service. 
2.2.4 Emvirical studies of the Political dimension 
There are some empirical studies of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes. The 
dimension is political in the sense that preferences amongst 
individuals are not homogeneous and choices are made by some non- 
economic procedure designed to be responsive to those individual 
preferences. 
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In the overtly political environment of US regulation, vested 
interests adopt accounting theories to advocate their positions 
before Congress, the SEC and the FASB. In general, the various 
interest groups that make up-the constituency of the FASB approve 
of the role of the FASB as a policy-making body and participate 
in its processes willingly and positively. There is some 
heterogeneity of preferences within the constituency. There is 
also evidence of heterogeneity of preferences and of perceptions 
on four higher-order issues: 
1 the Government should not have a significant role in the 
accounting standards setting processes; 
2 accounting standards should be left primarily to the company 
and its auditor; 
3 the quality of accountants' work should be a private-sector 
responsibility; and 
4 accounting standards should be based on a conceptual framework 
and on economic reality. 
There is a partial relationship between the written expression of 
preferences and the outcome of the process. The potential 
applicability of the US analytic framework to the UK is 
demonstrated; but the relationship between written preferences 
and final outcomes may not be as strong . in the'UK as in the US. 
The US "Big Eight" professional accounting firms possess 
disproportionately great power as measured by voting strengths; 
but this is not unambiguously translated into winning coalitions 
as measured by voting patterns. 
Characterisiug the professional accounting standards setting 
processes as an organisational decision-making process is useful, 
but additional considerations of conflict' resolution and of 
sociology of professions are important. In the organisational 
characterisation, concepts of decision-making and conflict 
resolution, to be found in the literature of organisation 
theorists, are adopted. Extending this characterisation, the 
choice process is botý political and scientific in nature. The 
professional dimension, implies that scientifics or technical, 
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choices will be kept within a profession but will always be 
subject to external approval, modification or veto. The 
relationship between a political style and a scientific, or 
technical, style of policy-making process is discussed; the 
political and scientific styles are argued to be inseparable. 
The usefulnesss and validity, of a self-interest assumption 
applied to participants in the professional accounting standards 
setting processes is addressed. In particularl these studies have 
found that the evidence is consistent with such an assumption. 
Some of the work has been in the nature of attitude survey. 
Emphasis has been placed on the nature and structure of the 
"constituency" of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. For example, the US Financial Accounting Foundation 
(FAF) argued that the US constituency was inadequately 
understood. Subsequent studies investigated the preference 
structure in response to the FAF argument. The contribution to 
theory construction is limited because relationships between 
attitudes and behaviour are little understood. However, these 
studies are useful to the extent that they have provided evidence 
of the heterogeneity of preferences which underlie the political 
dimension. Further, some of the studies have established 
usefulness of the technique of content analysis as applied to the 
written comments on Exposure Drafts submitted to the accounting 
standards setting body. 
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2.3 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PREVIOUS RESEACH 
I 
The problem of investigating UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes is substantially illuminated by the changing 
perspective of previous research studies. A description of the 
UK ASC is provided below in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards 
Committee". It encompasses not only an accounting activity of 
specific technical matters being resolved by a profession's own 
committee of experts, but also an accounting activity with 
economic, political and professional dimensions. Clearly, some of 
those dimensions are reflected in the literature. 
The economic dimension is the most strongly represented in the US 
literature; the political dimension less so. However, the 
professional dimension seems not to be represented. No US study 
has sought to investigate the way in which the accounting 
profession, as a profession, influences the accounting standards 
setting processes. The reason for this apparent lack of interest 
in the implications of the professional dimension is perhaps not 
difficult to identify. The US institutional arrangement changed 
in 1973 when the FASB, as an independent bodys took over the 
processes of setting accounting standards from the US accounting 
profession. Prior to that date, there was no serious US research 
int erest in accounting standards setting processes Per se. 
Of importance to the problem of'investigating UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes is the understanding that 
there are private gains available to those who both hold private 
information and can control the subsequent publication of that 
information. The existence of these gains arguably provides 
sufficient incentive for individuals to hold preferences in 
, 
favour of some classes of accounting information as against other 
classes. Clearly, it is possible to characterise management as 
holding private information and so they have incentives to seek 
to control its subsequent publication. A professional accounting 
standards setting programme will necessarily restrict the freedom 
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of management to exercise that control and so incentives exist 
for management to resist such a programme. Such is the economic 
rationale for participation in professional accounting standards 
setting processes. 
The economic rationale for participation is tot sufficient to 
explain the resultant choices of professional accounting 
standards. Firstly, the aggregation of individual preferences is 
indeterminate and, secondlyq there exists no unique -social 
preference function by which that indeterminacy can be resolved. 
It follows that the general problem of the present study can be 
characterised is an investigation of a social choice process in 
which non-economic criteria play an important part. Such is the 
rationale for the existence of a political dimension to 
professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Given that there is no unique solution to the problem of choice 
amongst alternatives, for accounting information, there is a 
natural and clear interest in the structure of the present, 
existing, solution. Consideration of the different institutional 
arrangements under which professional accounting standards might 
be selected suggests the following areas for further research 
specifically based on existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes: 
1 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate the Pareto-optimality criterion? 
2 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes overcome incentives to misrepresent 
preferences? 
3 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate a power dominated objective? 
The theoretical frameworks being developed in a predominantly US 
orientated jiterature have potential application to the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes. Clearly 
then, an adequate explanation of the UK professional accounting 
standards setting processes must take into account the political 
nature of those processes. 
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Empirical studies to date have provided a valuable introduction 
to the study of the political dimension in professional 
accounting standards setting processes, but a substantial 
contribution to theory construction is, as yet, undeveloped. In 
particular, the contributions of other disciplines, from which 
some explanatory concepts have been adopted, - 'have been 
inadequately explored. Rather, isolated concepts have been 
introduced with little discussion of their origins. - The present 
study seeks to redress that defect in Part IV "Review of 
literature from disciplines other than accounting and economics" 
in order to more fully appreciate their meaning and potential 
application to UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes. 
Precedents set by US studies suggest that a fruitful empirical 
study based on UK data could be conducted by the use of content 
analysis of written comments on Exposure Drafts. Some 
preliminary work conducted on UK data has provided strong support 
for the usefulness of such an analysis. The present study 
addresses this task in Part IV "Evidence from the empirical study 
of UK data". 
This area of research is yet in its infancy and some gaps are 
evident. For example, no resear cher has attempted to 
systematically observe several stages of the UK professional 
accounting standards setting process; the only information we 
have to date comprises anecdotes from participants and bland 
procedural statements from official publications. No researcher 
has attempted to systematically test hypotheses over a broad 
range of accounting issues; the inflation accounting issue has 
provided a strong attraction and possibly introduced a systematic 
bias into the results to date* No researcher-has convincingly 
studied the roles, or perceptions, of participants in -the 
process. Finally# only two studies have used the bank of data 
available in the UK as letters of comment to the ASC. These 
letters are fileds on public record, at the Library of the 
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Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales. The two 
studies have addressed one issue each, one of which was inflation 
accounting. 
Changes in professional accounting standards, such as the 
publication of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice by the 
UK professional accountancy bodies, have important wealth and 
welfare generation and redistribution properties. It follows 
that an understanding of how professional accounting standards 
decisions are made represents an important issue of social 
policy-making. The underlying economic processes are well 
understood. This contrasts with the underlying political 
processes, which are poorly understood and little researched by 
accountants* 
Two questions arise naturally from the previous research 
1 are the theoretical constructs, from disciplines other than 
accounting and economics, that have been identified in the 
previous research capable of contributing to a comprehensive 
explanation of professional accounting standards setting 
processes in the UK? 
2 what is the relationship between the written statements of 
preference and the final outcome in the UK? 
In order to begin to answer these questions, evidence of two 
types appears to be called for 
1 evidence that the theoretical constructs from disciplines other 
than accounting and economics are adequately supported by the 
literature of these disciplines and have implications which are 
meaningful in the context of professional accounting standards 
setting processes in the UK; 
n 2 empirical evidence of professional accounting sta dards setting 
processes in the UK. 
A substantial investment is required in understanding the 
political processes. The present study is devoted to 
systematically gathering those two classes of evidence through 
the two-fold approach of 
1 reviewing analyses from the literature of disciplines other 
than accounting and economics. This investment is undertaken 
and documented in Part III "Review of literature from 
disciplines other than accounting and economics"; and 
2 generating empirical evidence from professional accounting 
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standards setting processes in operation in the UK. This 
investment is undertaken and documented in Part IV "Evidence 
from the empirical study of UK data". 
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CE[APTER 3 THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE 
3.1 IMMODUCTION 
Mills [19611 argues that no social phenonema Can be usefully 
investigated without considering the historical perspective. In 
particular, he is concerned that many such phenomena are of such 
complexity that the outcomes can only be understood by fully 
appreciating that historical perspective. The sociological view 
of Mills is supported by the views of students of politics; such 
as Lindblom [19591, who argue that an understanding of the 
outcomes 6f political processes can only begin to'be attempted 
once the historical development of events leading to that outcome 
has been determined. It is with the benefit of these wisdoms 
that this study starts by embarking on an historical review. 
The nature and history of events leading up to the formation of 
the Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) in the UK is well 
documented in Leach & Stamp (Eds)'[19811, Zeff (19721 and Stamp 
Marley [1970]. Only a brief review is presented here. 
6 
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3.2 EARLY HISTORY 
The history of corporate accounting throughout the world and, in 
particular, in the UK is inseparably bound into the history of 
the development of corporations, or more generally, 
organisationst and their environments. A review of the early 
history of accounting is provided by, for example, Chatfield 
[19741 and Bird [1973, pp. 15-281. In the rapidly changing 
commercial environment of corporations two major dimensions of 
change can be identified. 
Firstlys new classes of transactions have been introduced for 
which novel accounting treatments have been required. Examples 
include the advent of hire pur6hase agreements, the issue of 
shares on listed securities markets, forward contracts for sale 
or purchase of goods, long term construction contracts in high 
technology areas, indirect holdings of rights in other 
corporations either as majority or minority shareholders. 
Secondly, new classes of persons interested in financial 
statements have evolved. Originally financial statements were 
the private records of the proprietor of the business adventure. 
With the advent of listed securities markets, -new "proprietors" 
arose who retained only partial ownership and who perhaps 
exercised no executive functions at all. The advent of long term 
contracts implied that customers were interested in assessing the 
corporation's ability to supply and-maintain its products over a 
long time horizon. The advent of organised labour and trade 
unions implied that employees were interested in a corporation's 
ability to pay an acceptable price for that labour. The advent 
of organised media implied that the public could be encouraged to 
be interested in corporate affairs if they were sufficiently 
spectacular or entertaining; in the following section it is shown 
that the collapse of household name corporations or the 
activities of high financiers in take-over battles have proved to 
be sufficient. These new groups of interested personss that is, 
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for example, non-executive proprietors, long-term contract 
customerss trade unions and the media, clearly have a right to, 
or are able to demand by threat of some sanction, financial 
information by way of accounting statements. The non-executive 
proprietors can withdraw their capital, the long-term contract 
customers can take their custom elsewhere, the trade unions can 
withdraw their labour and the media can undertake "investigative 
journalism". Each is able to demand some extent of financial 
information as part of the price for their continued 
participation in the organisation's well-being. 
Of interest to accountants, however, is the interaction of these 
two dimensions of change, that is, new classes of transactions 
and new classes of interested persons, with their body of 
technical knowledge. Like any intellectual discipline, 
accounting knowledge is changed mostly by two agencies, firstly 
the agency of responsibility for production and secondly the 
agency of abstract reasoning. In the UK, corporate legislation 
has conventionally placed responsibility for production in the 
hands of corporate management. Responsibility for abstract 
reasoning in accounting has, until only very recently in England 
and somewhat earlier in Scotland and the USA, been neglected by 
the very institutions which for centuries Western Europe has 
charged with the development of virtually all abstract reasoning, 
namely the universities. Necessarily then, the institutional 
structure we find in the UK implies that the role of accounting 
innovator will be filled by corporate management, as producer of 
financial statements. 
Implicit in the above description is the inference thatt in the 
absence of any unifying agency, there is to be expected a wide 
variability in -accounting practice as corporate managements 
innovate according to their own circumstances. The following 
sections show that expectation to be fulfilled. 
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3.3 RECENT HISTORY 
Standards of accounting practice came to the attention of the 
British public in 1931 when the "Royal Mail" case received 
widespread publicity and became infamous . The Royal Mail Steam 
Packet Company was at that time audited by Price Waterhouse & Co 
and the chairman of the board of directors, Lord, Kylsantq had 
over a number of years been taking advantage of the profession's 
attitude to the creation of secret reserves# The attitude of the 
day was that secret reserves, in which the amounts at which 
assets are disclosed are intentionally understated, gave 
companies hidden strength on which they could draw in times of 
temporary decline. The Royal Mail concealed losses, or lower than 
expected profits, by making transfers from secret reserves into 
its profit and loss account. The decline of the Royal Mail was 
somewhat worse than temporary and$ after a Government enquiry, a 
charge of fraud was preferred. Details of the case are well 
covered in Hastings [19491 and here it is only necessary to point 
out that the public debate which this event generated caused the 
profession, in particular the Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in England and Wales (English Institute), considerable 
embarrassment. 
In 1941 a Government committee set out to review the Companies 
Acts; a review which eventually resulted in the Companies Act 
1948, the principal legislation on company regulation for -at 
least the next quarter-century. During that'reviews it became 
clear to the English Institute that unless they acted to improve 
standards of reporting then this committee was likely to 
recommend substantial legislative control of professional 
accounting standards. Zeff [1972, pp. 7-91 notes that concurrently 
there were moves for reform within the English Institute and 
these two major factors, that iss the covert threat of 
legislative control of the profession's technical domain and 
internal moves for reform, resulted in publication, in December 
1942, of a series of "Recommendations on Accounting". This 
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series, which was to reach 29 in number, was designed to 
recommend to English Institute members preferred accounting 
practice in such areas as accounting for tax reserve 
certificates, war damage, depreciation, stocks, rising price 
levels, form and presentation of accounts, consolidated accounts 
and events occurring after the balance sheet date. These were 
areas in which considerable ambiguity existed in the set of 
existing conventions and consequently a wide diversity of 
practice could be found in the contemporary external financial 
reports of corporate management. The complete list of these 
recommendations is reproduced as Appendix 3.1 at the end of this 
chapter. In a separate statement [ICAEW 1942] the English 
Institute's Council, that is, its governing body, made it clear 
that the series represented only beat practice and was not 
considered mandatory on its members. In particular, it stated 
that "it is, of course, a matter for each individual member to 
consider his responsibility in regard to accounts presented by 
directors" (P. 354). 
At least one body of research examines the degree to which these 
recommendations were followed by corporate management in 
practice. The annual "Survey of published accounts", published 
by the English Institute from March 1970 reviews corporate 
reporting practices and includes these recommendations within its 
scope as part of the general background of literature against 
which practice is compared. The early issues of this surveys 
which commenced with the issue for 1968/69 [ICAEW 1970B], refers 
substantially- to the "Recommendat ions" (by then known as "N" 
statements by virtue of their classification in the "Members 
Handbook" issued to English Institute members). 
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3.4 THE 1960's 
The late 1950's and the 1960's in the UK saw an increased level 
of activity in corporate mergers and acquisitions. In addition 
there were a number of spectacular corporate crashes. These have 
been well documented elsewhere (for example, especially Stamp & 
Marley [19701). It is important to appreciate the effects of 
these events on public opinion and in particular to be aware of 
the role of external financial reports in the formulation of that 
public opinion. 
In 1958 British Aluminium, was a company with a number of 
potential take-over "suitors". In addition, there were other 
take-over battles involving the London store of Harrods and, 
separately, the brewing organisation of Watneys. Each of these, 
issues attracted considerable interest on the part of the media 
and, it must be inferred, the public. Public awareness of the 
activities of the business community or certainly these 
particular activities, was heightened and consequently for much 
of the next decade press comment on major financial issues was 
commonplace. Stamp & Marley [pp. 11-19,25-40,48-56 and 68-711 
chronicle the events of Pye in 1966, Courtauldso GEC-AEI and 
Metal Industries in 1967, International Paints9 Gallaher and 
Pergamon-News of the World each'in 1968 and Pergamon-Leasco in 
1969. The primary theme running through each of these issues was 
the behaviour of the London stock markets, the market traders and 
the advisors 'of the competing factions in the struggles for 
control of the companies in question. However, a secondary theme 
underlying these be'haviours was, as Lord Kearton of Courtaulds 
highlighted in a press conference in June 1968 shortly after his 
public censuring at the hands of the City Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers, the distinct lack of information concerning the 
companies involved. It is in this latter theme that the UK 
accounting profession, in particular the English Institutes came 
to the attention of the public. For it was alleged that where 
information was available it was invariably inaccurate or 
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misleading. The prime focus of attention was the profit 
forecast. It was used by AEI in its defence against GEC, used by 
Dufay in its attack on International Paints and used by Pergamon 
during its acquisition campaign for News of the World These 
forecasts are, by their very nature as p; edictions in an 
uncertain world, liable to misunderstanding by the public and 
misuse by vested interests. Nevertheless the effect on public 
perceptions cannot be understated. The AEI forecast of 
E10 million profits for 1967 made in the tenth month of that year 
(Stamp & Marley 1970, p. 691 was converted later into a reported 
loss of E4.5 million by the new management. The effect of this 
single event on public perceptions was exemplary. 
More crucial to the criticisms of the profession were the public 
exposure of diversity of accounting practice, not only in profit 
forecasts but also in audited financial statements. . 
Stamp & 
Marley (ibid. ) point out that the 1966 accounts of Pye were less 
than fair. in their treatment of losses written-off which were 
concealed by disaggregating the total and treating the components 
under separate classifications; that dubious accounting practices 
of Pergamon were revealed slowly and unwillingly to Leasco's 
accountant advisors, Touche Ross, in 1969; that Dufay 
deliberately delayed publication of poor trading results in 1968 
[pp. 27-281; and that Rolls Razor, which crashed in 1964 [Zeff 
19729 p. 331 tried to blame its failure on the misleading 
practices of its auditors [Stamp & Marley 1970 p. 711. The outcome 
of these exposures was informed press comment. The Economist 
commented that "the system which has been exposed .... simply is 
not good enough" [30 August 19691; and the Guardian commented 
"that auditors are too ready to follow blindly the instructions 
of a Board .... without facing squarely the question of whether 
the methods are the right ones for proper conduct of the 
business and the protection of shareholders' interests" 
[22 October 19691. 
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It was a direct result of these reports, and otherss reviewed in 
Zeff [1972, pp. 33-40] that variability in external financial 
reports of corporate management became discredited in the public 
eye. In particular, a celebrated public exchange took place in 
the columns of the Times in September 1969 between Professor 
Edward Stamp then of Edinburgh University and Mr (later Sir) 
Ronald Leach as President of the English Institute. It is widely 
held [p. 391 that this single exchange was the catalyst in what 
would otherwise have been a much slower reaction. At this time 
the UK Government department responsible, namely the Board of 
Trade, was to apply pressure (pp. 39-401 to the English Institute 
to take action to improve standards of financial reporting or 
else risk being deprived of the initiative. The threat of 
Government intervention was again in the minds of the English 
Institutes some quarter of a century after the threat posed by 
the 1941 company law review. 
On 12 December 1969 the English Institute published a "Statement 
of Intent" announcing the estiblishing of an Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee with a stated objective to .. 
"narrov the areas of difference and variety in accounting 
practice by publishing authoritative statements on best 
accounting practice which vills vherever possible, be 
definitive" [ICAEW 1970A, p. 21* 
I 
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3.5 THE 1970's 
The 1970's in the UK was the first decade in the life of the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC) (the name was changed in 
1976). In that decade the ASC appears to have achieved much in 
attempting to meet its'stated objectives. The committee started 
life at its first meeting in March 1970 as a committee of the 
English Institute and immediately a list of projects, set out 
below in Appendix 3.2 "The Accounting Standards Committee: 
Projects identified in 1970". was drawn up as potentially 
suitable material for the subject matter of accounting standards. 
Some of these subjects were already on the agenda of the English 
Institute's Technical Committee as topics for the "Accounting 
recommendations" series. In that sense, ASC was fortunate in 
being able to inherit an existing portfolio of work in hand. The 
accounting standards published to date, the exposure drafts and 
the other publications of the ASC are set out below in Appendices 
3.3,3.4, and 3.5 as an indication of the subjects on which it 
has deliberated. From the outset, the English Institute intended 
that it should not be alone in the UK initiative to publish 
accounting standards. The Institutes of Chartered Acocuntants of 
Scotland and in Ireland became participating members from April 
1970 [Zeff 1972, p. 401. The Association of Certified Accountants 
and the Institute of Cost and Management Accountants both joined 
in 1971 ["Accounting standards 1980", ICAEW 1980A, p. 1]. By 1976 
the last of the six UK accountancy bodies, that iss the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancyt had decided to 
participate in the ASC. 
In 1978 the ASC decided that it should embark on a review of its 
activities in order to determine whether or not changes were 
required in the light of experience. A discussion document was 
published under the title "Setting accounting standards: A 
consultative document" [ASC 19781 inviting public comment. 
Reviewers received this as a "status quo" document [Lafferty 
1979, Stamp 1979 and Paterson & Smith 19791 so indicating the 
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ASC'*s own perception of successful performance to date. 
The method of operation of the ASC is discussed in more detail 
below. At this stage it is sufficient to note the procedure to 
be found in "Accounting Standards 1980" LICAEW 1980A, pp-4-71. A 
draft accounting standard is*prepared by an ASC working party 
and then exposed to the public for comment during a fixed period 
after which a final accounting standard, incorporating any 
comments the ASC considers suitable, is published by the Councils 
of the six accountancy bodies. In this final form the 
accounting standard is mandatory on the members of the UK 
accounting profession. 
Coincident with the launch of the ASC# the English Institute 
launched a research initiative in the publication of an annual 
survey of external financial reporting practices as evidenced in 
the published accounts of 300 major UK listed industrial firms. 
This initiative was numbered among those of Professor Stamp in 
Stamp & Marley [p. 1491. The annual survey is now an established 
part of the literature under the title "Survey of published 
accounts" [for exampleg ICAEW 1980B]. The implied objective of 
the survey was, in substance, to offset the perceived unbalanced 
public view of external financial reporting gained during the 
1960's as a result of the adverse press coverage. One effect of 
the series is that there exists a permanent record of the 
chronology of the effectiveness of the ASC in changing practice 
in the companies surveyed. 
The series of accounting standardso entitled Statements of 
Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP), from SSAPI to SSAP15 which 
were published in the decade of the 1970's has resulted, 
Drima facies in an improvement in external financial reporting 
practice. For example, SSAP2 "Disclosure of accounting policies" 
became effective for accounting periods commencing on or after 1 
January 1972. "Survey of published accounts 1980" [ICAEW 1980B, 
P-1511 records that in 1972/73 only 189 of the sample of 300 
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companies disclosed their accounting policies together in one 
annexed statement or note to the accounts. By 1979/80 294 of the 
sample of 300 companies had adopted the practice of systematic 
disclosure in one statement or note (ibid. ). Further, ', 'Survey of 
published accounts 1980" shows that all the 300 companies it 
reviews published audited statements of source and application of 
funds in that year, whereas "Survey of published accounts 
1968/69" [ICAEW 1970B] shows that only one of those 300 companies 
published an audited statement of source and application of funds 
in that earlier year. In the earlier year a further 20 of the 
300 companies published unaudited statements of sources and 
applications of funds. The accounting standard requiring 
publication' of these statements was published in 1975. In the 
case of accounting for changing price levels, "Survey of 
published accounts 1980" shows that one of the 300 companies 
published supplementary current purchasing power (CPP) statements 
and 100 companies published supplementary current cost accounting 
(CCA) statements during that year, whereas "Survey of published 
accounts 1975" [ICAEW 1976] shows that 48 companies published 
supplementary CCA' statements during that earlier year. The 
accounting standard requiring publication of supplementary CPP 
statements, PASSP7, was published in 1974. It was later 
withdrawn -and an accounting standard requiring publication of 
supplementary CCA statements, SSAP16, was published in 1980. 
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3.6 THE 1980's 
The ASC entered the 1980"s with a continued programme of 
publishing (through its governing bodies) accounting standards 
with the aim of reducing variability in, and implicitly improving 
the quality of, external financial reporting. The accounting 
standards which have been published to 30 June 1983-are set out 
below in Appendix 3.3 "Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice published". 
In particular, March 1980 saw the publication of a SSAP16 
"Current cost accounting". October 1981 saw ED29 "Accounting for 
leases and hire purchase contracts" and April 1983 saw SSAP20 
"Accounting for foreign currency translations". Each of these 
three topics proved to be particularly controversial and are 
among those listed below in Appendix 3.1 "Recommendations on 
accounting principles published by the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales". 
Additionally, a review of the standards setting processes started 
with the publication of "Setting accounting standards: A 
consultative document" (ASC 19781. This review resulted in the 
amended constitution of July 1982 discussed below in Section 3.7 
"Constitutional establishment *and committee operation" and the 
publication of "Review of the standard setting process: A report 
by the Accounting Standards Committee" in June 1983. This latter 
report re-affirms the ASC's method of operation developed during 
the previous decade and sets out the policy for the future of the 
process. That policy is essentially the same as before but a 
distinguishing characteristic is the use of two new classes of. 
document to be published at a level below that of a-Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice. The first such is a "Statement of 
Intent" in which the ASC will publish an outline of the solution 
it will propose in a latter Exposure Draft. The second such is a 
"Statement of Recommended Practice" in which the ASC will publish 
a preferred solution which will not have the mandatory effect of 
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Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. The publication of 
the latter is to be restricted to '%matters of major and 
fundamental importance affecting the generality of companies, and 
vill therefore be few in number" [ASC 1983, p. 51. 
No clear rationalisations are presented for the adoption of these 
two new types of document, although their proposed functions are 
set out. In particular, a Statement of Intent "could be used to 
elicit public cam ut on a proposed course of action more 
promptly than a full-length discussion papers whilst serving to 
reduce problems at the exposure draft stage" [ASC 1983s p-131 
Further# Statements of Recommended Accounting Practice will be 
concerned with 
"issues ... which, although of sufficient importance to require 
. an authoritative pronouncements do not meet all the criteria for an accounting standard .... SORPs will generally deal with 
either (1) matters which, vhilst being of widespread 
application, are not of fundamental importance, or (2) matters 
which are of limited application" [ASC 1983, p. 191- 
Clearly, the impact of these changes to the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes is the subject of a future 
;: esearch study. 
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3.7 CONSITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENT AND COMMITTEE OPERATION 
The ASC is constituted as a committee which reports directly to 
the Councils of the six principal UK accountancy bodies, its 
governing bodies. The six bodies are The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of Scotlando The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
in Ireland, The Association of Certified Accountants# The 
Institute of Cost and Management Accountants and The Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. It is financed by 
and responsible to these six bodies andl, as suchs, is entirely a 
creature of the UK accounting profession. It is supported by a 
secretariat which is provided by the English Institute. 
Thd constitution was substantially amended in July 1982. The 
earlier constitution, reproduced in "Accounting standards 1982" 
JICAEW 1982, pp. 22-241, provided for a total of 23 members each 
of whom was nominated by one of the six accounting bodies. The 
English Institute had the right to nominate 12 members. The new 
constitution provides for a total of 2U members. Of these, five 
are reserved for "users" of accounts (distinguished from 
"preparers") and each governing body has a right to at least one 
seat. The 1982 annual report of the English Institute states that 
"the membership is nov based on a-'balanced slate' approachg 
ensuring an appropriate mix of preparers, users and auditors of 
financial stateiaents,. " LICAEW 1983, p. 5J 
Members are expressly stated to participate as individuals and 
not as representatives of any organisation. When the ASC wishes 
to vote on the publication of an exposure draft the constitution 
requires two thirds majority and similarly when the ASC wishes to 
recommend the publication of a Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice to the Councils. It is a feature of this consIftutional 
arrangement that the ASC does not publish accounting standards. 
The ASC recommends that the professiods governing bodies publish 
them and it is the governing bodies which possess the 
disciplinary machinery by which the standards may be enforced on 
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their own members. Clearly then, accounting standards are not 
directly imposed on persons who are not members of the accounting 
profession except to the extent that the Courts of Law choose to 
adopt Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. They may choose 
to do so when interpreting the legislative requirement that the 
accounts of a limited company shall present a true and fair view 
of financial position and profit or loss. In a 1981 case, 
magistrates tound the directors of Argyll Foods Ltd. guilty of a 
breach of that legislation. The directors were convicted of a 
failure to ensure that a true and tair view was being presented. 
In the evidence it was argued that the presentation was not in 
compliance with SSAP14 "Group accounts" LAccountancy, 
August 1981 , p. 19J. Accounting standards are, howevers 
indirectly imposed on persons who are not members of the 
accounting profession. There are two main mechanisms by which 
this can take place. Firstly, the auditors of all limited 
companies and of many other organisations are expected by their 
professional body to ensure that accounting standards are 
followed by others. A qualified or reserved audit opinion is the 
sanction auditors can apply to ensure compliance. Secondly, 
there is a subtle mechanism of "economic consequences" by which 
the effects of accounting standards can be indirectly translated 
to a number of individuals. The "economic consequences" of 
accounting standards are discussed more fully below in Part II 
"Review of previous research in accounting and economics". 
The series of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice is 
prefaced by an "Explanatory Foreword" L"Accountiug standards 
198011, ICAEW 1980A, pp. 117-1181 which providess inter alia for 
three further constitutional provisions. FirstlYs Statements of 
Standard Accounting Practice apply to "all financial accounts 
intended to give a true and fair view of financial position and 
profit or loss" [paragaph 11. Secondlyl departures from 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice must occasionally be 
expected in exceptional or borderline cases [paragraph 101 in 
which cases departures should be disclosed and explained 
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[paragraph 21. Thirdly, the governing bodies may enquire into 
apparent non-compliance by utilising their existing disciplinary 
procedures [paragraph 61. Finance is not provided for in the 
written constitution of the ASC. As noted above, the committee is 
supported by the staff of the English Institute and to this 
extent costs are incurred and borne by each of the six 
accountancy bodies. The Watts Report EASC 1981, pp. 37-381 
discusses finance and indicates that these costs are budgeted at 
the level of E200,000 for 1981. This excludes any research 
costse 
The procedure [ASC 1978, pp. 5-61 for developing a Statement of 
Standard Accounting Practice commences with one or more limited 
research studies and there is an implied decision that a problem 
has been identified which warrants researching. This process of 
problem identification is embodied in a periodic approval by ASC 
of its long range programme and its associated structure of 
priorities [ICAEW 1980A, p. 51. Then a sub-committee is 
established which comprises six to nine representatives of 
interested parties and which prepares a preliminary draft of a 
proposed standard. The sub-committee is intended to be as 
representative and balanced as possible Ubid, . This draft, 
is 
then circulated widely within the profession and initial meetings 
may be held with organisations potentially affected by these 
proposals. At this stages considerable reliance is placed on the 
network of technical committees within, the profession to provide 
additional input and, it is implicit that feedback. would be 
reflected in the draft document. Following this, publication of 
the Exposure Draft (ED) takes place with a fixed exposure period 
during which written public comment is invited on the proposals. 
Each Exposure Draft contains a statement that these written 
comments are "regarded as on public record unless confidentiality 
is requested by the commentator". Distribution of these Exposure 
Drafts is extensive, with the total number of copies 
approximating the total number of members of the UK accounting 
professions that is, about 100sOOO, The written comments are 
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collated, circulated amongst ASC members and considered by a 
panel of ASC which impliedly makes its consideration known to ASC 
for discussion. Any particular problems identified at this stage 
may result in further meetings with interested parties. At the 
final stage the draft Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 
is forwarded to the Councils of the governing bodies for their 
appro, ýal and subsequent publication along with a technical 
release indicating the background, any major differences between 
the Exposure Draft and the Statement of Standard Accounting 
Practice and explanations for any substantial comments which have 
not been reflected in the final accounting standard. Stress is 
placed [p. 71 on the time elapsing between publication of the 
Exposure Draft and final publication of its associated Statement 
of Standard Accounting Practice as being dependent on a careful 
consideration of all the issues raised by the commentators during 
the exposure period. 
The ASC has one further major constitutional device for eliciting 
the preferences of interested parties. Although not provided for 
in the written constitution, ASC has created a "consultative 
group" [ASC 1978, p. 61 which meets at least three times a year 
and is comprised of some 24 bodies which together probably 
captures all the City 
* 
of London Institutions in both government 
and private sectors. 
Few writers have added to the above description of ASC's 
constitution and operation. 
Westwick 119801 has added new insight in his story of the 
progress of the "inflation accounting" debate through the 
perceptions of an English Institute staff member. Westwick 
points out [p. 3561 that this particular issue came to the ASC's 
agenda by way of an English Institute Council request to ASC; a 
request which itself had been prompted by Sir Henry Benson in a 
letter to the President of the English Institute. Clearly, this 
is an important insight into the manner in which issues are 
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adopted by the ASC. Further, a sub-committee of the English 
Institute's Technical Committee had been charged with 
responsibility for preparing a "current purchasing power" 
exposure draf t. This represents an exclusion of choice at that 
sub-committee level and Westwick remarked that this "decision was 
perhaps not surprising in the light of publication of StewardshIR 
in 1968". He is clearly implying that choices in 1971 had, to a 
large extent, been restricted by the pub 
, 
lication of "Accounting 
for stewardship in a period of inflation" LICAEW 1968J, a choice 
made at least some three years earlier and during the presidency 
of Sir Edward Parker who was one of "the principal figures 
advocating the need for inflation accounting in the 1950's and 
60's" LWestwick 1980, p. 355J. Further insight comes from a 
passage in which Westvick says of the sub-committee preparing 
that exposure draft "as a new member of the secretariat I was in 
no position to suggest that the committee should reconsider its 
basic decision" [p. 359J. There is a clear implication that the 
secretariat's ability to change decisions iA limited. 
Nevertheless, Westwick did initiate work in three areas. These 
were the use of a sample of companies to field test the 
practicability of the proposals; an estimate of the effect of the 
proposals on reported profits; and the preparation of a working 
guide to aid implementation of the proposals. ED8 "Accounting 
for changes in the purchasing power of money" was published in 
January 1973. 
Westwick also throws light on the nature of Government 
involvement in this issue. Government involvement had been 
requested by Sir Henry Beason in May 1971 Lp. 3561 but the 
overtures of the profession came 'to no avail. Only in July 1973, 
at the end of the fixed period of exposure for the profession's 
own proposal, did the (then) Department of Trade and Industry 
decide to intervene by the establishment of a committee of 
enquiry, under the chairmanship of Mr. Francis Sandilands. The 
committee reported in September 1975 LSandilands 1975J after 
hearing evidence from several sources, including the ASC. It 
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recommended current cost accounting while specifically rejecting 
the ASC proposal for current purchasing power accounting. A 
further recommendation of this report was "that a Steering Group 
should be set up to supervise necessary detailed work in 
preparation for the introduction of Current Cost Accounting. " 
[Sandilands 1975, pp. 3-41. Such a steering group was established 
in January 1976, under the chairmanship of Mr. (later Sir) 
Douglas Morpeth and financed jointly by the Government, the 
accounting profession (through the ASC) and industry. It was not 
until the accounting standard SSAP16 "Current cost accounting" 
had been published in March 1980 that direct Government 
involvement in this issue ceased with the winding up of that 
steering group. 
The IASG immediately acted [Westwick 1980, pp. 362-3631 to make 
its task manageable by 
1 establishing working parties to consider different aspects of 
its responsibility; 
2 continuing to use the field-test companies whose comments 
were incorporated into the earlier ASC proposal under the 
Westwick initiative; 
3 deciding an early compromise to a perceived conflict between 
a Sandilands recommendation on the treatment of monetary 
items and the known views of the accounting profession; and 
4 holding an international conference to explore the 
implications for international harmonisation. 
The outcome of the IASGs work was the exposure draft ED18 
"Current cost accounting", reprinted in "Accounting standards 
1977" IICAEW 1977, pp. 45-151j, on which comments were received 
and analysed by normal ASC procedure. As a result of that 
analysisp the IASG published in May 1977 an outline of proposed 
changes aimed at meeting the (considerable) criticism of the 
exposure draft. Simultaneously, members of the English Institute 
requisitioned a special meeting of their Institute, on 6 July 
1977, at which a vote decided that CCA should not be made 
compulsory. Such was the strength of opposition to the exposure 
draft. Westwick notes [p. 3651 that following this vote several 
meetings were held at a high level between the Stock Exchanges 
the CBI, the ASC and the IASG; and furthers that "we were 
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fortunate at this critical juncture to have the statesmanlike 
qualities of Sir William Slimmings as chairman of the ASO 
(p. 3 6). The 
, outcome of 
this phase of activity was the 
appointment of a sub-committee ot ASC under the chairmanship of 
Mr. W. Hyde. This committee prepared for ASC interm 
recommendations on inflation accounting ["Hyde Guidelines", 
ASC 19771 which Westwick notes [p. 3661 were more acceptable to 
industry. He also notes that the Hyde Guidelines were entirely 
voluntary, simpler and shorter than either SSAP7 "Accounting for 
changes in the purchasing power of money" or ED18 "Current cost 
accounting" and perhaps more acceptable because "of the 
cumulative effect of the debate so far". The next phase of 
activity on which Westwick gives some insight is that of the 
preparation of the second exposure draft on the subject, *ED24 
"Current cost - accounting"$ reprinted in "Accounting standards 
1979", [ICAEW 1979, pp. 98-12: )14 Here he remarks (p. 3661 that 
much of the time prior to publication in April 1979 was spent, 
not in revising the earlier draft, but in "considerable debate on 
the political desirability and timing of another exposure draft". 
The final section of WestwiWs paper is devoted to a criticism 
of the process which he has described. 
From the moment of the intervention of the Governmentp inflation 
accounting became an issue which focussed abnormal attention onto 
the activities of the ASC. As a result the description of the 
operation of the ASC and its steering groups the Inflation 
Accounting Steering Group (IASG)j which Westwick L1980J provides 
should be cautiously viewed as not necessarily representative of 
a more "normal" pattern of operation* Nevertheless, a study of 
this issue is important in that it may aid an exploration of that 
operation at its limits. 
Barrett [19781 provides insight, as a former member, into the 
operations of the ASC. Barrett presents a view of a hard-working 
committee meeting for a full day each month with peak work even 
carried out at weekend meetings. Sub-committee meetings are even 
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more regular, often being held weekly. More importantly# 
Barrett tells us that the voting record was more nearly unanimous 
than the constitution requires 
"indeed on a great number of issues, there vas critical 
unanimity and on others only tvo or three dissenters" 1p. 211. 
Attendance alsoo was high, there being an average of 17 present 
of the 21 total membership (Barrett served before the ASC was 
expanded to 23 members by the admission of the Chartered 
Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy in 1976). He does 
point to a changing attendance and occassional reversal of 
decisions made at immediately preceding meetings; the implication 
being that decisions are sensitive to the attendance of "key" 
individual members. The changing attendance is attributed to the 
"very busy schedules" of members (ibid. . Barrett also describes 
frequent meetings with interest groupý [p. 231 in which other 
professional bodies views were heard, but not necessarily 
acceded. 
In reviewing issues in -which he was involvedo Barrett notes that, 
in the context of SSAP12"'Accounting for depreciation" 
"the British Property Federation simply ref used to go along 
with (depreciation of investment properties) .... under such a 
procedurej very many companies holding investment properties 
would be condemned to permanent loss" (ibid. ; 
and that, in the context of SSAP11 "Accounting for deferred 
taxation" 
"apart frox the technical surrender in this debate one of its 
vorst features is that ve backed dovn under pressure and vere 
publicly seen to have done so" (p. 241. 
Such passages give a clear insight into the conflict of interests 
which are focussed on ASC, the outcomes of some of. the win or 
lose struggles and the attitude of the professional member to the 
integrity of 
"the 
technically preferred solution. 
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There are other publications by members, f qrmer members of the 
ASC, and others, for example, Gibbs [19811, Leach [19811, Morpeth 
[1981 & 19801, Slimmings [1981 & 19781, Watts [1981 & 19801, and 
Edey L1977j. None, however, were found in the progress of the 
present study which described the actual. operation of the 
committee* Most were concerned with debating specific issues; 
past, current or future. Brief notes on some of them follow. 
ICAEW [1980J is one issue in an annual series of the collected UK 
accounting standards which, in its introductory sectionso 
presents a description ot the UK accounting standard setting 
process. The document's brevity adds insight into the 
perceptions of its authors. 
Slimmings [19781 is of value in that it gives an insight into how 
a member, this time a former chairman, of ASC views the 
professional accounting standard setting processes. The author 
gives a description of the administrative functions' of the ASC 
and its supporting staff. It suffers from brevity and the 
limitations of a view of organisations as bureaucracies Ifor 
example Weber 1947J. 
Edey L19771 gives an insight into how another member of ASC views 
the professional accounting standard setting processes. The 
processes themselves are not discussed but only the 
characteristics of accounting standards themselves as if they 
were independent of any process by which they are generated. 
This* in itselfs gives the insight referred to. 
Lee [19751 is an historical narration of the background to the 
professional accounting standard setting processes of both the UK 
and the US. This narration is not as extensive as Zeff [1972J 
but does more clearly make comparison between the two 
environments. 
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3.8 INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
The ASC is not unique as a mechanism by which an accounting 
profession seeks to narrow areas of difference and variety in 
practice by publishing authoritative statements. Much 
comparative material is collected together in Sprouse [19831, 
Moonitz L19741 and Zeff. [19721, and so only a brief review will 
be provided here. 
.0 
As early as 1914, the US accounting profession was confronting 
the problem of variability of accounting practice and the 
subsequent criticism which that variability attracted from 
outside bodies [Zeff 1972, p. 1131. A "Special Committee on the 
Development of Accounting Principles" was formed by the American 
Institute of Accountants (AIA)s (renamed the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accounts in 1957) in 1933 Lp-1341. This 
committee became the "Committee on Accounting Procedure" (CAP) in 
1936 under the chairmanship of George 0. Mays then senior partner 
of Price Waterhouse & Co. During the period 1939 to 1959 the CAP 
published a series of 51 "Accounting Research Bulletins" which 
were designed to "narrow down the range of choices in accounting 
procedures" [Blough 1967, quoted in Zeff 19729 p. 1371. Initially 
there was no provision for consultation by the CAP with either 
the AIA members or other outside parties$ but as the members 
began to perceive that the bulletins were to have an impact on 
their practices so there grew a pressure for consultation (Zeffs 
p. 1461. By the end of its terms the CAP was regularly issuing 
drafts of its bulletins for exposure to organisations and 
individuals. 
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In 1959 the (then renamed) 
AO 
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) created the Accounting Principles Board (APB) 
as a successor to the Committee on Accounting Procedure. The APB 
was supported by an Accounting Research Division with the 
intention that statements on accounting practice published by the' 
APB should be seen to be adequately supported by a substantial 
research effort. The lack of such a research effort was one of 
the main criticisms addressed at the CAP. During the period 1962 
to 1973, the APB published a series of 31 "Opinions"; the first 
being delayed by the need to prepare a research study on basic 
postulates and principles. This research study, published as 
Moonitz t19611 and Sprouse & Moonitz [19621, was suggested by a 
special committee which was responsible for the establishment of 
the APB and which envisaged that 
"the results of these (studies), as adopted by the Board, 
should serve as the foundation for the entire body of future 
pronouncements" (quoted in Zeff [1972, p. 1721). 
Additionally, professional accounting standards setting processes 
exist in Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa) Germany, 
Holland, Mexico and Japan to name but a few. Many of these 
countries' professional bodies also participate in the 
International Accounting Standards Committee -[Benson 19761. 
The present study is organised as a UK orientated study rather 
than as an* international comparative study. -Accordingly, the 
richness of insight which could be' gained from'an extensive 
comparative study, is left', to a future research study. 
Nevertheless in the following 'Part II "Review of previous 
research in accounting and economics"i the -present - study is able 
to take advantage of the US comparis? n by drawing on a growing 
body of research addressing the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes. 
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3.9 A UK COMPARISON: THE ERG T STANDARDS COMMITTEE 
In addition to the international comparison, it is possible to 
make a direct comparison within the UL The ASC is not unique as 
a mechanism by which a UK profession seeks to narrow areas of 
difference and variety in practice by publishing authoritative 
statements. 
In 1903 the Engineering Standards Committee published its first 
standard entitled "British standard sections" some two years 
after its first meeting on 26 April 1901 lWoodward 1972J. 
Parallels with the ASC are striking. There were strong 
incentives for standardisation operating within the engineer3. ng 
industry of the late 19th century, an industry which had seen a 
period of sustained growth for at least the preceding hundre4 
years. 
"ve have too much individualism in this country ..... no two 
professional men are agreed upon (the proper specification of 
product) ... to meet the irregular unscientific requirements of (users)" (letter to The Times 1895, quoted in Woodward [1972, 
P-81). 
Once established, the Engineering Standards Committee commenced 
work through its "sectional comm: Lttees" [Woodward 1972, p. 91 on 
which were reýresented trade associations and government 
departments who would be affected by the standards. Flexibility 
was a hallmark of the committee's work, an early chairman noted 
that it was not an organisation "for stereotyping... we have 
arranged that our committees sit permanently for the purpose of 
considering improvements". The work of members is provided 
voluntarily and a major task is that of arriving at "a concensus 
between producers and users" [p. lJ. Compulsion is seen as 
"ultimately self-defeating" and so compliance is essentially 
voluntary. 
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Developments, have since moved the Engineering Standards Committees, 
now the British Standards Institution (BSI)j a considerable 
distance from the ASC. The BSI has some 4500 technical 
committees, received its own Royal Charter in 1929 and is financed 
by sales of standards documentation; by subscriptions of 15jO00 
member bodies and individuals; by government grant; and by fees 
for certification. In 1970 the total budget was E2.8m, of which 
some El. lm was provided by Government grant [p. 931. 
Clearly, the Engineering Standards Committee provides a model 
against which development of the ASC can be compared. A thorough 
investigation would be the subject of a separate study and will 
not be attempted here. However, it is interesting. to note that 
to date there is no evidence that the UK literature has 
identified the Engineering Standards Committee as a model for the 
ASCv attention to date being given more often to the US FASB. 
In the following Chapter 14 "Prof essionalisation processestis the 
present study examines more closely some of the implications of 
the idea that standards setting processes are to be found within 
the framework of aý prof essiou such as the accounting and the 
engineering professions. 
0 
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3.10 CRITICISMS OF THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE 
There have been several criticisms of the ASC and its programme 
of accounting standards. 
Lafferty L19791 catalogues a number of examples of UK reporting 
practices which, In some way or other do not follow the practices 
set out in Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. Lafferty 
strongly criticises the role of the auditor on the grounds of its 
inability to ensure enforcement of Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practice. He predicts that a Governmental body will 
be created to ensure enforcement [p. 511. Lafferty also argues 
that the ASC generates ambiguous Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practice which are designed to "avoid(s) embarassing 
public confrontation!. Further, he argues that the ASC's own 
membership is inadequate to ensure that the needs of users are 
fully represented. This latter point has been met to some extent 
by the 1982 constitutional changes referred to above in Section 
3.7 "Constitutional establishment and committee operation". 
Stamp was noted above in Section 3.4 "The 1960's" as being 
instrumental in the formation of opinion which precipitated the 
creation of the ASC. His continued criticism and review of the 
ASC and professional accounting standards setting processes is 
noteworthy LStamp 1983,1982,1981A, 1981B, 1980A9 198OB9 1979A, 
1979BO 1979C, 1973, Leach & Stamp (Eds) 19811. In particular, 
Stamp 119811 addresses the enforcement issue and argues that the 
London Stock Exchange should take powers to fine directors of 
companies not following Statements of Standard Accounting 
Practice. Stamp (19811 also fivours a solution adopted in Canada 
whereby professional accounting standards have been incorporated 
into legislation. Stamp [19801 argues that professional 
accounting standards setting processes are deficient in that they 
are not based on any clear conceptual framework; they do not 
adequately meet the needs of users; there is underlying conflict 
of interest; and they suppress variety of practice on which 
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legitimate innovation is based. This latter point is also made 
b. y Baxter [1981 & 19531. Stamp [1979A] critices the Watts' 
Report LASC 1978J as being "an uncertain trumpet". Stamp argues 
that the ASC's own resources should be increased substantially 
and that an "agreed conceptual framework" should form the basis 
of its Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. Stamp [1979B] 
suggests that the English Institute has a "death wish" and that 
"the whole accounting standards programme is now bogged down in 
confusion, acrimony, and dissent" [P. 2031. 
Weetman [19771 reviews progress of the ASC against the criteria 
set out in the original "Statement of Intent" [ICAEW 19701 and 
concludes that the ASC "has moved too far towards extreine 
rigidity, and future accounting standards must steer a middle 
course if they are to gain universal acceptance and respect" 
Ep-1761. That conclusion was based on a brief survey of the 
comments of management to be found in the annual report and 
accounts of large listed companies. 
Hope (19791 criticises the critics of the ASC. He argues that . 
ýf 
the ASC's function is seen as policy-making in a democratic 
society then the interests of a wide variety of groups need to be 
taken into account. In such a setting, "purely conceptual, 
rationar approaches to the determination of accounting practice 
may lead accounting policy-makers to make decisions which produce 
results incompatible with the workings of a democratic social 
system" [p. 5641. Hope argues that the ASC should adopt an 
"incremental" approach to its policy-making and incorporate some 
assessments, of the economic impact, of its proposals. 
McCusker 119791 criticises the ASC for its "ad hoc and pragmatic 
. 
approach to problem solving" [p. 221. Such an approach is said to 
produce "contradictions and inconsistencies" which are compounded 
by missing defintions of the purpose of the balance sheet; the 
meaning of profit; the implications of capital maintenance; and 
the accounting entity. 
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Paterson & Smith [1979] also addresses inconsistency in the 
accounting standards programme. For examples they point Out that 
measurement of profit was defined on the basis of matching of 
revenues and expenses in the first proposal for a standard on 
deferred taxation, ED11, but that this was then changed, to 
include the measurement of profit on the basis of changes in 
balance sheet position, in the first accounting standard on the 
same issue, SSAP11. Paterson & Smith argue that some explicit 
o-bjective should be adopted by the ASC to reduce the 
inconsistency. Further, they argue that a re-structuring of the 
committ6e itself would provide an opportunity for wider 
participation by other tiuanciai institutions who would also be 
able to play a role in monitoring and enforcing the application 
of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice. 
Morris [19751 considered the impact of the ASC on accounting 
practice as reflected in the English Institute's annual "Survey 
of Published Accounts". Morris concluded that, although there 
was, in 1975, a measurable impact on the format of disclosures 
there was no measurable additional disclosure. On this basis 
Morris suggests that "there is little evidence that investors are 
worse of ff or this, and much of the criticism... seems to have 
been ill thought out" [p. 141. 
Solomons [1983J argues that the intervention of the UK Government 
in the inflation accounting debate in 1974 is evidence of a 
political dimension to accounting standards. The argument 
continues that political bias in accounting is a bad thing 
because it produces an "erosion of confidence". Solomons 
suggests the adoption of US style solutions such as a conceptual 
framework; full-time ASC membership; and independence from its 
governing bodies. 
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In summary, the ASC has not been without its critics. The points 
of criticism include inconsistency of practice; ambiguity of 
requirement; lack of definition; lack of explicit conceptual 
framework; conflict of interests; poitical interference; and 
lack of defined objectives; to name but a few. The existence 
and persistence of these criticisms is noteworthy and invites 
investigation and explanation. Such an observation provides the 
initial motivation for the present study, the purpose of which is 
to contribute both to that investigation and to an explanation. 
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3.11 SU04ARY 
The historical, professional and international perspectives have 
been described in which the professional accounting standards 
setting processes in the UK, are to be found. Early external 
financial reports are argued to be originally influenced 
primarily by the needs of corporate management as responses to 
the changing commercial environment. However, the role of the 
State is seen to be important in times of extreme testing of the 
financial reporting system. In cases of State interventions 
existing reporting practices, and so professional accounting 
standards, had been discredited in the public perception and the 
role of the State was arguably that of an external corrective 
mechanism. 
The core machinery for an accounting standards programme was born 
in the English Institute in 1942 with the development of the 
first "Recommendations on accounting principles". These 
recommendations were formulated in committee and then published 
by the English Institute* There is no evidence of an outside 
consultative process, but such a process was introduced, with the 
birth of the ASC in 1970, as an attempt to take into account the 
views and perceptions of eariier critics. 
The ASC is now an organ of the six principal -UK accountancy 
bodies and during the period since 1970 has been responsible for 
a series of published professional accounting standards which 
appear to have had a significant impact on the external financial 
reports of UK companies. The ASC has a well defined 
constitutional structure based on a committee structure. Within 
this committee structure, issues are identified, selected for 
public debate and the professional accounting standards setting 
machinery set into motion. Specific issues may originate from 
different circumstances and the roles of individuals have been 
seen to be important in advocating both issues and solutions. 
Further, some issues generate more controversy in the public 
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forum than others and at the extremes there has been State 
intervention. ' 
The ASC is not a unique body. Interest in standards of external 
financial reporting has permeated many major trading nations of 
the world sympathetic to Western European commercial value 
sytems. Primary amongst these being the USA, Australia, and 
Canada. At the international level there exists an International 
Accounting Standards Committee and governmental organisations are 
also interested in the topic through the United Nations and the 
European Economic Commmunity. Additionally, at least one other UK 
profession, the engineering profession, has used a similar 
institutional structure. 
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APPENDIX 3.1 RECOMMENDATIONS ON ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES PUBLISHED 
BY THE INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS IN 
ENGLAND AND WALES 
Date Issued 
1 Tax reserve certificates 12 December 1942 2 War damage contributions, premiums 
and claifas 12 December 1942 3 The treatment of taxation in accounts 13 March 1943 4 The treatment in accounts of income 
tax deductible from dividends 
ayable and annual charges , g 13 March 1943 5 e inclusion in accounts of proposed 
irofit appropriations 13 March 1943 6 eserves and provisions 23 October 1943 7 Disclosure of the financial position 
and results of subsidiary companiqs in the accounts of holding companies 12 February 1944 8 Form of balance sheet and profit and loss account 15 July 1944 9 Depreciation of fixed assets 12 Januag 1945 10 The valuation of stock-in-trade 15 July 1 45 11 Excess profits tax post-war refunds 19 July 1946 12 Rising price levels in relation 
to accounts 14 January 1949 13 Accountants' reports for prospectuses: fixed assets ana depreciation 11 March 1949 14 The form and contents of accounts of 
estates of deceased persons and 
similar trusts 12 August 1949 15 Accounting in relation to changes in 
the purchasing power of money 30 May 1952 16 Accountants' reports for prospectuses: 
adjustments and other matters 13 November 1953 17 Events occurring after the balance 
sheet date 18 October 1957 18 Presentation of balance sheet and 
rofit and loss account October 1958 (sic) 19 ý reatment of income tax in accounts 
of companies October 1958 (sic) 20 Treatment of investments in the balance sheets of trading companies 13 November 1958 21 Retirement benefits 29 February 1960 
22 Treatment of stock-in-trade and work in progress in financial accounts 16 November 1960 23 Hire purchase, credit sale and rental transactions 9 December 1964 
24 The accounting treatment of investment grants 14 April 1967 25 The accounting treatment of major 
changes in the sterling parity 
of o i 17 February 1968 
26 verseas currenc es Land Commission Act 1967: 
accounting implications 11 May 1968 27 Treatment of taxation in accounts 
of companies July 1968 28 The accounts of investment trust 
com anies 7 August 1968 29 p Trust accounts 5 November 1969 
ples", London: Source: "Recommendations on accounting princi Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, 1975. 
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APPENDIX 3.2 TRE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE: 
PROJECTS IDENTIFIED IN 1970 
Disclosure of accounting bases 
Form and content of P&L account 
Form and content of balance sheet 
Treatment of extraordinary and prior 
year items 
Changes in accounting bases 
Treatment of investments in the accounts 
of trading companies and industrial 
holding companies 
Treatment of income of associated 
companies 
Fundamental principles of inventory 
valuation 
Fundamental principless form and content 
of group accounts 
Accounting for mergers and acquisitions 
Accounting for 
* contract work 
in progess 
Fundamental principles of depreciation 




Review of SSAP6 
January 1983 
Review of SSAP6 
January 1983 
Abandoned 





Review of SSAP12 
December 1982 
Earnings per share SSAP3 
Accounting for research and development SSAP13 
Accounting treatment of pension funds in 
company accounts ED32 
Form and content of pension fund accounts Discussion paper 
June 1982 
Accounting for changes in purchasing PSSAP7 
Power of monev (Since withdrawn) 
Fundamental objects and principles of 
periodic financial statements 
Accounting for goodwill 
Insurance company accounts 
The Corporate Report 
ED 30 
Abandoned 
Source: Based on Tweedie (1981, pp. 186-1871 (Updated to 30 June 1983) 
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APPENDIX 3.3 STATEMENTS OF STANDARD ACCOUNTING PRACTICE PUBLISMW 
Date--Issued 
Explanatory foreward January 1971 
SSAP1 Accounting for the results of 
associated companies January 1971 
SSAP1 Accounting for associated (Revised) companies April 1982 
SSAP2 Disclosure of accounting policies November 1971 
SSAP3 Earnings per share February 1972 
SSAP4 The accounting treatment of 
government grants April 1974 
SSAP5 Accounting for value added tax April 1974 
SSAP6 Extraordinary items and prior year 
adjustments April 1974 
PSSAP7 (Provisional)Accounting for changes 
in the purchasing power of money 
(withdrawn January 1978) May 1974 
SSAP8 The treatment of taxation under 
the imputation system August 1974 
SSAP9 Stocks and work in progress May 1975 
SSAP10 Statements of source and 
application of funds July 1975 
SSAP11 Accounting for deferred taxation 
(withdrawn October 1978) August 1975 
SSAP12 Accounting for depreciation December 1977 
SSAP13 Accounting for 
research and development December 1977 
SSAP14 Group accounts September 1978 
SSAP15 Accounting for deferred taxation October 1978 
SSAP16 Current cost accounting March 1980 
SSAP17 Accounting for post 
balance sheet events August 1980 
SSAP18 Accounting for contingencies August 1980 
SSAP19 Accounting for investment properties November 1981 SSAP20 Acounting for foreign currency 
translations April 1983 
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.r 
APPENDIX 3.4 EXPOSURE DRAFTS PUBLISHED 
Issued 
ED1 Accounting for the results 
of associated companies June 1970 
ED2 Disclosure of accounting policies January 1971 
ED3 Accounting for acquisitions 
and mergers January 1971 
ED4 Earnings per share March 1971 
ED5 Extraordinary items and 
prior year adjustments August 1971 
ED6 Stocks and work in progress May 1972 
ED7 Accounting for extraordinary items 
(replaced ED5) July 1972 
ED8 Accounting for changes in the 
purchasing power of money January 1973 
ED9 The accounting treatment of grants 
under the Industry Act 1972 March 1973 
ED10 Accounting for value added tax May 1973 
ED11 Accounting for deferred taxation May 1973 
ED12 The treatment of taxation under 
the imputation system in the 
accounts of companies May 1973 
ED13 Statements of source 
and application of funds April 1973 
ED14 Accounting for research 
and development January 1975 
ED15 Accounting for depreciation January 1975 
ED16 Supplement to extraordinary items 
and prior year adjustments September 1973 
ED17 Accounting for research and 
development - revised 
(replaced ED14) April 1976 
ED18 Current cost accounting November1976 
ED19 Accounting for deferred taxation May 1977 
ED20 Group accounts July 1977 
ED21 Accounting for foreign 
currency transactions September 1977 
ED22 Accounting for post 
balance sheet events February 1978 
ED23 Accounting for contingencies November 1978 
ED24 Current cost accounting April 1978 
ED25 Accounting for the results 
of associated companies October 1979 
ED26 Accounting for investment properties September 1980 
ED27 Accounting for, foreign 
currency translations October 1980 
ED28 Accounting for petroleum revenue tax March 1981 
ED29 Accounting for leases 
and hire purchase contracts October 1981 
ED30 Accounting for goodwill October 1982 
ED31 Accounting for acquisitions 
and mergers October 1982 
ED32 Disclosure of pension information 
in company accounts May 1983 
ED33 Accounting for deferred tax June 1983 
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APPENDIX 3.5 OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
CONMITTEE 
Dat2--Issued 
Inflation accounts (discussion paper and fact sheet) September 1971 Notes on accounting for corporation tax under 
the imputation system (discussion paper) September 1972 
Evidence to the Infla ion Accounting Committee S 
(Sandilands Committee April 1974 
A review of the relationship between. historical 
cost accountinýq current puchasing power 
t t s a ementso and replacement cost. accopnting (evidence to the Sandilands Committee) October 1974 
A note on last in first out (LIFO) 
first in first out (FIFO), base stock 
and CPP supplementary statements (evidence to the Sandilands Committee) October 1974 
The corporate report August 1975 
Initial reactions to the report of 
the Inflation Accounting Committee October 1915 
Inflation accounting - the interim period December 1975 The Corporate Report and the future 
ro ramme of the ASC July 1976 t 
nf ation accountinS - an interim recommendation Novbmber 1977 Price level accounting - statement of intent July 1978 Setting accounting standards: 
a consultative document September 1978 
Submissions on the Accounting Standards 
Committee's consultative document: 
Setting accounting standards 1979 
Guidance notes on ED24 April 1979 
Guidance notes on SSAP16 March 1980 
Submissions on the Accounting Standards 
Committee's ED24 "Current cost accounting" 1980 
Accounting for goodwill: a discussion paper June 1980 CCA the easy way July 1980 Draft guidance notes on the application of SSAP16 to the oil and gas industries July 1980 Draft guidance-notes on the application of SSAP'S to local authorities in England and August 1980 Wales 
Setting accounting standards: Report and 
recommendations by the Accounting , Standards Committee May 1981 
Draft #uidance notes on the application A of SS 's to local authorities in. England 
and Wales June 1981 
Guidance notes on ED29 October 1981 Corresponding amounts and ten year summaries in current cost accounting: A discussion paper January 1982 Accounting for pension costs: An interim 
t February 1982' repor . The usefulness of current cost accounting: 1982 by Bryan Carsberg 
Draftjuidance notes on the application ' s to local authorities in England of SS 
and Wales April 1982 
Draft guidance notes on current cost 
accounting in interim reports June 1982 Pension scheme accounts: A discussion June 1982 japer 
review of SSAP12 - Accounting for depreciation: A discussion paper December 1982 
A review of SSAP6 - Extraordinary Items and 
rior year adjustments: A discussion paper i January 1983 
eview of the standard fetting rocess: 
A report by the Accounting Stangards Committee June 1983 
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APPENDIX 3.6 FINDINGS OF THE US FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING FOUNDATIONS 
SURVEY OF OPINION ON THE US FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS BOARD 
1 Support for private sector standards 
2 Standards are no more than conventions 
3 'Tue process" is supported 
Openness is crucial for communication 
Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Councilg FASACI is 
crucial but is not being used adequately (because FASAC does 
not want to involve itself with the technical issues) 
6 Task forces need to be exploited 
7 FASB misses too many deadlines and is too slow 
8 FASB hierarchy is poor and not conducive to good organisation 
9 Economic impact analysis is crucial'and results should be 
included in exposure drafts 
10 The post of Research Director should be equivalent to that of 
FASB board member 
11 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants should lose 
their right to veto appointments to the Financial Accounting 
Foundation (FAF) 
12 The voting rule of five out of seven should be reduced to a 
simple majority. Reduction of FASB board membership should 
be considered 
13 The relationship between the SEC and the FASB is satisfactory 
14 An educational programme designed to enhace adoption of FASB 
proposals is essential 
15 Fund raising by appeals would be unsatisfactory 
16 The FAF trustees should be more involved in planning 
17 Funding should be more long term and more independent 
Source: FAF 1977 "The Structure of establishing finandial 
accounting standards" 
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PART II REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
Chapter 4 Introduction to previous research in accounting and 
economics 
Chapter 5 Professional accounting standards, the political 
dimension and economic consequences 
Chapter 6 Information economics 
Chapter 7 Other economic processes 
Chapter 8 Empirical studies of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes 
Chapter 9 Conclusions drawn from previous research in accounting 
and economics 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
CHAPTER 4 INTRODUCTION TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND 
ECONOMICS 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 Previous research'in accounting and economics 
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CHAPTER 4 INTRODUCTION TO PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND 
ECONOMICS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
As yet, there exists no substantial body of research which 
addresses, directly, the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes. It was observed above, in Section 3.8 
"International comparisons", that the ASC is not unique as a 
mechanism by which a national accounting profession seeks to 
narrow areas of difference and variety in practice by publishing 
authoritative statements. This study draws on a body of research 
that has been conducted, in particulars in the USA. For 
example, Bromwich [19811, discussing the role of research in the 
process of setting UK professional accounting standards, also 
aknowledges the debt due to US research. 
The review of previous research starts by describing the 
development of the literature as from a technical orientation, 
through an economic theory orientation. -to a relatively recent 
interest in the political dimension. The chapters in this Part II 
"Review of previous research in accounting and economics" follow 
the sequence of the development of the literature. 
In view of the importance attached by US studies to the economic 
dimension, Chapter 6 "Information economics" and Chapter 7 "Other 
economic processes" explore the mechanisms by which economic 
consequences are generated. After that review, the research 
studies which explicitly address the political dimension are 
reviewed in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards setting 
processes". The- order in which these chapters is presented is 
intended to reflect the development of the literature. 
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4.2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH III ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
Chapter 5 "Professional accounting standards, the political 
dimension and economic consequences" demonstrates the underlying 
reasons for the importance of both professional accounting 
standards and the processes by which they are determined. 
Firstly, the chapter explores the relatively recent appearance in 
the accounting literature of discussion the political dimension. 
Secondly, the underlying economic consequences rationale for the 
existence of the political dimension is identified. The evidence 
in support of this rationale is review6d briefly. Finally, the 
notion that the professional accounting standards setting 
processes can be characterised as a policy-making process is 
discussed. 
Chapter 6 "Information economics" develops the interest in the 
economic consequences of professional accounting standards 
setting processes by addressing the question "Where do economic 
consequences come from? ". 
Firstly, the chapter reviews the underlying 
framework which is implied by the economic C, 
Secondly, it reviews briefly the idea of 
accounting information; and finallys 
institutional mechanisms for regulating the 
information are discussed. 
information economic 
onsequenceýs argument. 
a free market for 
some alternative 
supply of acounting 
The literature on the economics of information is important 
because it can make a substantial impact on the analysis of the 
problem of explaining professional accounting standards setting 
processes. It offers a model of the behaviour of people who have 
access to, or the expectation of, information. This adds insight 
into the behaviour of the profýssional accounting standards 
setting processes because the latter are processes by which the 
flow of accounting information is regulated. 
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Chapter 7 "Other economic processes" explores some other research 
which flows from the underlying economic properties of accounting 
information. 
Firstly, rational choice theory is explored. This is concerned 
with the analysis of the use of information by an individual. 
Secondly, agency theory is explored. This is concerned with the 
analysis of both the role of management as agent of the owners of 
the firm; and the information requirements of both agents and 
owners. Some important empirical studies are reviewed under this 
heading. Finally, the characterisation of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes as a policy-making process 
leads to an exploration of social choice theory. This is 
concerned with the analysis of conditions under which 
heterogeneous preferences might be aggregated to generate stable 
choices. 
Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes" reviews the 
few empirical studies in which the political dimension is the 
primary focus of interest. The review of these studies follows 
from the relatively recent appearance in the accounting 
literature of discussion the political dimension and provides 
important material on which the remainder of the present study is 
based. 
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CHAPTER 5 PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS, THE POLITICAL 
D SION AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
5.1 IN7RODUCTION 
In this chapter are demonstrated the underlying reasons for the 
importance of both professional accounting'standards and the 
processes by which they are determined. 
It is shown that characterisations of the professional accounting 
standards setting processes have recently changed from a purely 
"technical" description to a newly emerging "political" 
description. Changes in professional accounting standards have 
economic consequences to which can be attributed wealth and 
welfare generation and redistribution effects. The problem of 
where the benefits or redistributions fall is the issue which 
gives rise to a political dimension in the sense that individuals 
will seek to influence the incidence of the costs and benefits. 
Recognition of a political dimension in a theory of professional 
accounting standards setting processes suggests that these 
processes can fruitfully be characterised as a social policy- 
making process. 
Section 5.2 "Professsional accounting standards and the political 
dimension" shows that the recognition of a political dimension in 
the research literature is a relatively recent phenomenon dating 
back to the early 1970's in the US literature and, arguably, not 
appearing in the UK literature until the early 1980's. 
Section 5.3 "Professional accounting standar 
consequences" shows that the US research argues 
of a political dimension lies in the economic 
changes in professional accounting standards. 
this is discussed in Section 5.4 "Empirical 
economic consequences of professional accounting 
ds and eýonomic 
that the source 
consequences of 
The evidence for 
studies of the 
standards". 
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Finally, Section 5.5 "Professional accounting standards setting 
as policy making" follows the political orientation into a body 
of literature which adopts a policy-making characterisation of 
professional accounting standards setting processes with an 
implied objective of social welfare maximisation. 
In a sense, this chapter demonstrates that the literature has 
discovered the existence of the political dimension only 
recently. It has yet to describe that dimension adequately and 
to explore its implications. Therein lies the contribution of 
the present study. 
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5.2 PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND THE POLITICAL 
DIMENSION 
The accounting literature has long been characterised by a search 
for, or discussion of, better accounting practices and the 
external financial reporting practice of corporate management is 
the natural empirical domain of this literature; for -example, 
Ijiri [19751, AAA [19661, Chambers [19661, Sprouse & Moonitz 
[19621, Edwards & Bell [19611, Moonitz [19611, Littleton [19531, 
Alexander [19501, Paton & Littleton [19401, Gilman [19391, 
MacNeal [19391, Sweeney [19361, Canning [19291, Hatfield [19271, 
Paton [1922] and Sprague [19071. 
There is a noticeable trend in the more recent accounting 
literature toward discussion of what is becoming termed the 
"political dimension of professional accounting standards". 
Examples include Thomas [1983]s Bromwich & Hopwood (Eds) [19831, 
Burggraaff [19831, Hope & Briggs [19821, Hope & Gray [19821, 
Solomons (1983,1980 & 19781, Beaver [198119 Hakansson [19811, 
Hope [197919 Watts & Zimmerman [1979 & 1978], Henderson & Peirson 
[19781, Kirk [19781, Standish [1978], Zeff [19781, Watts [19771, 
Armstrong [19761, Horngren [1976,1973 & 19721, Moonitz [19741 
and Gerboth [1973A; 1973B & 19721. Although a UK literature is 
beginning to appear, the history of this trend in the US precedes 
that in the UK. This is perhaps because the former has 
1a longer experience of explicit professional accounting 
standards, that is, from at least as early as 1936 with the 
AICPA's Committee on Accounting Procedure; and 
2 an institutionalised focus for the "political" dimension, that 
is, the SEC. 
To illustrate the nature of this trend in the literature, 
selected arguments are summarised below. 
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A significant UK contribution to this literature is represented 
by Bromwich & Hopwood (Eds) [19831. This is a collection of 
papers with a substantial European flavour, which addresses, and 
in most cases simply describes, the various institutional 
arrangements which exist in Europe by which professional 
accounting standards setting processes operate. The political 
dimension is implicit in many of these papers, but explicit in 
Burggraaff [1983j, Hopwood [19831 and, to a lesser extent, 
Coleman & Petite [19831. 
Burggraaff 11983J, uniquely discusses what is meant by a 
"political" dimension. He suggests two possible sources of 
meani. ng. 
1-man issue has political implication vheu the issue is taken up 
by political bodies, governments, governmental agencies, or 
political parties in order to pursue their objectives" and 
2. "an issue may be said to have a political dimension vhere in 
the private sector the interests of various groups are affected 
by the way the issue is solved and those groups vary in their 
judgement as to the appropriateness of the solution. " [1983, 
p. 41 
The second of 'these definitions is consistent with the analysis 
of the literature below in Section 5.3 "Professional accounting 
standards and economic consequences". As such, it provides the 
best (and only)-available definition of the term "political". 
Nevertheless, it is the intent of the present study not to 
exclude the possibility of the governmental oriented alternative 
also being significant in the political dimension of the 
professional accounting standards setting processes. 
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Burggraaff goes on to conclude that 
"Information, including financial statements, entails power in 
today's society, and thereby affects the interests of people 
both at home abroad. It is legitimate for parties whose 
interests are affected to try to influence the rules applied in 
preparing and disseminating information. There is room for 
such influence in those areas where the experts are unable to 
come up with one single unequivocal and irrefutable answer. " 
[1983, p. 111 
Coleman & Petite [1983] is more concerned with the implementation 
of the political objectives of the European Commission and so 
addresses the first of the two Burggraaff meanings of 
"political". In suggesting ways in which accounting research can 
be effective as an input to the political process, at the 
European Commission level, they argue that 
"approaches vhich pay insufficient attention to the objectives 
of the rule makers, and to the constraints under vhich they are 
operating, are unlikely to influence events to any appreciable 
degree. " [1983, p. 1021 
The Burggraaff [19831 and Coleman & Petite [19831 works are 
important because they reflect, in the UK literature, an interest 
in the political dimension of professional accounting standards 
setting processes. Burggraaff is particularly important as it 
is, as yet, the only example of a discussion of the meaning of 
the term "political". 
Thomas [1983J is a study which offers an empirical investigation 
of UK disclosure practice. Thomas finds an unpredicted result 
that disclosure of expensed research and development costs is 
related to company size. In the discussion it is suggested that 
the Watts & Zimmerman [19781 factor of political costs might be 
important. Watts & Zimmerman argue that larger firms are more 
likely to bear costs from the increased interest of pressure 
groups and politicians in their operations. Increased disclosure 
practice is argued by WZ 1978 to be a strategy aimed at 
minimising these costs. WZ 1978 is reviewed further below in 
Section 7.3 "Agency theory". 
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Hope & Briggs [1982] has addressed the political dimension of UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes by 
investigating the power relationship between the constituency of 
the ASC and its policy outcomes. The study is somewhat anecdotal 
in nature. It addresses the deferred taxation issue which 
resulted in the publication of UK accounting standard SSAP 15 
"Accounting for deferred taxation" in October 1978. No 
quantitative analysis of data is provided, rather an historical 
discussion of the issue is presented. The discussion is followed 
by several assertions about the authors' views on improvements 
which could be made to the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes As such, the study is more in the nature of 
a position statement than an empirical study. Nevertheless, the 
study is important because it demonstrates clearly that the 
arguments in support of a political dimension, which hitherto had 
been developed in a predominantly US oriented literature, have 
application to the UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes. 
Carter [19811 throws light on professional accounting standards 
setting processes by utilising the algebra of rational choice 
theory. Those arguments are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 
"Other economic processes" following. Carter argues that, for 
many accounting alternatives, the information set is wholly 
contained within the information set of otherss that ist one set 
is "finer" than the other, so making the latter absolutely 
preferable to the former. Carter illustrates this proposition by 
suggesting that accrual accounting information containSt and so 
is finer than, cash flow accounting information. He asserts 
thatt in fact, debate within the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes is centred on the benefits of these 
alternatives rather than the costs and this is inconsistent with 
the above hypothesis. He goes on to argue that this fact can 
only be explained by the existence of incentives for 
participation which are based on economic consequences. These 
incentives, if publicly disclosed, would be considered unethical 
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so he argues that they are not revealed. 
Carter's work is important because it focusses attention on the 
nature of debate in the US professional accounting standard 
setting processes. In particular, Carter alerts us to the 
possibility that in the debate the various participants have 
incentives to favour outcomes consistent with their own economic 
interests and that they also have incentives to adopt arguments 
which do not necessarily reveal their true positions. A weakness 
of Carter's conclusion is that it is speculative. He uses his 
informal observation of the processes to disprove the initial 
hypothesis, but then offers one explanation of his observation 
which has no argument to support it at all. Rather, Carter simply 
asserts that the above incentives to misrepresent positions are 
sufficient to explain the nature of the debate. Also, as we 
shall see later in the detailed review of the rational choice 
theoretic research, Ng [1978, p. 9151 has shown that in a multi- 
person setting, fineness is not even a sufficient condition for 
preference. 
Hope (19791 uses two distinctions found in the literature of (a) 
organisational decision making and (b) accounting standard 
setting. The distinctions are (a) "rational comprehensive" vs. 
"incremental" in which he cites both Simon and Lindblom and (b) 
"technical" vs. "political" in which he cites both Chambers and 
Gerboth. Hope argues that implications flow from assumptions 
about these distinctions and goes on to make positive 
recommendations to' ASC about the ideal professional accounting 
standard setting processes, The value of this work is that it 
highlights the importance of the assumptions about these 
distinctions and the nature of the implications that flow 
therefrom. Unfortunately, no attempt is made to test the 
validity of possible assumptions and no framework for conducting 
such tests is put forward. 
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Solomons [19781 briefly describes, again from the viewpoint of a 
participant in the US professional accounting standards setting 
processes, the nature of intervention in those processes by 
interested parties. Solomons continues the debate concerning 
whether or not professional accounting standards setting 
process es are essentially technical or political. In so doing, 
he assumes that accounting is strictly technical and concludes 
that political intervention is undesirable and so to be resisted. 
Solomons' work is, important because it gives us further evidence, 
albeit somewhat anecdotal, of the nature of the US professional 
accounting standards setting processes. 
Standish [19781 is notable as being perhaps the earliest 
contribution to the UK literature which makes any attempt to use 
the political dimension to describe the professional accounting 
standard setting processes. Standish identifies "capital 
markets" and "political markets" in a discussion which is not 
attributed but is very much like that of Watts [19771 reviewed 
below in Chapter 7 "Other economic processes". He then goes on 
to discuss the desiderata of an accounting standard setting 
process designed to serve the interests of those two markets. 
To the extent that Standish's capital and political markets are 
sufficiently rich to capture the needs of society, then his study 
is of value in presenting many of the'issues which arise in 
discussion of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. Unfortunatelys his style is often assertive and backed 
up by very little reference to the existing literature. In his 
section describing political markets there is not one reference 
to literature on political markets to support his assertions. For 
these reasons the study is of limited usefulness as a scholarly 
work and it is unfortunate in its lack of attribution to Watts 
[19771. 
Moonitz [19741 provides another example of insight gained from 
personal experience, as a Board member, of the US professional 
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accounting standard setting processes. In his monograph, Moonitz 
describes the history of US professional standards setting in 
both auditing and accounting. He observes that professional 
accounting standards only gain general acceptance when they have 
no effect on the-income calculation. From this observation he 
infers that the role of interested parties, and in particular 
management, is important because they will attempt to influence 
the professional accounting standards setting process to their 
own advantage. Moonitz sees this influence as undesirable. He 
asserts that professional accounting standards are technical and 
so should be enforced by agencies such as the SEC or the New York 
Stock Exchange, which are more powerful than the FASB. 
Moonitz's monograph is important because of his insight gained 
from experience. He has used this to generate inductively an 
argument supporting his view of an idealised process, namely one 
in which the US accounting profession is left alone to determine 
professional accounting standards against some set of objective 
and strictly technical criteria. 
Gerboth [19731 discusses the role of research in the Us 
professional accounting standards setting processes as based on 
his own views and experience as a researcher in the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants. Gerboth's thesis is 
that human affairs, of which professional accounting standards 
setting processes number one, are of such complexity that the 
methods of scientific analysis are not capable of being usefully 
applied. He asserts that policy-makers should rely on their own 
intuition which, based on their own wide experiences, is alone 
sufficiently expansive to capture the richness of the problems. 
Within this context, he sees the political approach to the 
professional accounting standards setting processes as being the 
only approach sufficiently flexible to capture the relative 
importance of the needs of all those who are affected by 
professional accounting standards. Gerboth appeals, without 
referenceg to the writings of economists who, he says, long ago 
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realised that the concepts of "wealth" and "income" are normative 
and subjective concepts and so not susceptible to rational 
analysis. 
Gerboth's work is important in that it is an early attempt to 
introduce both a notion of the complexity of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes and a potential solution 
for coping with that complexity. His arguments on the inadequacy 
of scientific analysis are given support in the present study in 
the review below'in Chapter 11 "Scientific choice processes". 
Horgren [1973 & 19721 describes a model of the US professional 
accounting standards setting processes as a large, decentralised, 
organisation with a three-tier structure of top managements that 
is, Congress; middle management, that is, the SEC; and lower 
managements that is, the FASB's forerunner, the Accounting 
Principles Board (APB). Within this framework Horngren sees the 
APB as fulfilling a production role and he argues for a 
complementary marketing role, which he sees to be missing. 
Marketing, he ar. ýues, is a politically active function. V 
Horngren**s work is important because it captures the insights of 
one who has been involved in the US professional accounting 
standard setting processes as a Board member. 
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5.3 PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES 
Carter [19811 and Hakansson [19811 argue that one explanation for 
the existence for the political dimension in professional 
accounting standards setting processes is recognised by the 
"economic consequences" accounting literature. For example, 
Benjamin & McEnroe (1981J, Carter [19811, Earl [19811, Foster 
[19811, Horwitz & Kolodny [1981 & 19801, Laughlin & Puxty 
[19811, Selto & Newman [1981J, Dukes, Dyckman & Elliot [1980J, 
Kelly [19801, Zeff [1980 & 19781, Brown [19791, AAA [19781, 
Benston & Krasney L19781, FASB [19781, Kirk [19781, Solomons 
[19781, Norby [19771, Prakash & Rappaport [1977,1976 & 19751, 
Rappaport [19771, Swieringa [19771, Wyatt [19771, Buckley [19761 
and Demski [19741. 
Demski [19741 has modelled the impact of changes in professional 
accounting standards on the consumption patterns of individuals. 
Using a rational choice theoretic framework, considered below in 
Section 7.2 "Rational choice theory", he predicts that 
I economic consequence effects exist in the form of altered 
consumption schedules for individuals [pp. 222-2261; and 
2 "a given firM's reporting policy may effect both owner and noný- 
owner individuals; moreover, there is no compelling reason to 
suspect that individual firm decisions will be desirable in a 
social sense" [p. 2261. 
Demski's result is important because it gives an explicit and 
formal statement of the expectation that individuals will suffer 
a wealth redistribution when a professional accounting standards 
change is implemented. This, then, is the economic consequence. 
Briefly, the economic consequences argument states that there 
exist rational and self-interested economic agents who have 
incentives to change their behaviour as a result of changes in 
professional accounting standards. These incentives derive from 
three under; ying sources* 
Firstlys accounting information is assumed to be used for 
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decision making Purposes ["ASOBAT", AAA 19661. If different 
accounting information is provided to accounting information 
users then different decisions will result. This is known as the 
"information-use" framework [AAA 1977, p. 221. 
Secondly, the outcomes of many financial contracts are assumed to 
be dependent on accounting information. If different accounting 
information is generated, then the financial contracts will 
either result in unanticipated outcomes or will need to be 
renegotiated [Watts & Zimmerman 1978 and Watts 19771. This will 
be referred to below as the "financial contracts" framework. 
Thirdly, corporate management is assumed to seek to control the 
behaviour of accounting information users as part of its 
function of controlling the organisation it manages. Management 
possessds theories and beliefs about the behaviour of accounting 
information users given the disclosure of specific accounting 
information. If management has no control over accounting 
information disclosure, because this is determined externally by 
the professional accounting standards setting processes, then the 
only means by which it can control the behaviour of accounting 
information users is by modifying its own behaviour. This is 
known as the "information-inductance" framework [Prakash & 
Rappaport 19771. ' 
Benston & Krasney [19781 argue that the "information-use" 
framework effects include the following 
1 the linking, by the US Internal Revenue Service,. of inventory 
valuation rules and taxation payments, implies that a change in 
valuation rule would have a direct effect on the tax payable [p. 1661; 
2 the regulation of the price structures of several US 
industries, such as electricity supply, is based on accounting 
information and so changes in the basis of calculating that 
information has a direct effect on the revenues of those 
industries [p. 1681; 
3 unionised labour groups have successfully negotiated large pay 
increases which are strongly correlated with large increases in 
earnings [Tomczyk 1975; Horowitz & Shabahang 19711;, 
4 unsophisticated customers of technically sophisticated goods or 
services, particularly financial services such as insurance and 
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banking, may make their purchasing decisions in part based on 
financial accounting information. Changes of disclosure of in 
the basis of computation could have a direct effect on those 
decisions. Put more sepcifically, customers will shift from 
less profitable to more profitable firms [pp. 171-1721; 
5 financial contracts, including managements' own compensation 
schemes, are often written in terms of accounting information 
which determines either the outcomes in terms of rewards or 
costs, or alternatively the conditions on which a default is 
recognised. Changes in the basis of computation of the 
accounting information can result in either the outcome being 
different from that originally intended or, alternatively, 
costs being incurred in re-writing the contracts [pp. 172-174]; 
6 the use of accounting information by the investment community 
implies that changes of disclosure, or in the basis of 
computation, of the accounting information will directly effect 
theallocation of resources in the capital market [pp-180-1851. 
Watts and Zimmerman [19781 argue that management compensation 
plans belong to the class of financial contracts which are 
dependent on accounting information. In particular, the effects 
of accounting information changes on management compensation 
plans can be expected to be particularly important for smaller 
firms [p. 1201. 
Benston & Krasney 11978, p. 1751 argue that the "information- 
inductance" framework effects include the following 
1 the use of an inventory valuation-method which results in a 
higher taxation cost, that is a real cash outflow, in order to 
avoid disclosing a reduced net income; 
2 mergers undertaken or foregone in circumstances in which the 
only advantage is the effect on earnings per share; 
3 investments undertaken or foregone in circumstances in which 
the only effect is on the deferred taxation charge to income; 
4 reduced bank lendings to high risks when there exists the 
possibility of loss disclosure; 
5 changes in operations to bring reported accounting information 
in line with previously published forecasts; 
6 use of outside insurance contracts rather than self-insurance 
when contingent liabilities are no longer to be accrued; 
7 reduction in expenditure on research and development when the 
expenditure is no longer to be carried forward; 
8 merging of small oil companies to avoid the variability of 
earnings proposed by a new FASB ruling. 
Hakansson [19811 provides an illustration of the economic 
consequence effects arising from the interaction of the above 
three frameworks. Using an hypothetical example of a taxi-cab 
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firm, Hakansson shows that different information disclosure 
policies generate different distributions of wealth amongst the 
following groups of individuals: management; and analysts who 
actively seek out information; investors who subscribe to 
information services provided by analysts; and investors who 
adopt a passive role. 
4 
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5.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
Economic consequence arguments have been used in the context of 
debate on specific professional accounting standards [Amershi, 
Demski & Wolfson 1982, Carter 1981, Solomons 1978, Zeff 1978 and 
Moonitz 19741. They have also been subjected to empirical 
testing. The field in which most empirical work has been 
undertaken is that of information use by the investment 
community. Reviews of that empirical work (for example, Selto & 
Neumann [19811, Foster [19801, Watts & Zimmerman [19801, Kaplan 
[19781 and Gonedes & Dopuch [19741) have generally concluded that 
published accounting information changes have little or no 
measurable impact on the securities markets. * There is no general 
agreement about the explanation for this result. Possible 
explanations include the following, of which items 2 to 5 are 
discussed by Watts & Zimmerman [19801 in the context of the US 
replacement cost disclosure requirements. 
1 confirmation of the hypothesis that the securities markets are 
efficient in the sense that, on average, they can process all 
publicly available information and so "see through" superficial 
accounting information changes (for example, Gonedes & Dopuch 
[19741 and Ball [19721); or 
2 confirmation of the hypothesis that the securities markets do 
not make substantial use of published accounting information 
but rather obtain additional or alternative information from 
other sources (for example, Watts & Zimmerman [19801); or 
3 confirmation of the hypothesis that published accounting 
information possesses externalities and so the security price 
effect is diffused across -many securities 
(for example, 
Leftwich [19801); or 
4 confirmation of the hypothesis that there is a learning effect 
which results in a delay before the information has any impact 
(for example, Beaver [19791); or 
5 confirmation of the hypothesis that the research methodology or 
theoretical frameworks utilised in these tests are inadequate 
to support the conclusions drawn (for example, Amershi, Demski 
& Wolfson [19821, Foster [1980J and Kaplan [19741 ). 
To illustrate the empirical studies, without seeking to establish 
a comprehensive review, selected studies are summarised below. 
Horwitz & Kolodny [1981 & 1980] have tested the hypothesis that 
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research and development expenditure has been reduced by some 
managements as a result of the US requirement ["SFAS2", FASB 
19741, that such expenditure is no longer to be carried forward. 
Their results show that, for small, high-technology firms who had 
previously carried the expenditure forward, research and 
development expenditures had been reduced.. On the other hand, 
sample of all firms which included "a concentration of large 
firms in the sample" [p. 211 and did not find any significant 
reduction. 
Eccles & Lifford [19791, although not actively researching and 
testing hypothesess state authoritatively Ep. 91 that returns 
under UK Government contracts for research and development are 
based on published accounting information; this is elaborated in 
Hope & Gray [19821 which is reviewed below in Chapter 7 
"Empirical studies of the political dimension in professional 
accounting standards setting processes". The existence of an 
associated economic impact is significant. 
Lev [19791 tested the hypothesis that the returns on the 
securities of US oil and gas companies changed as a result of the 
announced intention to implement a change in the basis of 
accounting for oil and gas exploration costs (subsequently 
published as "SFAS1911, FASB (1977]). His results show [p. 5001 
there was a significant change in security returns associated 
with that announcement. These results are consistent with those 
of Benjamin & McEnroe [1981]. 
Evans, Folks & Jilling [19781 have tested the hypothesis that the 
foreign exchange risk management practices of US multinationals 
have been changed by some managements as a result of the US 
requirement ["SFAS8". FASB 19751 that foreign currency 
translations be accounted for on a uniform basis, known as the 
temporal' method. Their results show (pp. 19-20] that for many 
firms the change in-accounting practice has been a major factor 
in explaining changes in foreign exchange risk management 
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practice. On the other hand, Dukes [19781 tested the hypothesis 
that the returns on the securities of US multinationals. changed 
as a result of the implementation of SFAS8. His results show 
[pp. 3 & 431 that no change in returns could be detected, a result 
which is consistent with the "efficient markets hypothesis" noted 
above, but not consistent with the Evans, Folks & Jilling [19781 
result. 
Goshay [19781 tested the hypothesis that the risk and insurance 
management practices of US firms have been changed by some 
managements as a result of the US requirement ["SFAS5", FASB 
19751 to disclose contingent losses. His results show [pp-3-41 
that there was no significant change in the risk and insurance 
management practices associated with the new requirement. 
Morris (19751 tested the hypothesis that returns on the 
securities of UK companies changed as a result of the publication 
of inflation adjusted accounting information. His results show 
[p. 861 that there was no significant change associated with the 
publication of inflation adjusted information. 
From the above survey of the empirical tests of economic 
consequences arguments, it can be seen that so me are supported 
and some are rejected. Importantly, it can be seen that 'some 
economic consequence effects do exist. The mechanisms by which 
they arise are often complex, particularly where the primary 
underlying reason is explained by the information-inductance 
framework of Prakash & Rappaport [19771. Within such a 
framework, it is managements' theories and beliefs about the 
behaviour of accounting information users that is significant 
rather than whether or not those theories and beliefs are well 
founded. 
Laughlin & Puxty 11981J have argued that the economic 
consequences arguments are invariably adopted by firms who 
dissent from proposed changes to professional accounting 
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standards. Rather than being concerned with technical accounting 
characteristics or allocative efficiency of the proposals, such 
firms are said to be "concerned about the survival and growth of 
their respective enterprises. Where anything is perceived to 
threaten such survival or growth, it needs to be aggressively 
dealt with. " [p. 11, emphasis in original]. Clearly, this 
argument implies that, not only are firms concerned about the 
distribution of costs and benefits arising from proposed changes, 
but where a firm perceives a substantial cost consequence then 
its very survival or growth may be called into question. 
From the above discussion it can be seen that professional 
accounting standards possess wealth and welfare generation and 
redistribution properties in the sense that resource 
reallocations are dependent, inter alia, on accounting 
information changes. Individuals possessIng claims to a resource 
whose value is increased by an accounting information change 
enjoy an increase in their wealth and welfare; individuals not 
possessing those claims and individuals possessing claims to a 
resource whose value is decreased by an accounting information 
change suffer a decrease in their wealth and welfare. 
Given that these wealth and welfare redistribution properties 
exist, then an interest in the political dimension is a natural 
focus for the consideration of the issue of the redistribution of 
wealth and welfare. The study of politics is arguably concerned 
with the study of decisions about the incidence of transfers for 
the purposes of wealth generation and redistribution. - 
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5.5 PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS S ETT ING AS POLICY-MAKING 
Given that professional accounting standards possess wealth and 
welfare distribution properties, May & Sundem [19761 characterise 
the professional accounting standards setting processes as a 
"process of accounting policy-making" [p. 7471. That is , 
accounting policy-making is a social choice process which 
"requires a commitment to goals and, therefore, requires a 
policy-maker to make value judgements" [p. 7481. From this social 
choice framework, maximisation of social welfare is argued to be 
the goal against which proposals should be tested; the cost of 
not adopting such a goal being the alternative of having the 
"power (of accounting policy-makers) consistently pre-empted by 
the legislature" [p. 7491. 
Following Demski [1973), May & Sundem argue that accounting 
policy-makers must take account of individual preferences and 
that the results of the accounting policy-making process can 
therefore be characterised as being the outcome of a collective 
choice rule, that is, an implied decision model Ep-7501. 
However, using the "impossibility" result of Arrow (1963 & 19511, 
May & Sundem conclude that no such collective choice rule exists 
which "satisfies even a relatively few desirable properties" 
[p. 7511. Further, they argue that exploration of the problem 
posed by this result might fruitfully follow the social choice 
literature as applied to accounting by, for example, Demski 
[19741. The social choice framework is discussed further in 
Chapter 7 "Other economic p rocesses" of the present study. In 
that discussion it is suggested that Arrow's "impossibility" 
result is important because it provides a clear basis for 
expecting there to be constraints on the preferences of 
individuals. It is the existence of these constraints which 
makes social choices possible; and it is the structure of these 
constraints which is in need of description and elaboration. In 
an important sense, professional accounting standards are 
themselves constraints on the preferences of individuals and, in 
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particular, management. 
From the basic social choice theoretic framework, with the goal 
of social welfare maximisation, May & Sundem develop a model of 
the professional accounting standards setting processes 
characterised as "the accounting policy-making process". Their 
model is summarised below in Figure 5.1 "The accounting policy- 
making process". 
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Source: Adapted from May & Sundem [1976, p. 7521 
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May & Sundem [19761 is, for two reasons, an important 
contribution to the problem of investigating UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes* 
Firstly, it is the seminal characterisation of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes as a single policy-making 
process* 
Secondly, it is the first use of a criterion other than Pareto- 
optimality for. choosing between alternative professional 
accounting standards; social welfare maximisation is advocated. 
The review below in Chapter 6 "Information economics" and Chapter 
7 "Other economic processes" demonstrates the importance of 
Pareto-optimality to economic models of behaviour. Pareto- 
optimality requires that a state is optimal if no one individual 
can be made better off without making at least one other 
individual worse off [Cirillo 1979, p. 441. Social welfare is an 
aggregate function in which redistributions, that is making some 
individuals worse off, can actually increase social welfare in 
the cause of "equity" [McClelland & Rohrbaugh 19781. The 
distinction between the two criteria is ilustrated further below 
in Appendix 6.2 "Social welfare maximisation and the irrelevance 
of Pareto-optimality". 
At the time of writing, no other writers have sought to 
characterise the professional accounting standards setting 
processes as a policy-making process with an explicit social 
welfare maximisation goal. Howevers Kelly-Newton [19801 
organises much of the previously published work into a review of 
the US professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Kelly-Newton adopts a characterisation of the processes as an 
agency of engineered social change. Within such a framework, new 
professional accounting standards are seen as innovations and the 
policy-making and implementation process is characterised as a 
process of diffusion of an innovation. 
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Hussein [1981 & 19771 adopted just such a diffusion of innovation 
perspective. Hussein sets out to generate a comprehensive 
descriptive theory of the US professional accounting standard 
setting processes. His model represents an interaction of 
frameworks developed from two non-accounting disciplines, namely 
1 diffusion of innovation (for example, Rogers & Shoemaker 
[19711); and 
2 bargaining (for example, Young [19751). 
Hussein characterises the professional accounting standards 
setting processes as one in which the accounting profession 
adopts an accounting standard as an innovation. There are, he 
argues, conflicting interests to be met in the decision-making 
stages and, because participants do not all have the same 
decision-making power, they bargain with each other to determ2. ne 
the outcome. 
To test his hypothesis Hussein considered the same issue as did 
Watts and Zimmerman [19781, that is, US imflation accounting. A 
mail questionnaire was conducted in which respondants were 
participants in the US professional accounting standard setting 
processes, either as decision-makerst that ist members of the 
FASB* or as others, that is, change agents, opinion leaders or 
bargainers. Discriminant analysis was conducted on several 
variables and the results did not reject the hypotheses. 
Hussein's adoption of the diffusion of innovation process model 
represents a further substantial move toward characterising the 
professional accounting standards setting processes as 
essentially a social choice process. Although May & Sundem argue 
that a social welfare maximisation goal is implicit, Hussein 
makes no assumptions about the nature of the implied goal. 
Hussein's use of the inflation accounting issue may introduce a 
systematic bias to the extent that it is an issue of extreme 
positions and as such may, or may not, be unrepresentative of the 
US professional accounting standards setting processes. The 
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study has also ignored questionnaire bias except in one minor 
case of a particular group of non-responses. Questionnaire bias 
includes well-recognised problems such as different 
interpretations of the meanings and intents of questionst 
"socially acceptable" answers and unknown motives for the 
response decision [Oppenheim 19661. In addition, Hussein has 
hypothesised that, in a bargaining situation, communications 
channels are manipulated in order to change the behaviour of the 
receivers. Nevertheless, he ignores the fact that his 
questionnaire may also constitute a communications channel to be 
manipulated by the participants. 
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5.6 SUHMY 
It has been shown how, over the period from the early 1970's to 
the early 1980's, the US research studies which are concerned 
with professional accounting standards setting processes have 
moved away from a conventional, technical, characterisation of 
those processes. That characterisation concerned the resolution 
of technical issues using well established criteria which apply 
to accounting information Per se. The processes are coming to be 
seen as possessing a political dimension and that dimension is 
explainedg at least, as being generated by the economic 
consequences of a change in professional accounting practice. A 
change in the measurement or disclosure of accounting information 
results in economic agents changing their decisions. This has 
consequent wealth and welfare generation and redistribution 
effects. 
Thus a new perspective is evident in these studies. The 
professional accounting standards setting processes have been 
characterised as 
1 an accounting policy-making process [Kelly-Newton 1980; May & 
Sundem 1976]; and 
2a political process [Solomons 1980 & 1978; Gerboth 1973A, 1973B 
"& 
19721; and 
3a diffusion of innovation process [Hussein 1981 & 19771; and 
4a social choice process [May & Sundem 19761. 
It is noteworthy that, at the time of writing, one UK empirical 
research study, [Hope &, Gray 19821, has been conducted which has 
made a contribution to this. literature. It is reviewed below in 
Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political dimension in 
professional, accounting standards setting processes". 
Chapter 5 Page 26 
--I tj 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
Professional accounting standards setting processes are 
aknowledged as possessing not only a technical dimension but also 
a political dimension [Burggraaff 1983, Hopwood 1983 and Solomons 
19781. The technical dimension can be said to focus on the 
rational selection of accounting practices based on the 
established body of knowledge available to accountants. As such 
the technical dimension is analogous to scientific enquiry 
whereby new practices or knowledge are sought within the 
framework of existing theoretical understanding, implied or 
otherwise. 
The political dimension can be said 
accounting practices based on the 
The general processes, by which 
translated into selections, are 
researchers in a number of disciplii 
[Mueller 19761. 




aes within tI 
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of interest to 
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The underlying importance of professional accounting standards 
setting processes is attributable to the economic consequences of 
changes in professional accounting standards [Demski 19741. 
These changes generate economic consequences which have 
subsequent wealth and welfare generation and redistribution 
effects and which in some cases can be significant [Horowitz & 
Koloduy 19819 Eccles & Lifford 1979, Lev 1979 and Evans, Folks & 
Jilling 19781. Individuals have preferences concerning where 
the benefits or redistributions are to fall. The expression of 
these preferences 'in a forum which had hitherto been regarded as 
an exclusively technical forum caused some debate in the US 
accounting profession [Carter 19810 Solomons 1978, Zeff 1978, 
Moonitz 1974 and Gerboth 19731. In the UK accounting profession, 
there is evidence that these preferences may well underly the 
technical debate [Hope & Gray 19821. 
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Given that wealth and welfare generation and redistribution 
properties exist, then professional accounting standards setting 
processes can be characterised as a policy-making process [May & 
Sundem, 19761, in which it is impossible to meet individual 
preferences by using solely technical critleria (Demski 1973]. 
Intentional wealth and welfare redistributions might be made 
using professional accounting standards setting processes as 
processes of social engineering [Kelly-Newton 19801 in which the 
adoption of a new professional standard accounting practice is 
characterised as a diffusion of innovation process 
(Hussein 19811. 
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5.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of investigating UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes has been substantially illuminated by the 
changing perspective of previous research studies. The 
description of the UK ASC provided above in Chapter 3 "The 
Accounting Standards Committee" encompassed not only an 
accounting activity of specific technical matters being resolved 
by a profession's own committee of experts, but also an 
accounting activity with economic, political and professional 
dimensions. Clearly, some of those dimensions are reflected in 
the US literature. 
The economic dimension is the most strongly represented in that 
US literature; the political dimension less so. However, the 
professional dimension seems not to be represented. No US study 
has sought to investigate the way in which the accounting 
profession, as a profession, influences the accounting standards 
setting processes. The reason for this apparent lack of interest 
in the implications of the professional dimension is perhaps not 
difficult to identify. The US institutional arrangement changed 
in 1973 when the FASB, as an independent body, took over the 
processes of setting accounting standards from the US accounting 
profession. Prior to that date, there was no serious US research 
interest in accounting standards setting processes Rer se. 
The previous research studies have moved the orientation from a 
strictly technical professional accounting standards setting 
processe to a political process. The political dimension is seen 
to stem from the economic consequences of accounting information. 
Yet a major question has been left unanswered, that is "where do 
the economic consequences come from? " The studies have either 
asserted their existence and so argued they cause a political 
dimension to come into being; or alternatively# the studies have 
sought to generate evidence that they exist. To explain the 
mechanisms by which economic consequences are generated is to 
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contribute an important part of the explanation of the mechanisms 
underlying professional accounting standards setting processes. 
This contribution is made in the following Chapter 6 "Information 
economics" and Chapter 7 "Other economic processes". 
Additionally, the previous research studies reviewed above have 
not sought to describe the political dimension. The literature 
is almost polemic. The research studies which explicitly address 
the political dimension are reviewed in Chapter 8 "Empirical 
studies of the political dimension in professional accounting 
standards setting processes". 
0 
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CHAPTER 6 INFORMATION ECONOMICS 
6.1 IMMODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the extent to which previous research 
suggests how economic processes operate to translate the 
generation of accounting information into incentives which might 
influence the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. In other words, it sets out some of the mechanisms by 
which economic consequences are generated. 
Information economics is concerned with, on the one hand, the 
analysis of the impact of information on markets, and on the 
other hands the analysis of the conditions for a market in which 
information itself is traded. In the present study these two 
frameworks are labelled "supply-side" and "demand-side" 
respectively to distinguish between the underlyinj assumptions 
being made about the information generation process. These two 
frameworks are then compared. Some additional economic frameworks 
by which institutional solutions to the problem of introducing 
information into the market place are also addressed in this 
chapter. 
A review of information economics is important in the context of 
the present study because it offers a model of the behaviour of 
rational, utility-maximising, individuals who have access to, or 
the expectation of, information. Such a model can add insight 
into the behaviour of individuals in the'professional accounting 
standards setting processes because the latter are processes by 
which the flow of accounting information is regulated. 
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6.2 TnE suppLy-siDz viEw 
6.2.1 The underlying framework 
In economics, information is defined in a similar sense to that 
elaborated by Shannon [1948J, that is. 'as a message which changes 
the subjective probability of the occurrence of some future event 
or state. The literature on the economics of information can 
make a substantial impact on the analysis of the problem of 
explaining professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Examples of this literature include Hakanason, Kunkel & Ohlson 
[19821, Hakansson [19811, Beaver [19811, Bejan [19811, Bird & 
Locke [1981J, Hirshleifer & Riley [1979J, Gonedes [1976 & 1975J, 
Gonedes & Dopuch [1974], Marschak & Radner [1972J, Fama & Laffer 
[19711, Hirshleifer [19711 and Akerlof [19701. Hirshleifer & 
Riley [19791 MR) has surveyed much of the information economics 
literature. 
Information has a value to an individual who receives it because, 
by trading, he can then adjust his claims to resources in future 
states . The prices at which he trades will depend, inter alia, 
on 
1 the characteristics of that information; and 
2 the characteristics of the markets both before and after 
receipt of the message. 
The economic analysis considers the effects of these differing 
characteristics. In the case of public information received in 
markets which are complete, in the sense that all possible 
contingent state claims are tradable, then H&R point out that$ 
subject to a "rational expectations,, assumption, the markets will 
be Pareto-optimal LH&R, p. 14001. With'different combinations of 
market or information incompleteness, there are incentives to 
either acquire information or to trade, for example by mutual 
insurance, in the absence of information Ep-14021. In the case 
of research or invention an individual with new information can 
trade speculatively in future claims favoured by his information. 
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After his trading he then releases the information. Further, if 
his property rights to the information, or the productive 
opportunities derived from that information, are protected by 
patent laws then he has the opportunity to increase his trading 
gains. Clearly, patent laws act as an incentive to invention by 
offering opportunity for increased gain. If the property rights 
conferred by-patent laws are unnecessarily protective, then there 
comes a point at which there may be a general overinvestment in 
invention (p. 14041. There is, then, a conflict between the need 
to create incentive to invention; the need to ensure equitable 
use of the invented information afterwards; and the need to limit 
the possibility of overinvestment of inventive resources. The 
patent laws, in their use of a fixed term for property rights to 
information, seek to achieve this balance of equity. 
The above argument has a clear analogue in the field of financial 
reporting where accounting informat, 6n can be viewed as 
; 'invention" information. Management have incentives to make that 
i information public but can. often increase the gains to themselves 
or to the firm by witholding the information and realising the 
gains from the productive opportunity [Hakansson 1981J. In this 
sense, at least, arguments against regulation requiring 
additional disclosure of accounting information can be rational. 
H&R go on to consider the effects of the use of information in 
realising the possible gains to an individual. 
Firstly, they consider the "signalling" effect -[p. 14061 which 
occurs after the individual has traded by taking up his 
speculative positions. The individual will then wish to signal to 
the markets by rqlease of the information so that he can then 
reverse that speculative position. Here the problem is one of 
authentication of the message. This can be particularly 
problematic for high-quality goods or services. For example, a 
perverse form of adverse selection often operates as can be 
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illustrated in the case of insurance markets. It is particularly 
difficult for good risks to be distinguished from bad risks and 
so there is a tendancy for insurers to bias the prices of their 
insurance towards the bad risks. This has the effect of pricing 
good risks out and so, without any other signal to discriminate, 
the bad risks are insured whereas the good risks are not. H&R 
note that good risks can signal their superiority by accepting a 
higher deduction [p. 14061. Akerlof [1970J argues that in the 
absence of distinguishing signals which can be adequately 
authenticated, the used car market tends to result in only the 
"lemons" being traded in the market. H&R argue that some sort 
of$ non-Pareto, stability in markets can be expected if the 
market agents come to expect reactions by other agents. This 
equilibrium they term a "reactive equilibrium" lp-14081 and on 
this basis conclude 
"the endogenous revelation of information via markets is, after 
all, explainable as a noncooperative equilibrium phenomenon" 
[p. 14091. 
Secondly, H&R consider the "information leakage" effect [p. 14091. 
This effect arises from a relaxation of the assumption that 
traders have homogeneous beliefs. In this case the individual 
who has acquired new information and trades speculatively in the 
market will find that other individuals will observe the price 
changes which result from his initial trades and they will infer 
some, or all, of the information upon which he is acting. As a 
result they, too, will trade speculatively in these same goods 
the; eby depriving the original trader of further opportunity for 
gain. In a sense this situation is problematic for, there is 
little or no incentive to buy new information except where such 
information leakage is sufficiently adversely affected by either 
time lags between initial trade and the trades of other 
individuals; or noise from other s, ignals arriving approximately 
simultaneously. 
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H&R point out [p. 14111 that both "signalling" and "information 
leakage" are disequilibriating effects. If an individual has 
acquired costly new information then each of these effects tends 
to make it less likely for gains to be made from that 
information. It is only by introducing non-market factors* that 
is, expectations of reactions by other agents in the case of 
"signalling", and time and noise in the case of "information 
leakage", that information generation remains an explainable 
phenomenon. 
To summarise, the possibility of equilibrium in the markets in 
which information plays a role has been discussed by H&R and, 
while Pareto-optima are not obtainable because of the 
externalities involved, some sort of stability is suggested in 
the partial analysis of each of the two problems of "signalling" 
and of "information leakage". H&R conclude [p. 14141 that 
information generation is a disequilibriating process while 
information dissemination is an equilibriating process and that 
current theory is not adequate to determine "the dynamically 
optimal level of such activities" [ibid. ]. 
6.2.2 The frmmework avplied to_accountinst information 
The above, then, consititues a general framework for a 
consideration of accounting information. Clearly$ accounting 
information is a-particular type of information and the relevant 
markets into which accounting information flows are, primarily, 
the securities markets. It is also possible that accounting 
information has a role to play in product markets. For the time 
being the present study concentrates attention on the securities 
markets. Within this framework, accounting information is 
interesting for the following reasons. 
It is possible to hypothesise about demand for accounting 
information in completely unregulated securities markets. 
Clearly management is in a position to generate new accounting 
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information costlessly as a by-product of their normal trading 
and production processes. Additionally, there is production by 
individuals outside of management, namely analysts, whose primary 
function is to generate accounting information for private 
consumption. In both these cases of private production, 
individuals have strong incentives to trade on that information, 
that is, take speculative positions in the sense of H&R, 
considered above. Having taken up speculative positions it can 
be expected that the information leakage effect would start to 
operate and this effect would be strongly enhanced by the 
existence of the body of active analysts. The speed and degree 
to which that information is impounded in the prices* of the 
securities traded is the subject of the efficient market 
hypothesis (EMH) (for example, Fama [19701). It has been argued 
that this initial, speculatives trading is a disequilibriating 
process. The individual with the information now has a strong 
incentive to *release the information in order to realise the 
trading gains. To overcome the signalling problem the individual 
has an incentive to have the information attested, a procedure 
which is clearly easier for management than for an outsider. To 
summarise, in completely unregulated securities markets there are 
strong incentives on management to publish audited accounting 
information. Similarly, analysts have as strong incentives to 
seek the publication of their own private accounting information. 
Note that nothing has been said about the natureq or the timing 
of the publication, of the accounting information - 
The above can be illustratedýby assuming unregulated' securities 
markets and considering the information economics of raising new 
capital. In this context, management can be viewed as the sellers 
of a good, that is the security, in a situation of quality 
uncertainty. The sellers have considerable knowledge about the 
quality of the good but the buyer has less knowledge and perhaps 
no knowledge at all. This situation has been modelled by Akerlof 
[19701 as a market for "lemons". in which the price is determined 
in the market on the basis of the poorer quality goods. Here 
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corporate management has a strong incentive to signal to the 
buyers. This incentive can be conceptualised in exactly the same 
sense as H&R discuised earlier. Corporate management have some 
information and they have taken a speculative position in 
additional productive capacity. They are now reversing that 
speculative position by selling rights in the expected cash 
flows. As already observed, corporate management-is in a strong 
position to signal by publishing accounting information which has 
been audited. There is evidence of just such accounting 
information disclosure in unregulated markets [Watts 1977 and 
Choi 19731. 
Now consider the equilibrium properties of published 
accounting information in unregulated securities markets. H&R 
concluded that current theory is inadequate to determine an 
equilibrium concept. This arises from the underlying supply-side 
property of published accounting information. Essentially, 
accounting information, as analysed above, is not published in 
response to any demand but as a result of incentives operating on 
individuals who already possess the information. Further, nobody 
in these markets has any incentive to demand published accounting 
information because prior to publishing the information 
'individuals will already have taken their speculative positions 
and the redistributive effects will have been exhausted. 
Accordingly, 'within the framework of this analysis the supply of 
published accounting information, is essentially a stochastic 
process and there is no actual demand. There is thenj no 
relevant concept of equilibrium in this process. 'This can be 
simmarised in the following statement. 
In unregulated securities markets; management have strong 
incentives to publish accounting information vhich has been 
audited even in the absence of a demand for published accounting 
information; in such casesýthere vill be no associated market 
equilibrium concept. 
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6.3 THE DEMAND-SIDE VIEW 
A number of studies have approached the problem of the economics 
of accounting information from a completely different 
perspective. These attempt to avoid the apparently counter- 
intuitive statement, derived from the H&R analysis, that there 
need not be a revealed demand for public accounting information. 
These studies avoid the "no demand" problem by assuming that 
such a demand exists. In substance, they are consequently 
addressing a quite different problem, namely the identification 
of the characteristics of the market for accounting information. 
In contrasts the H&R analysis addresses the problem of the 
characteristics of other markets, capital and product, under 
conditions of incomplete information when the information set 
changes. 
Gonedes [19751 utilises the game theoretic model of a "market 
game" suggested by Shubik. [19591. The market game has proved to 
be a useful concept in economics because Scarf (19671 and Debreu 
A Scarf [19631 have demonstrated that the "core", which "consists 
of those utility vectors vhich are feasible for the entire group 
of players and vhich can be blocked by no coalition" [Scarf 1967, 
p. 501, comprises just those very utility vector'so or preference 
functions, associated with a Pareto-optimum. Gonedes 
contribution was to demonstrate sufficient conditions under which 
an unregulated market for accounting information would itself be 
Pareto-optimal. These conditions require a demand for 
information to be characterised as a demand for a "gamble" on a 
signal about a specified attribute [Gonedes 1975, p. 8631. It is 
argued that such a, demand for gambles exists and that the 
resultant market for accounting information is Pareto-optimal. 
The underlying securities market is assumed*to be Pareto-optimal. 
One of his, other conditions is that "participants may enter into 
a contract for information at mutually acceptable terms. 
Produced information resulting from such a contract is only made 
available to those who entered into the contract" [p. 8431. 
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Additionally, the information which Gonedes participants may buy 
is "a completely reliable message 'from nature' about the actual 
distribution functions" [Appendix p. 862 and p. 8461. All outcomes 
are realised in this two period model and so the private 
information. is automatically made public in period two as a 
"realisation". Gonedes also implicitly assumed away the 
"signalling" and "information leakage" problems of the H&R 
analysis above. 
Bird & Locke [1981J (B&L) seeks to establish sufficient 
conditions under which an unregulated market for corporate 
information would be Pareto-optimal. B&L essentially postulate 
that the usual assumptions of perfect markets can be applied to 
accounting information without any market failure being implied. 
They envisage value maximising firms and utility maximising 
investors as the market agents and, like Gonedes, assume an 
underlying securities share market which is Pareto-optimal. The 
supply and demand characteristics of information are then 
discussed by B&L in order to demonstrate that they are not 
inconsistent with the usual assumption of, inter alias increasing 
marginal costs of production and zero externalities. 
Bromwich [198IJ also adopts this demand-side view in his 
consideration of the UK professional accounting standards setting 
process, After a review of the UK historical background, 
supporting the discussion above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting 
Standards Committee"# Bromwich considers some of the problems 
facing those who attempt to determine UK professional accounting 
standards. Bromwich argues [p. 491 that the market for accounting 
information is incomplete and so some form of intervention is 
required. Market incompleteness is argued to arise from both 
reducing marginal costs of supply [p. 481; and positive 
externalities, or "free riders" [p. 471. 
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Given that market incompleteness is a sufficient condition for 
intervention to elicit the preferences of individuals, Bromwich 
then identifies some institutional solutions to the 
incompleteness problem recognised by the economics literature. 
These solutions are bargaining games; taxation systems, such as 
the Clarke process reviewed below in Section 6.5 "Some 
alternative institutional arrangements"; and "norms of social 
behaviour" [p. 501, reviewed below in Section 7.4.2 "Social choice 
and the social welfare function". Additionally, Bromwich 
identifies Arrow's Possibility theorem [Arrow 1963 & 19511 as 
sufficient to argue that there exists no unique conceptual 
framework from which can be systematically deduced general 
purpose professional accounting standards setting solutions. This 
is also reviewed below in Section 7.4.2 "Social choice and the 
social welfare function". 
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6.4 COMPARISON OF THE TWO VIEWS 
It is now possible to review the above literature in the context 
of the study of professional accounting standards setting 
processes. The contribution that such a review can make is to 
generate an understanding of the nature of the underlying 
economic forces which work in the markets. By considering an 
idealised, unregulated, market the implications of economic 
behaviour become clear and the behaviour of those markets under 
those conditions can be determined. Against that understanding 
of free-market behaviour can be assessed the utilities and 
diautilities of existing and potential real-world institutional 
structures. In contrast, the setting up of free-market behaviour 
as a goal, against which real-world instititutional structures 
are each regarded as deficient in varying degrees, has been 
criticised by Demsetz [19691 as the "nirvana" approach. 
The literature has been characterised above by two fundamentally 
different approaches. On the one hand, there is the approach 
that considers the beý#viour of markets when the information set 
changes. This has been called, above, the supply-side view and 
is represented by the Hirshliefer & Riley [19791 survey. The 
implications of differing market assumptions and different 
information properties have been explored as they affect the 
efficiency of the underlying resource allocating markets. On the 
other hand, there is the approach that posits the existence of a 
market for information itself. This has been called, above, the 
demand-side view and is represented by Gonedes [19751. It assumes 
that the underlying resource allocating markets are perfect. In 
a sense, these two approaches almost correspond to differing 
"Kuhnign" world views [Kuhn 1970]. Kuhn's analysis of the 
structure of scientific "revolutions" suggests that individual 
researchers are often theory-bound in the sense that their views 
of the world are determined by their theories or "paradigms". 
Only when those individuals are succeeded do new theories gain 
general acceptance. 
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The source of the above difference lies in the concluding remarks 
of Riley L19791 on the nature of information equilibrium "that 
the imperfectly competitive market structures described above are 
a major, departure from the standard neo-Walrasian model" LP. 353, 
emphasis in original]. Essentially Riley is saying that where 
there is an information asymmetry between buyer and seller then 
the usual market analysis breaks down and no Pareto-optimal 
equilibria are available. Green [1977, p. 4511 has argued 
independently that Pareto-optimal equilibria are not available. 
He attributes this to the findings of his analysis that 
individuals without information are not able to fully infer the 
information from prices - "the space of prices is not "large 
enough', in a certain senses to transmit all of the relevant 
data" [ibid. I. As H&R observed, Riley's major contribution is to 
suggest the existence of equilibria whichs howeverl are not 
Pareto-optimal. 
So then, the results of analysis in which a market for 
information is not assumed is not yet adequate to explain the 
manner in which stability, if any, is determined. However, when 
Gonedes and B&L make the more traditional assumptions and posit 
the existence of a market for information, their analysis is in 
contradiction to that of H&R; Pareto-optimal equilibria are 
argued to be determinable. Examination of the assumptions of the 
two schools helps to clarify this paradox. Gonedes explicitly 
assumes that information is only available to those who contract 
to purchase it. Implicitly then, the "information leakage" 
effect, namely that at least some of the information is 
unavoidably transmitted through pricess is assumed away. Further, 
B&L recognise a problem in their discussion of the 
characteristics of the demand for information (B&L, p. 38]. In 
their analysis, the problem is 11interpreted as being synonymous 
with showing that accounting information is a public good" 
[ibid. ]. The 'nature of public goods and the implications for 
Pareto-optima are discussed in Appendix 6.1 "Pareto-optimality 
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and public goods". Here, then, is the kernel of the debate. 
Gonedes has assumed away externalities for his market game and 
when the externalities do exist then a Pareto-optimum is 
impossible (at least in the case of negative externalities). B&L 
have argued away the externalities [p. 391 by both positing 
contractually defined property rights which can be enforced; and, 
as an alternative, arguing that corporate information as a public 
good is a necessary but not sufficient condition "for suggesting 
that a form of intervention is required" [p. 381. This second 
argument is simply avoiding the issue. Their analysis is 
primarily concerned with Pareto-optimality rather than the need 
for intervention (although they fail to distinguish the two; on 
which see Appendix 6.2 "Social welfare maximisation and the 
irrelevance of Pareto-optimality") and so the second argument can 
be dismissed as irrelevant. Essentially then, B&L argue that 
enforceable property rights are sufficient to escape the 
externalities. H&R demonstrate this not to be the case because 
"information leakage" will be re-allocative and so there will be 
both positive and negative externalities simultaneously. Walker 
[19831 has criticised the B&L argument on much the same grounds. 
In summary, the H&R supply-side analysis assumes that 
externalities are associated with information generation and 
usage; whereas the Gonedes and B&L demand-side analysis assumes 
that these externalities can be supressed, either costlessly or 
otherwise. The empirical existence of externalities, both 
positive and negative, is supported by the available evidence 
[Foster 1981; Gonedes & Dopuch 19741 and we must conclude. that the 
analyses of Gonedes and B&L are of limited descriptive value. 
Further, it is possible to conjecture that the assumption of 
being able to alter the system of proerty rights to treat 
information as a private, rather than public, good would involve 
infeasible institutional arrangements. - This conjecture is 
supported to an extent by the Demsetz [19701 analysis of public 
goods noted in Appendix 6.1 "Pareto-optimality and public goods". 
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The following section considers research which assumes the 
existence of accounting information externalities and which 
explores alternative institutional arrangements for selection 
amongst accounting information systems. 
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6.5 SOME ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGMENTS 
Johnson (19791 has analysed an institutional solution to the 
problem of determining professional accounting standards gIven 
the existence of information externalities. Following Demsetz 
[19701 he characterises accounting information as a "collective 
good" (elaborated below -in Appendix 6.1 "Pareto-optimality and 
public goods"). Johnson argues that there is an adequate 
investment of research into the description of both the economic 
conseqences of professional accounting standards changes and the 
implications of the existence of information externalities. 
Where he does perceive a need is in modelling institutional 
processes for formulating policy Lp. 261. Five extant proposals 
for such institutional processes are reviewed. 
Firstly, Cushing [19771 is reviewed and criticised on the grounds 
that a "finer" information set is not always preferred, a 
criticism based on Ng [1978, p. 915j. Additionally, Johnson 
points out that Cushing's pairwise selection procedure permits a 
considerable degree of agenda control. The problem of agenda 
control is noted again below in Chapter 12 "Political choice 
processesil. 
Secondly, Scheiner [19751, which developed a multi-dimensional 
optimisation technique based on "spatial-analysis"j, a technique 
popularised in political science by Riker & Ordeshook (19731, is 
reviewed and criticised. Johnson's main criticism is that 
Scheiner made unrealistic assumptions about (a) the measurability 
of preferences; (b) the impartiality of assigning weightings to 
revealed preferences; (c) the use of "acceptability thresholds"; 
and (d) the ability to overcome individuals' incentives to 
misrepresent their preferences. 
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Thirdly, Scott [19771, which suggested that Blacks "single- 
peakedness" condition [Black 19481 can be used, is reviewed and 
criticised on the grounds that (a) the assumption of single 
peakedness of preferences is not realistic; and (b) again the 
pairwise selection procedure admits agenda control problems. 
Fourthly, Gonedes [19751 is reviewed and criticised on much the 
same grounds as in the preceding section of the present study, 
namely that the elimination of information externalities requires 
infeasible institutional arrangements. 
Fifthly, Demski [19771, which suggested a pairwise selection 
voting scheme based on the notion of a "constitutional game" 
[Bloomfield & Wilson 19721, is reviewed and criticised. The main 
criticism is again that pairwise selection schemes permit a 
considerable degree of agenda control. Additionally, Johnson 
notes that (a) only ordinal preferences are utilised, so no 
account is taken of the strength of preference; and (b) although 
"power" is modelled as an independent variable, there is no 
provision for it to be explicitly incorporated into the process. 
From this review of extant proposals for alternative 
institutional arrangements, Johnson argues that the Clarke 
process [Clarke 1972 & 19711 remains to be considered for its 
ability to select among professional accounting standards 
proposals. The Clarke process (also noted below in Appendix 6.1 
"Pareto-optimality and public goods") is essentially a taxation 
regime in which participants are asked to reveal their 
preferences, for goods which possess consumption externalities, 
knowing that there is a real probability (but not a certainty) 
that at the end of the process they will be called upon to pay 
the sum they declared themselves willing to pay. Here is not the 
place to review the Clarke process. It is important for the 
present study to note that the process exists. Johnson argues 
[p. 641 that if a market based scheme could be applied to the 
selection of professional accounting standards then it would have 
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the following three advantages 
I it would always be Pareto-efficient; 
2 actual payments would ensure honest preferences are elicited; 
and 
3 it would allocate entire information systems and so avoid 
problems of interaction and agenda control with an issue-by- 
issue process. 
Johnson goes to some length to argue [pp. 64-781 that his first 
criterion of Pareto-efficiency is a desideratum of social 
welfare. Citing Bator [19571 as demonstrating that Pareto- 
optimality is not sufficient for maximisation of social welfare, 
he argues that a problem exists in defending the case for the 
criterion and cites only Tindbergen [19521. A careful reading of 
Tindbergen shows that his analysis of "productive efficiency" 
demonstrates only several conditions under which Pareto- 
optimality is not sufficient for social welfare maximisation, a 
result Johnson has already recognised in Bator [19571. The 
question of whether or not Pareto-optimality is a necessary or 
sufficient condition for social welfare maximisation is addressed 
below in Appendix 6.2 "Social welfare maximisation and and the 
irrelevance of Pareto-optimality". 
Johnson proceeds [pp. 79-1241 to consider the production and 
consumption properties of accounting information. In contrast to 
Bird & Locke's (1981J analysis, reviewed above in the preceding 
section, Johnson concludes that, in each cases a Mori analysis 
is insufficient to determine the nature of those properties and 
calls for further empirical work. The four properties he 
considers are as follows 
I the rival/non-rival consumption propertyl that is, whether or 
not consumption by one individual deprives others from 
benefitting by subsequent consumption. It appears that a test 
of, this property in the securities markets amounts to a test of 
the strong, form of the efficient markets hypothesis; 
2 the excludability-of non-purchasers, that iss whether or not it 
is technically or economically feasible to restrict access to 
purchasers only; 
3 the returns to scale for information production, that is, 
whether or not these are increasing or decreasing; and 
4 the existence of negative consumption externalities, that is, 
whether or not consumption by one individual results in a cost 
to another individual. Johnson argues that the very purpose of 
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information as a decision input implies the existence of 
negative externalities. 
Based on his review of these production and consumption 
properties of accounting information, a review which he admits is 
necessarily inconclusive, Johnson makes the assumption that 
"accounting information is a non-rival consumptive good from 
which it is technologically impossible to exclude non- 
purchasers" [P. 126J. 
Using this assumption Johnson proceeds to illustrate the 
potential operation of the Clarke process as a professional 
accounting standards setting process. He selects the US debate 
on accounting for oil and gas producing companies to illustrate 
the application and then identifies the following problems which 
would be encountered in making such a process operational 
1 even if the process generated a Pareto-optimal solution, this 
would not guarantee social welfare maximisation [Bator 19571, 
and so a central intervention agency would still be required to 
protect the "public interest" through constitutional safeguards 
[p. 1681; 
2 control of the agenda is a problem because the ability of the 
Clarke process to generate a Pareto-optimal solution depends on 
the presentation of all possible alternatives; and 
3 the collections of tax under the process need to be "wasted" 
and this might be difficult to arrange in a socially meaningful 
way. 
In summary, Johnson classifies, and comments ons possible 
professional accounting standards setting processes as 
1 expert opinion, such as the US FASB and the UK ASC, in which 
selected individuals arrive at a decision on the basis of their 
collective experience. Expert opinion is subject to bias and is 
not Pareto-optimal; 
2 market forces, such as the market game scheme proposed by 
Gonedes [19751, in which a Pareto-optimal solution is 
available, but only if there is no market failure. Market 
forces are not Pareto-optimal 'to the extent that market 
failure exists; 
3 voting schemes, such as that proposed by Demski [19771, in 
which a pairwise selection procedure generates'an outcome based 
on power dominant coalitions. Voting schemes are not comparable 
because they incorporate a different objective, namely power 
dominance rather than Pareto-optimality; and 
Chapter 6 Page 19 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
4 the "willingness-to-pay" scheme, based on the Clarke process 
proposed by Johnson, in which a tax is levied on successful 
bidders. Willingness to pay schemes are Pareto-optimal but can 
impose a heavy tax burden and might be dynamically unstable (in 
the sense that preferences might change). 
In conclusion, Johnson argues that there is no rational basis for 
selecting between these processes and in each there is still a 
need for a separate body to provide constitutional safeguards in 
the public interest. To Johnson's argument can be added the 
argument of May & Sundem [19761, reviewed above in Chapter 5 
"Professional accounting standards, the political dimension and 
economic consequences", that professional accounting standard 
setting processes are social choice processes in which the 
objective of maximisation of social welfare is implied. 
Clearly, professional accounting standards setting processes in 
the UK may, or may not, be adequately characterised as such; and 
sot then, Johnson's constitutional safeguard in the name of the 
public interest may or may not be redundant. 
Johnson's analysis is important because it appears to draw 
together the different possible institutional arrangements for 
determining professional accounting standards. Using his review, 
the present study is better able to identify the specific 
institutional structure which best*describes the professional 
accounting standards setting processes in the UK. The 
description of the ASC, above in Chapter 3 "The Acco-unting 
Standards Committee". suggests that Johnson"s "expert opinion" is 
that institutional structure. 
Importantlys Johnson has further implications for the present 
study and for future research studies in as much as his review 
highlights the claimed advantages and disadvantages of these 
alternative institutions. The present study needs to be alert to 
the existence of these advantages and disadvantages. This 
alertness will. enable generation of statements of whether or not, 
and if so, how, the processes attempt to cope with the factors of 
the environment not captured by the basic model. These statements 
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can then be incorporated into the description. For example, 
Pareto-optimality is an important goal of some of these 
alternatives. It- is important to know to what extent "expert 
opinion" incorporates the Pareto-optimality criterion. Also, 
overcoming the incentive to misrepresent preferences is important 
to the rationale for adopting the Clarke process; it is important 
to know to what extent . "expert opinion" accomodates such 
incentives. Finally, the objective of the voting scheme was 
argued to be to generate a power dominated outcome; it is 
important to know to what extent "expert opinion" generates such 
outcomes. All of these offer suitable topics for further 
research. 
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6.6 SUMARY 
The information economics literature is essentially analytic in 
nature. Information economics suggests that the very subject 
matter of professional accounting standards setting processes, 
namely corporate information, is a resource the possession of 
which enables economic agents to realise gains at the expense of 
others [Hirshliefer & Riley 19791. That is, it has inherent 
economic consequences.. Information economics is concerned both 
with the effects of changes in the information set on the 
underlying capital and product markets; and with the possible 
properties of a market for information itself. 
In the first case, individuals are seen to stand to gain 
significantly from the possession of private information. In the 
absence of regulations some sort of audited, financial statements 
would be expected because accounting information is generated 
privately. Speculative gains can be realised by subsequent 
publication of the information in a form in which it is credible. 
There is evidence of such published accounting information in 
unregulated markets in the form of audited financial statements 
[Watts 1977; Choi 19731. The trading activities of individuals 
with private-information . are essentially de-stabilising, and any 
resultant equilibria are not likely to be Pareto-optimal. Such 
an analysis is generating a reconsideration of the nature *of 
general equilibrium economics. 
In the second case, ýthe properties of a'market for information 
are explored in order to determine its possible equilibrium 
properties and, in particulars the conditions under which such a 
market would be Pareto-optimal. 
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These two analyses are seen to be mutually inconsistent, the 
primary distinction being the extent to which information is 
assumed not to possess consumption externalities and so support a 
clear demand for information as a tradeable good. Under the 
existing institutional structure, accounting information clearly 
possesses externalities [Foster 1981; Gonedes & Dopuch 19741 and 
so the characterisation of a market for information is of little 
relevance to the present study. 
Comparison of market and non-mrket based information allocation 
processes suggests that there is no rational economic basis for 
selecting between processes (Johnson 19791. Some are Pareto- 
optimal, others only approximate Pareto-optimality and, in each, 
some sort of constitutional safeguard is required to protect the 
"public interest" [op. cit]. The economic analysis leaves 
unanswered the' problem of identifying the public interest 
[Appendix 6.2 "Social welfare maximisation and the irrelevance of 
Pareto-optimality"]. 
Review of the proposals for differing institutional arrangements 
for selecting professional accounting standards highlights the 
fundamental distinction between the two information economic 
perspectives. Some institutional arrangements assume the 
existence of consumption externalities and attempt to overcome 
the related problem of "market failure" by adopting non-market 
solutions. These arrangements include expert opinion, voting 
schemes and taxation regimes. on the other hand, other 
institutional arrangements assume that consumption externalities 
can be eliminated by appropriate changes to , 
the system of 
property rights [Bird & Locke 1981; Gonedes 19751. These latter 
arrangements are essentially free market solutions- From the 
variety of different possible institutional arrangements can be 
drawn two observations 
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the "expert opinion" arrangement most closely matches the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes; and 
2 the different arrangements possess different properties and 
objectives. Future studies might be able to address themselves 
to the problem of discovering to what extent the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes reflect any 
or all of those properties and objectives. 
p 
Chapter 6 Page 24 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
Of importance to the problem of investigating UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes is the understanding that 
there are private gains available to those who hold both private 
information and can control the subsequent publication of that 
information. Clearly, it is possible to characterise management 
as holding private information and so they have incentives to 
seek to control its subsequent publication. A professional 
accounting standards setting programme will necessarily restrict 
managements' freedom to exercise that control and so incentives 
exist for management to resist such a programme. The fundamental 
mechanism generating financial statements implies that some level 
of professional accounting standards is inevitable. The 
interesting question is how they are actually determined. 
The next chapter reviews the literature which investigates more 
closely managements" incentives by explaining their behaviour in 
terms of the agency relationship. 
.p 
Given that there is no unique economic solution to the problem of 
choice amongst alternatives for accounting information, there is 
a natural and clear interest in the structure of the present, 
existing, institutional, solution. One important contribution 
has been made by the dissertation of Johnson [19791. 
Johnson identifies different institutional arrangements under 
which professional accounting standards might be selected. Among 
the objectives of those arrangements* the usual economic 
criterion of Pareto-9ptimality is central although non-economic 
alternatives are clearly seen to be possible. Johnson's review 
suggests the following areas for further research specifically 
based on existing professional- accounting standards setting 
processes: 
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1 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate the Pareto-optimality criterion? 
2 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes overcome incentives to misrepresent 
preferences? 
3 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate a power dominated objective? 
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APPENDIX 6.1 PARETO-OPTIMT AND PUBLIC GOODS 
In the above review of the information economics literature, the 
property of information to possess positive or negative 
externalities was seen to be of fundamental importance. One 
implication of this lies in the well known result that markets 
for goods which possess externalities cannot be guaranteed to be 
Pareto-optimal. Pareto-optimality is the criterion for which "a 
state is reached (where) it is not possible to increase the 
utility of some consumers without diminishing that of others". 
[Cirillo 1979, p. 441. 
It is clear that, under the existing institutional arrangements, 
accounting information constitutes a public good. This appendix 
briefly identifies some of the theoretical issues without 
attempting to conclude on the implications for professional 
accounting standards setting processes. Those implications are 
addressed in the main body of the text. 
One of the usual assumptions of economics is "that there are no 
(nonpecuniary) external economies or diseconomies of production 
and consumption" [Bator 1957, P. 421. Commodities which possess 
the property of having external economies or diseconomies are 
known as "public goods", which Samuelson [1969, p. 1021 defines as 
a good which enters into two or more persons preference functions 
simultaneously. Under such conditions, market agents have 
incentives to misrepresent their preferences. For example, for a 
good (such as a television broadcast, a transport system or a 
defence system) , with positive externalities, consumers and producers have incentives to understate their preferences in the 
hope of transfering the costs of production and consumption 
elsewhere; for a good with negative externalities (such as 
pollution) consumers have an incentive to overstate their 
preferences in order to reduce or even prevent production and 
consumption. Much attention in the literature has been given to 
the problem of overcoming these incentives to misrepresent 
preferences. In the case of non-purchasers who can be 
economically and technologically excluded from consumption then 
the usual solution proposed is exclusion [Demsetz 19701. In the 
case of non-excludable consumers, understating preferences has 
become known as the "free-rider'l effect. For example, Clarke 
[1972; 19711 has suggested a process for marketing on a multi-part 
pricing system in which part of the pricing structure is 
determined by a central agency. Demsetz calls goods for which it 
is impossible to exclude non-purchasers, "collective goods" 
(1970, p. 2951. 
one of the major problems of public goods which has tested 
theorists is the identification of- necessary and sufficient 
conditions (if any), for the existence of a Pareto-optimum. 
Samuelson started to analyse the problem in his three seminal 
papers [1958; 1955 & 1954]. In his model he conceptualised a 
"pure public good" (that is one in which consumption by any one 
individual could be at any level and without limitation on the 
consumption by other individuals). In the following paragraphs 
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it will be shown that the literature has progressed somewhat 
since Samuelson, but still the position is that no Pareto-optima 
can be guaranteed. 
Two lines of analysis of the problem of the existence of Pareto- 
optima with public goods can be discerned. These are the game 
theoretic approach which utilises the concept of the market game 
of Shubik [19591, and the marginalist approach represented by 
Samuelson [1958; 1955 & 1954J. 
Firstly, in the market game analysis, interest is focussed on the 
"corell of the market, in which lies the set of feasible solutions 
(which cannot be blocked by any other coalition). Shapley & 
Shubik (19691 demonstrated that the existence of a non-empty core 
is guaranteed when the externalities are positive but is not 
guaranteed when the externalities are negative. Their analysis 
was restricted to the case of externalities of production only. 
Roberts 119741 continued the analysis and demonstrated that, in 
cases with either (a) decreasing returns to scale; or (b) non- 
excludable purchasers, then there is no core. Scarf [19671 
identified some sufficient conditions for the core to exist and 
be Pareto-optimal but he did not consider the case of public 
goods. So the question remains open as to what are the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for a Pareto-optimal core to exist in 
the case of public goods. 
Secondly, in the marginalist analysis, Musgrave [19591, Samuelson 
[19541 and Wicksell [18961 each demonstrated that Pareto-optima. 
are not guaranteed in the case of public goods. The phenomenon 
has become known as "market failure" and, as such, analysis 
suggests supplementing the market with some institutional 
mechanism. Recent 
, analyses 
by Hurwicz [19751 and Ledyard & 
Roberts [19741 have provided more rigorous demonstrations of 
market failure and have considered further the problem of 
incentives to conceal true preferences. The result of both of 
these lines of analysis is, again, that when there are 
externalities then a Pareto-optimal solution may exist but it is 
not guaranteed. 
As already noted much of the recent literature has turned itself 
to the problem of discovering necessary and sufficient conditions 
(if any) for the existence of a Pareto-optimum- This problem 
seems to be intractible. However, there has been some limited 
success in discovering specific institutional mechanisms under 
which a Pareto-optimal solution is guaranteed, that is* some 
sufficient conditions are being identified albeit in a piecemeal 
fashion. Examples of some of the processes so discovered are 
reviewed by Hurwicz 119731. Clarke's [1972 & 19711 process is to 
date the most celebrated of these novel mechanisms [Tideman 19771 
and is reviewed above in Section 6.5 "Some alternative 
institutional arrangements" as part of the review of the Johnson 
[19791 suggestion for an alternative to the existing professional 
accounting standards setting processes. 
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An interesting outcome of the growth of a Literature of 
alternative mechanisms has been an increased awareness of their 
different properties, such as feasibility, convergence to 
stability and, in particular, their information requirements. For 
Hurvicz [19731, the most interesting-property of the classical 
free-market mechanism is that of information decentralisation; a 
property that makes it a most attractive mechanism in Western 
democracies as opposed to Eastern socialist ' states. This 
observation could be interpreted as an ideological justification 
of. the dominant US interest in the free market mechanism. 
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APPENDIX 6.2 SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMISATION AND THE IRRELEVANCE OF 
PARETO-OPT331AIr ITY 
One result of economic analysis and, in particular welfare 
economics, is that Pareto-optimality is not a sufficient 
condition for social welfare maximisation [Hennipman 1976, 
Arrow 1974, Sen 19708 Bator 1958 & 1957, Tindbergen 1952 and 
Little 19501. 
A second result of economic analysis is that there exist 
conditions under which Pareto-optimality is not even a necessary 
condition for social welfare maximisation [Mishan 1965 and 
Lipsey & Lancaster 19561. 
Bergstrom [19711 gives an interesting example of the case of a 
Pareto-optimal slave economy; and Kaldor [19721 a criticism on 
different grounds, namely that Pareto-optimality oriented 
equilibrium 'analysis has no empirical meaning because the 
empirical world is rich with examples of increasing returns to 
scale in direct contravention of the classical assumption of 
decreasing returns to scale. 
The irrelevance of Pareto-optimality for social welfare 
maximisation can be elaborated by adopting Bator's analysis and 
exposition in the two-person two-coamodity case. Using 
conventional consumer utility analysis, Bator constructed the 
following Figure 6.2.1A "Conditions under which Pareto-optimality 
is not sufficient for social welfare maximisation". 
In Figure 6.2.1A ,; convex social welfare indifference curves are 
shown as W, to W5 in increasing order of welfare. The irregular 
line is the Pareto-frontier, that is the locus of all points on 
which the market is Pareto-optimal. For an analytical discussion 
of Pareto-frontiers see Biller & Bixby [19741 and Zeckhauser & 
Weinstein [1973]. Clearly, Pareto-optimality is not sufficient 
for welfare maximisatiou because both points a and b are Pareto- 
optimal whereas point b corresponds to a higher level of social 
welfare than point a. 
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FIGURE 6.2.1A.: CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH PARETO-OPTIMALITY IS NOT 










Source: Bator [1957, p. 281. 
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Further to the above result, there may actually be a welfare 
frontier, that is a level of social welfare which it is not 
possible to exceed but toward which social welfare indifference 
curves tend [Mishan 1981, pp. 269-270 and Bator 1958, p-3781- 
Kaldor argues that "except in a purely short term sense, total 
output can never be. confined by resources" [1972, p. 12511. The 
implication of Kaldor is that production of individual 
commodities is limited by the existence of a social welfare 
frontier. The case of a welfare trontier is set out next in 
Figure 6.2.1B "One condition under which Pareto-optimality is not 
necessary for social welfare maximisation: The case of a welfare 
frontier". 
In Figure 6.2.1B, it can be seen that Pareto-optimality is not 
necessary for welfare maximisation because all points on the 
welfare frontier segment, gto d, correspond to maximum social 
welfare whereas only the end-points,. Sand d, are Pareto-optimal. 
Having argued the irrelevance of Pareto-optimality for social 
welfare maximisation in the two-person, two-commodity case it is 
no difficult task to extend the analysis to the n: -person, n- 
commodity case. 
The irrelevance of Pareto-optimality can be elaborated in 
alternative terms based on considerations of "equity". One of 
the initial conditions of economic models is the distribution of 
initial endowments. Immediately then, Pareto-optimality becomes 
efficient only with respect to that initial endowment 
distribution. There is no guarantee that the distribution of 
equilibrium endowments will be "equitable" [Arrow 1974, p. 2691. 
All that. Pareto-optimality guarantees is that the system in 
equilibrium is operating "efficiently", that is, nobody can be 
made better off without making at least one other person worse 
off. 
This "equity" interpretation can be illustrated* In terms of 
Figure 6.2.1B, it can be seen that as a point moves along the 
Pareto-frontier, away from "centrist" positions towards one or 
other of the two axes of the figure, then the distribution of 
utilities becomes increasingly less balanced. In this sense, 
these "away-from-centrell distributions can be. said to be less 
"equitable" and so correspond to lower social welfare 
indifference curves. 
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FIGURE 6.2.1B: ONE CONDITION UNDER WHICH PARETO-OPTIMALITY IS NOT 
NECESSARY FOR SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMISATION: 
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Source: Original adaptation of Bator [1957, p. 281. 
Chapter 6 Page 33 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
CHAPTER 7 OTHER ECONOMIC PROCESSES 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 Rational choice theory 
7.3 Agency theory 
7.4 Social choice theory 
7.5 ' Summary 
7.6 Conclusions 
Appendix 7.1 A conflict minimisation hypothesis 
Cbapter 7 Page 1 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
CHAPTER 7 OTHER ECONOMIC PROCESSES 
7.1 IMODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the extent to which previous research shows 
how economic processes, other than information economics, operate 
to translate the consequences of, or the incentives for, the 
generation of accounting information into factors which might 
influence the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. In other words, it sets out additional mechanisms by 
which economic consequences are generated. 
The literature on these other economic processes can make a 
substantial impact on the analysi's of the problem of explaining 
professional accounting standards setting processes. Three 
separate subsets of this literature are reviewed. 
1 Rational choice theory, which is concerned with the analysis of 
information and its use by an individual, in which the focus of 
interest is the maximisation of expected utility for an 
individual. Examples of this literature include Beaver [19811, 
Cushing [1981 & 19771, Bromwich [19801$ Demski [1976,1973 & 
19721, Beaver & Demski [19741, Marshall [19721 and Feltham. 
119681. 
2 Agency theory, which is concerned with the analysis of both the 
-role of management as agent of the owners of the firm; and the information requirements of both agents and owners. Examples of 
this literature include Fama [19801, Sutton [19801, Watts & 
Zimmerman [19781, Watts [15771, Jensen & Meckling [19761, 
Alchian & Demsetz [19721. 
3 Social choice theory, which is concerned with the analysis of 
conditions under which heterogeneous preferences might -be 
aggregated to generate stable, or unique, choices. Examples of 
this literature include Mueller [19761, Fishburn [19731, Sen 
[19701, Arrow [1963 & 19511 and Black [1948J. 
Chapter 7 Page 2 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
7.2 RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 
Demski [19731 demonstrates that, it maximisation of expected 
individual utility is an objective, then, there exists no set of 
criteria ("standards" in his terminology) which both 
1 can be used to determine an accounting information system 
optimal for an individual; and 
2 does not take into account the preferences of that 
individual. 
Demski's argument, although presented in algebraic notation, can 
be paraphrased by saying any set of technical criteria can only 
serve to partition the available set of accounting alternatives 
into subsets based on those technical criteria. Unless an 
explicit utility criterion is also applied, there is no guarantee 
that accounting alternatives selected on the basis of the 
-technical criteria would also meet the utility criterion. 
Sets of technical criteria had been advocated, for example, by 
ASOBAT [AAA 19661, and by Chambers [1976 & 19661. They continue 
to be advocated by, for example, Stamp [1980, pp-55 & 901 who 
lists some twenty criteria. By way of example, the four ASOBAT 
criteria were relevance, verifiability, freedom from bias and 
quantifiability [p. 81. 
Demski's 119731 conclusion is important because it is now known 
that it is =possible to guarantee that a set of strictly 
technical criteria will always be sufficient even for an 
individual, or a class or individuals with homogeneous 
preferences, in a world in which preferences are meant to counte 
That is, if we assume a society in which the wants and needs of 
individuals are to be translated into behaviours then those 
preferences must be taken into account at some stage. This 
result has clear implications for an understanding of 
professional accounting standards setting processes. It predicts 
that professional accounting standards setting processes will be 
structured in such a way that both technical and preference 
criteria are taken into account. The evidence above in Chapter 3 
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"The Accounting Standards Committee" confirms just such an 
arrangement. 
Chambers [19761 criticised Demski's analysis on the grounds that 
there does exist a set of technical criteria which must be 
satisfied before any information can be useful for the purposes 
of making a decision. That is, Chambers sets up a set of 
necessary conditions Epp. 649-6501 for information to be decision 
useful. However; Demski -counters 
[19761 with the observation 
that usefulness stems from preferences, that is, that Chambers' 
conditions are not sufficient. Demski further counters [1976, 
p. 6541 that Chambers' conditions are not even necessary; that 
is, in comparing two information systems then fineness is the 
only necessary and sufficient condition for one system to be 
preferred to the other [Blackwell 1953]. By fineness Demski 
means [19.76, p. 654 and 1973, p. 722 I that the information 
contained in one system is, at least, also contained in the other 
system. 
Ng [1978, p. 9151 has shown fineness not to be a sufficient, or 
even nece"ssary, *condition for absolute preference. This result is 
generated by moving away from the individual utility maximisation 
framework of rational choice theory and introducing a multi- 
person setting. Management s and investors' preferences are shown 
to conflict and so the fineness result is shown to be limited to 
the single person setting. 
Bromwich 
-[1980J seeks to 
develop the impossibility result of 
Demski 119731 by investigating sufficient conditions under which 
partial standards might-be optimal. for an individual. Bromwich 
contrasts partial standards with the general standards of 
Demski's [19731 analysis by describing partial standards as those 
which, are "narrowly defined" and which 
nprescribe a desired treatment for one or more accounting items 
in isolation from the procedures adopted for solving other 
accounting problems" [p. 288J. 
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Bromwich shows (p. 293J that, using a result of Marschak [19711, 
one sufficient condition for partial standards to be optimal for 
an individual is that the individual's utility function be a 
simple linear function of independent variables. That is, it 
should be an "additively separable" utility function [p. 2941. 
The implication is-that, provided the accounting alternatives 
available under one issue have no interaction effects with 
alternatives available under a separate issue, separate 
consideration of those issues can determine outcomes optimal for 
an individual, that is, maximise his expected utility. 
Cushing 119771 takes issue with the impossibility result of 
Demski [19731, arguing that it is an "artifact of the way in 
which the issue is initially formulated" (p. 3081 and as such 
unnecessarily pessimistic. Cushing argues that each accounting 
choice problem can be treated as a pairwise choice between two 
alternatives, a proposal and the status QUO, and so the 
tineness condition is sufficient to ensure optimality for the 
individual. Cushing was presumably unaware of the Ng [19781 
result that fineness is not sufficient in a setting with more 
than one individual. 
Cushing's analysis is criticised in Bejan [19811, Bromwich [19801 
and Johnson [19791. Bejan (pp. 707-7091 argues that Cushing's 
rational choice framework, focussing as it does on the preference 
function of the individual is insufficient to capture the effects 
of public information in a multi-person setting. Bromwich 
[1980, 
p. 2951 argues that it is insufficient even to capture the 
interaction effects in a single-person setting* Bejan argues 
further that these phenomena need to be studied within a general 
equilibrium setting in which "the welfare analysis of public 
information has great potential" [p. 7091. Cushing replied [19811 
to Bejan's criticism by a restatement of his earlier position. 
It is clear that the two writers are analysing the problem of 
information system selection from different positions; Cushing 
from an individual utility position and Bejan from a multi- 
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person, or markets, position. There is no reason to expect that 
these two perspectives should generate identicjal results. 
Johnson's [19791 criticism of Cushing picks. up the Ng [19781 
fineness insufficiency result and further argues that the 
pairwise choice process is unstable and subject to agenda 
manipulation. Agenda manipulation is the term often applied to 
the process of selection of issues by individuals who control the 
stage at which issues. are identified for further consideration. 
Agenda manipulation is discussed further below in Chapter 12 
"Political choice processes". 
It has been noted that the individual utility, or rational 
choice, framework implies that even an individual cannot select 
amongst accounting alternatives without taking account of his 
preferences [. Demski 19731 and that an "additively separable" 
preference function is sufficient for such selection to proceed 
on a partial basis [Bromwich 19801. It is, then, natural to 
enquire, as Bejan has prompted, into the results of the analysis 
of a multi-person, or market, setting. This is undertaken in the 
following review and in the remaining sections of this present 
chapter. 
Beaver & Demski 119741 has extended the individual orientation of 
rational choice theory by explicitly considering the implications 
of a multi-person framework in which there are heterogeneous 
preferences. Heterogeneity implies that there should not be 
expected any agreement on which accounting information should 
be 
provided to users [p. 1711. This result is supported by- the 
argument in Hakansson [1981). Further, in order to reduce the 
areas of disagreement between individuals, or classes of 
individuals, accounting policy-makers have conventionally sought 
to achieve agreement on the underlying objectives of accounting 
information [p. 1751. Examples of such attempts include Stamp 
(19801, ASC 119751, AICPA (19731, AAA [19661p Sprouse & Moonitz 
[19621 and Moonitz 119611; as such their role "is to specify the. 
nature of the tradeoffs" [P. 1851. 
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The Beaver & Demski analysis draws attention to the implications 
of heterogeneity in a multi-person environment. The previous 
Chapter 6 "Information economics" reviews, in much greater 
detail, several analyses of how the inherent heterogeneity, or 
conflict, might interact with the market place. 
The following section considers the imlications of the individual 
expected utility maximising assumption in the specific context of 
individuals who act as managers, that is, as agents of the owners 
of the firm. 
Chapter 7 Page 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
7.3 AGENCY THEORY 
7.3.1 The agency theoretic framework 
Agency theory is. a body of literature which seeks to explain the 
behaviour of non-owner managers in establishing the ownership 
structure of a firm. In a seminal article, and following Alchian 
& Demsetz L19721, Jensen & Meckling [1976] (J&M) models the firm 
as a set of contractual relationships [pp. 310-3111. Managers are 
shown to have incentives, deriving from a utility maximising 
assumption, to consume not only their contracted pecuniary 
remuneration but also non-pecuniary benefits. Such non--! pecuniary 
benefits are assumed to be appropriated by managers from the 
firms resources and result in a discounting of the value of the 
firm [pp. 316-3191. This discounting arises because outside 
owners of an equity claim to the resources of the firm are 
assumed to expect that the managers will consume those non- 
pecuniary benefits. The amount by which the value of the firm is 
discounted is known as the agency cost; that is, given that 
there is a separation between ownership and management, then the 
agency cost is the difference between 
1 the market value of equity claims on the resources of the firm, 
given that the manager is (notionally) also the owner of the 
firm; and 
2 the market value of equity claims on the resources of the firm. 
Given the existence of agency costst then at the same time that 
he offers to the market equity claims on the resources of the 
firm, the owner-manager has an incentive to offer bonding 
commitments not to consume these non-pecuniary resources [J&M, 
p. 3251. This incentive derives from the result that when he 
offers equity claims then he bears the full agency costs himself 
as the discount in the market value of those claims. So, by 
incurring "bonding costs"the manager increases the market value 
of equity claims to the resources of the firm. Similarly, by 
monitoring the manager's performance of the bonding commitment, 
then the non-managing owner also increases the value of equity 
claims to the firm Ep. 323]. Assuming that the full agency cost 
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cannot be bonded or monitored away then there will be a residual 
cost. In this sense the agency cost can be said to be made up of 
three elements, namely bonding costs, monitoring costs and 
residual loss [p. 308J. Further, J&M argue that owner-managers 
have an incentive to engage in risky projects when the firm's 
activities are financed by debt because the lender bears the risk 
of loss whereas the owner captures the chance of gain [p. 334- 
3371. Again, this incentive generates an agency cost by the same 
market discounting mechanism described above and so there is an 
incentive to engage in bonding and monitoring costs in those 
circumstances also. 
Using these reults, J&M develop their model further to 
demonstrate the existence of optimal levels of debt and equity in 
a "theory of the corporate ownership structure" W&M, pp. 343- 
3511. The present study is not concerned with these extensions 
but with implications of the results that bonding and monitoring 
contracts are likely to be entered into when securities are 
offered to the markets. Clearly, if subsequent to the creation 
of those contracts some important measures of the monitoring 
variables are changed exogenously then there will be a wealth 
transfer from (a) one or more of the manager, equity claim owner 
or debt claim owner; to (b) one or more of the others; except 
where such changes can be costlessly adjusted in the bonding and 
monitoring process. Changes in professional accounting standards 
operate precisely as changes in monitoring variables to the 
extent that they change the methods by which these variables are 
measured. 
Fama [19801 has criticised the J&M model of the agency 
relationship between owners and managers of the firm. Supporting 
the characterisation of firms as a set of contractual 
relationships, Fama argues that the concept of the entrepeneurial 
owner embodied in the J&M model is unnecessary as a device for 
the explanation of the structure of the firm [p. 2901. Further, 
Fama argues [ibid. ] that, in attempting to understand how control 
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is exercised over-the firm and its decisions, the notion that a 
firm is any sense owned is misleading. In particular, the firms 
equity owners can be said to own nothing more than claims to 
residual rights in the net flows of resources through the firm. 
From this position then, managers are best controlled not by the 
owners of the firm's securities but rather by the mechanism of 
the market for managers. This argument is clearly not consistent 
with the J&M agency theory argument, in which managers are 
controlled not by the market for managers but by the monitoring 
activities of the owners of debt and equity securities. In the 
J&M model monitoring signals are, in part, provided on a 
contractual basis to securities holders; in the Fama model 
monitoring signals are provided on an uncontracted (and so ad 
hoc) basis to the management labour market. 
It is an open question whether the J&M "agency theory" model or 
the Fama "market for managers" model proves to more fully explain 
the observable world of firms and their contractual relationships 
(or firms as their contractual relationships). 
.0 
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7.3.2 The-framework applied to professional accountint 
standards setting processes 
Watts [19771, in a seminal development of an earlier study 
[Watts 19741, sought to extend the application of agency theory 
to an explanation of financial information production. As such, 
his study represents a substantial change in the approach of the 
literature to the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. Watts develops a deductive theory of the processes by 
integrating the results of both ' 
agency theory 
[Jensen & Meckling 19761 and economic theory of politics 
[Downs 1957j. He argues that agency theory predicts that the 
content of financial statements will be determined by market 
forces and that those contents will be dependeat on the 
circumstances of individual companies; he argues that economic 
theory of politics predicts that bureaucratic standards setters 
will be risk-averse in the sense that they will generate 
standards which will minimise the risk of their being blamed for 
failures. Politicians are described as using crises, created by 
the media, as opportunities to apply simplistic solutions. 
Watts tests some of his hypotheses by using evidence of 
accounting historye 
Watts work is important because it represents a first attempt to 
develop a model of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes as processes. Within the framework of this modelp 
Watts has provided a richness of ideas and hypotheses for 
testing. 
Watts & Zimmerman [19781 (WZ 1978) extends the work of Watts 
119771 by testing some of the implications of the agency theory 
assu , mptions. 
In this work, it is deduced that management will 
behave in a manner consistent with the minimisation of costs. WZ 
1978 categorises the costs of professional accounting standards 
as they affect companies and tests predictions of management 
behaviour based on that categorisation. By the authors' own 
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admission, the extent of testing was not great. One US 
professional accounting standards issue, that of inflation 
accounting, was selected for testing and another study's 
previously published transformations of historic cost data into 
general purchasing power data was used. WZ 1978 discriminated 
between different effects based on informal estimates of costs, 
including political interference costs, and on the basis of the 
impact. of these costs on management as predicted by the 
hypotheses. The results did not reject the hypotheses and, in 
particular, suggested that size is by far the most important 
factor in determining choice in inflation accounting. 
The WZ 1978 study is important because it develops further the 
Watts L19771 model and shows how some of those hypotheses might 
be tested. 
Nevertheless, the WZ 1978 study suffers from limitations of 
method. As with the Hussein [1981 & 19771 study reviewed above 
in Chapter 5 "Professional accounting standards, the political 
dimension and economic consequences". the use of the inflation 
accounting issue does not represent a randomised approach to 
sample -selection and, arguably, introduces a strong systematic 
bias, to any generalisations based on it. It is arguable that the 
inflation accounting issue is one of extreme positions and as 
such it may be unrepresentative of professional accounting 
standards issues generally. More work needs to be conducted to 
investigate this question alone. 
A number of studies have followed the lead of Watts [19771 and 
WZ 1978. 
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Hagerman & Zmijewski [19791 (HZ) seeks to extend the analysis of 
WZ 1978 by deducing possible economic 'variables which, it is 
hypothesiseds might operate as determinants of accounting policy 
choice on the part of management. These economic variables are 
size, risk, capital intensity, competition and existence of 
management incentive plans. Four accounting policy issues were 
selected for testing. These were accounting for inventory, 
depreciation, investment tax credits and pension costs. 
Interestingly, HZ adopted probit analysis as the statistical 
tool by which to analyse their data; their arguments are 
considered more fully below in Chapter 18 "Research approach and 
method". The HZ results suggest that different sets of economic 
variables are associated with managements' choice of accounting 
policy on different issues. In particular, size was the most 
important variable in only two of the four issues. This is a 
result that limits the generalisability of the WZ 1978 finding 
that size was most important for the inflation accounting issue. 
Zmijewski & Hagerman [198lj provides evidence additional to that 
of HZ. It is demonstrated that, when the individual issues of 
the HZ study are combined to form an overall "income strategy", 
then the association between the accounting policy choice and the 
economic variables is stronger than in HZ (above). This result 
only holds for larger firms in concentrated industries. 
Sutton [19801 is a study which is particularly important for 
the present study because it seeks to test the WZ 1978 result 
against' data from the UK' professional accounting standards 
setting processes. As has been done above in Chapter 5 
"Professional accounting standards setting processess the 
political dimension and'economic consequences", Sutton notes that 
many writers recognise the political nature of these processes* 
As part of a brief review of the history of-these processes, both 
in the US and in the UK, Sutton suggests that 
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"the economic consequences argument has a strong appeal to non- 
accountant critics of a standard. 'Technical' arguments the 
(ASW can rebuff, all the more easily if the standard accords 
vith an 'agreed conceptual framevorV. But non-technical 
arguments lie outside its competence and, more crucially, its 
authority" [p. 22, footnote 191. 
Sutton argues that the ASC has shown itself to be sensitive to 
corporate self-interest and -so management has not found it 
necessary to openly pursue wider, economic consequences, 
arguments. In a sense, the evidence presented below in Part IV 
"Evidence from the empirical study of UK data" offers qualified 
support for Sutton's assertion. 
Following Watts [19771, Sutton develops implications of Downs" 
[1957] analysis of the economics of political action. From a 
rational choice theoretic frameworks Downs predicted that 
rational$ self-interested individuals would not perceive 
sufficient benefit to induce them to vote in general elections. 
That is, voting costs would exceed expected benefits. Sutton 
argues that corporate managements' behaviour as lobbyists in the 
professional accounting standards setting processes can be 
assumed to be explained by this simple cost/benefit analysis. 
From such an assumption it follows that 
1 lobbying costs must be less than expected benefits. For some 
managements close to the decision makers, the costs of 
information acquisition and lobbying will be relatively low; 
2 high levels of uncertainty will induce lobbying in an attempt 
to reduce the uncertainty; 
3 supportive lobbying will be less frequent than opposing 
lobbying; and 
4 group lobbying will be more influential, but only in the area 
of the group interest. 
In developing the framework for his study, Sutton is sensitive to 
criticisms of the Downs [19571 analysis. In particular, Barry 
[19781 argues that Downs' analysis is internally inconsistent and 
his conclusion, that individuals in general will not vote in 
general elections, is counter intuitive. However, Sutton relies 
on Riker & Ordeshook [1968J which provided some evidence in 
support of Downs. So, by assuming Downs, Sutton aims "to 
Chapter 7 Page 14 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
determine if there exists a measurable relationship between 
perceived "benefits" and stated preferences" [p. 591. He uses the 
UK professional accounting standards proposal ED18 "Current cost 
accounting" as the issue to investigate and identifies the 
written submissions of management to the ASC as evidence of 
stated preferences. Sutton provides a brief description of the 
ED18 proposals, discussing the main points of contention such as 
high costs of implementation and expected taxation effects. 
Sutton's research design utilises four critical stages, namely 
1 discover stated preferences from the written submissions; 
2 discover incentives for stated preferences by assuming Downsian 
. rational self-interest; 3 classify preferences into supporting/opposing; and 
4 use discriminant. analytic techniques to determine, whether or 
not the incentives are sufficient to discriminate between the 
stated preferences. 
In order to identify the incentives, Sutton classified the 
expected economic consequences of the ED18 "Current cost 
accounting" proposals into 
1 the additional cost of generating the information; 
2 the increased probability of a change in the taxation base or 
rate structure; 
3 the increased probability of "political" consequences, such as 
additional price controls, monopolies investigations, dividend 
controls and corporate legislation; and 
4 the additional costs of rewriting existing financial contracts 
based on the changed accounting ratios. 
The following accounting characteristics were used by Sutton to 
distinguish the expected economic consequences. 
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Size of company - 
Proportion of overseas 
assets 
Current cost information 
-already being generated 
2 Tax effect 





Source: Sutton [1980J 
Size of current cost 
adjustments relative to 
taxable income 
Sales and absolute profit 
Actual margin relative to 
a reference margin 
Legal definition of 
monopolist 
Interest cover 
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Sutton7s data analysis took the f orm of a test of the hypothesis 
that 
corporate management will expect a professional accounting 
standards change to alter cash f lows and so they will support 
or oppose a proposal if the net benefit is positive or negative 
respectively. 
Managements' preferences were inferred from the accounting 
characteristics identified above in Figure 7.1 "Sutton's 
accounting characteristics of economic consequencesil, In 
summarising the, results of his analysis, Sutton observed that 
I the characteristics chosen discriminated poorly between the 
supporters and opponents of the proposal; 
2 there was only weak evidence of a relation between size and 
support for the proposal; 
3 the taxation variable seemed to be unimportant; 
4 companies currently under investigation by the Monopolies and 
Mergers Commission were more likely to support the proposal; 
and 
5 price controls appeared to have little impact. [p. 1391. 
The unanticipated failure of Sutton's results to confirm his 
hypothesis led him to conclude his study, firstly, by analysing 
possible points at which his study may have failed to adequately 
operationalise the variable he was investigating; and, secondly, 
by analysing the possible points at which his hypothesis might 
not. have captured all the variables relevant-to, the study. 
An operational criticism identified by Sutton was that his 
initial classification of stated preferences into supporting or 
opposing may have been incorrect. -He 
did earlier (in his Chapter 
3) admiý to having 
'difficulty 
with this classification because 
some statements of, preference were conditional and others 
expressed varying degrees of strength of preference. This 
particular point is important to the present study and is 
considered below in Chapter 18 "Research approach and method". 
Additionally, Sutton identified the possibility. of introducing 
bias into the choice of proxy accounting characteristics and the 
possibility of the exclusion of some important ones, This self- 
criticism of Sutton's is valid, for at no stage did he develop a 
model to show how his selected characteristics could be seen to 
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be predictive of the expected economic consequences with which 
they were associated. 
Sutton's self-criticism also explores the possibility that the 
hypothesis might not have captured all the variables relevant to 
the study. For example, he suggests that there may have been 
disagreement amongst the different managements about the effects 
of the proposal; or "public spirited" managements might have 
lobbied regardless of the expected cost or benefit. Sutton 
suggests that the literature of political science might be a 
fruitful source of explanations of the professional accounting 
standards setting processes. Sutton further suggests 
investigation of the nature of the power of the professional 
standards setting authority and of the consititutional aspects. 
A final criticism of Suttods contribution focuss'es on the role 
of theory construction in his dissertation. As he adequately 
noted, insufficient attention was given to an exploration of 
other possible explanatory factors within which the study was 
being conducted. In particular, the introduction to his study 
clearly identified a political dimension to his problem. He 
failed, however, to explore the implications of the existence of 
that political dimension. Rather, those implications were 
dispensed with in an early decision to consider only the Downs 
[19571 rationalisation of political behaviour. As is demonstrated 
below in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes", the literature 
of political science is rich with alternative rationalisations 
and a careful review is necessary before any one is 'selected in 
preference to others. 
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Christenson [19831 criticises applications of the agency 
theoretic framework to studies of the professional accounting 
standards setting processes which are based on the Watts & 
Zimmerman model. Christenson argues that the "positivist" 
methodology underlying the work ot Watts 1977 and WZ 1978j 
amongst others, is philosophicaly unsound. This unsoundness lies 
in the aim of the researchers to describe the world "as it is". 
The philosophy of science is argued (p. 101 to have moved away 
from such a characterisation of theory construction to one in 
which theories are seen as statements of what the world is not, 
rather than what it is [Popper 1959, p4lj. This is known as the 
"strictly universal negative-existential proposition" and is 
often illustrated by the ubiquitous "black swan" argument, in 
which an observation of two swans, one black and one white, no 
longer leads to the proposition that "one half of all swans are 
black"; rather it leads to the proposition that "it cannot be 
said that either all swans are white or all swans are black". In 
this brief review of the empirical studies addressing the 
economic processes which underly professional accounting 
standards setting processes, there is insufficient opportunity to 
consider these arguments in depth. However, it is noted that 
they do exist andhave implications for the way in which theories 
are interpreted. Beyond that naive observations the present 
study avoids the underlying subtleties by not pursuing the point 
further. Rather, the Poppe*rian position is adopted below Part IV 
"Evidence from the empirical study of UK data" and the issue of 
its philosophical rectitude is left to others to debate and 
criticise. 
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7.4 SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 
7.4.1 Introduction 
Two analyses have led to the literature of social choice 
theory. 
Firstly, in Chapter, 5 "Professional accounting standards, the 
political dimension and economic consequences", it was shown that 
May & Sundem [19761 argues that professional accounting standards 
setting processes are themselves social choice processes with an 
implied objective of social welfare maximisation. 
Secondly, in Chapter 6 "Information economics", it was shown that 
Johnson [19791 argues that there are a number of possible 
institutional structures for determining professional accounting 
standards and that there is no rational economic basis for 
selecting, among them; each requires some separate constitutional 
safeguard, acting to defend the "public interest". 
Additionally, it is shown, below in both Chapter 8 "Empirical 
studies of the political dimension in professional accounting 
standards setting processes" and in Chapter 12 "Political choice 
processes"_ that the characterisation as a social choice process 
is meaningful. The importance of such a characterisation is 
elaborated in the following-sections. 
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7.4.2 Social choice and-the social-velfare function 
The literature of social choice theory, or public choice, and the 
social welfare function has grown considerably over the period 
since the analyses of Arrow [1963 & 1951j and Black [19481. 
Surveys of the field are provided by Mueller (19761, Fishburn 
[19731 and Sen [19701. What follows is an elementary introduction 
to the topic supplemented by elaboration only in so far as is 
useful to the present study. 
Much literature in the social sciences assumes, either 
implicitly or explicitlys that a goal of collective human 
behavoiur is the maximisation of social welfare. Equally, the 
literature is agreed that the specification of a social welfare 
function is problematic. Indeed, Arrow"s "Possibility theorem" 
11963 & 19511 demonstrated that it is only possible to 
determine a unique social welfare function by violating one or 
more of the following four conditions 
1 all logically possible orderings of the alternative social 
states are admissible [1963, p. 961; 
2 the choice betveen tvo alternatives depends only on the 
preferences of individuals concerning those tvo 
alternatives, (the independence of irrelevant alternatives) 
L1963, p. 98]; 
3 if every individual prefers x to y. then so does society (the 
Pareto principle) [1963, p. 96J; 
4 the social velfare function is not dictatorial [1951, p. 301. 
Arrow's result then states, in other words, that, under the 
specified conditions, social choices are indeterminate. The 
result of such indeterminacy would be instability of choice, with 
a constant recycling of alternatives. Nevertheless, society is 
not unstable. Much behaviour is orderly and, to some extent, 
predictablee So then, the interesting question is "What 
mechanisms are there that operate on individual preferences such 
that they do not generate unstable choices? ". Black [19481 
elaborated one of these mechanisms in his work on the preference 
structure of committees. Black's contribution was to demonstrate 
that if individual preferences were "single-peaked". in the sense 
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that there is a single maximum, then a unique preference function 
is determinable. Generalising, it can be said that 
if individual preferences can be constrained then, there exist 
circumstances under vhich a social velfare function can be 
determined. 
This is an important result. For in a sense, it can be seen as a 
clue to a possible re-interpretation of the purposes of the 
present study. That re-interpretation would suggest that the 
present study investigates the structure of constraints on 
individual preferences such that professional accounting 
standards are determined in the UK. This notion of the 
investigation of the structure of constraints on preferences is 
seen again below in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes" to 
be advocated by Riker [1980J. 
Black"s result violates one of Arrow's essential conditions. 
Reflecting on those conditions, it can be seen that preferences 
are constrained as everyday occurrences. There are some 
activities in which individuals are not permitted to engage 
without, fear of penalty. There exists a coercive force, namely 
the penal system of the law, by which individuals can be 
restrained from engaging in some of these activities. That is 
not to say that preferences have been constrained into "single- 
peakedness", but BlacVs constraint may be but a single example 
of a class of constraints under which a unique social welfare 
function is determinable. Arrow's conditions are not, then, as 
reasonable as seems at first sight. One of thems at leasts 
does not accord with the social world. That is, not all 
logically possible orderings of the alternative social states 
are admissible. The contribution of Arrow"s work is the formal 
statement that unconstrained freedom in social choice and a 
stable social structure are inconsistent with each other. 
Chapter 7 Page 22 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
Constraints that operate on individual preferences to generate 
stability of social choice can be identified. Trivially, there 
is the coercive force of the State. In a sense this represents 
the dictatorial imposition of a class of preference rankings 
and so identifies a breach in Arrow"s fourth condition. The 
social structure is subtle, though, and many other constraints 
to preferences exist. For example 
1 economists have identified a set of constraints they call 
"market forces". In the firm, market forces operate to 
determine output prices; 
2 political theorists have identified a set of constraints they 
call "institutions". The family is an institution; and, in 
the firm, the audit is an institution (Thornton 19791; 
3 sociologists have identified a set of constraints they call 
"normal@,, In the firm, norms might operate to restrict the 
freedom of the employee to act against the employer's wishes; 
The source of each of these constraints may be explained in terms 
of economic factors; political factors; or sociological factors; 
or one or more of many other factors depending on the perspective 
of the analyst. For the-purposes of the present study, the 
sources of these constraints are less important than the fact of 
their existence. For it is their very existence that enables the 
social welfare function to be operationalised. 
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7.4.3 Social velf are maximisation and a conflict minimillation 
hvvothesis 
It has been argued above that* if a unique social welfare 
function has been determined then, Arrow's "Possibility theorem" 
[Arrow 1963 & 19511 implies that at least one person's 
preferences' must have been constrained. That is, not all 
logically possible orderings of the alternative social states are 
admissible, a violation of the first of Arrow's conditions as 
listed above. 
Assuming heterogeneous preferences, there will exist some 
individuals whose preferences are in conflict with others 
including, if any, those whose preferences are identically equal 
to the outcome of social choice. In this sense, conflict is 
being* equated with heterogeneity of preferences. Such conflict 
could be based on market forces, social norms, psychological 
needs or what have you. The formulation is generalland everyday 
experiences confirm that conflicts with roots in religious or 
political ideology also abound. A natural question is that of how 
the maximisation of the isocial welfare function might be 
operationalised. 
As a basis forý starting to consider the role of conflicts we can 
observe that, in some sense, ' social welfare- and social conflict 
are opposing concepts. In particular, when we have one in 
abundance we would expect to find less of the other, in short 
they are at least negatively correlated. Further, it can be 
observed that many social problems or issues seem to be generated 
by conflict. Conflict seems to be the natural answer to the 
question "where do issues come from? ". Also, it is possible to 
characterise decision opportunities as conflict occasions, where 
if there were no conflict then there would be no underlying 
ambiguity of choice* The' very ambiguity arises from the 
existence of differing, and so conflicting, preferences for 
alternative outcomes. Only in the very restricted case of the 
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decision theoretic approach to problem solving is there no 
conflict of preference. That case is discussed in more detail 
below in Chapter 11 "Scientific choice processes". 
It can be observed that, although social welfare is not a readily 
observable phenomenon, it is clear that social conflict is 
observable. It is conceivable that a scale of conflict 
measurement might be constructed with, say, conflict in the form 
of "physical violence" at one extreme and at the other extreme 
perhaps "mild irritation". It is not suggested that such a scale 
actually be constructed, rather that a discussion of the 
possibility of its construction helps to clarify the concepts 
From the negatively correlated relationship it should be 
deducible that a non-trivial, that is non-zero, point of maximum 
social welfare is, in some unspecified wayl related to a non- 
trivial point of minimum social conflict. The elaboration of this 
relationship is beyond the scope of the present study but is 
presented as a topic for further research. So, although society 
cannot easily maximise its welfare function directly, it might 
operationalise that goal by minimising conflict. A simple 
corollary then is that evidence of conflict is T)rima-facie 
evidence of non-optimality. 
Empirical meaning is difficult to attach to the concept of social 
welfare maximisation because of its inherent unobservability. 
Minimisation of social conflict-is considerably more tractable in 
empirical terms because it is observable. -Arrow predicts 
(1963 & 19511 that no state -would occur in which no conflict 
occurred at all. But it is likely that there is the opportunity 
to achieve a minimum level of conflict, deviations from which 
would necessarily be in the direction of increasing conflict and 
would be evidence of deviation of the social welfare function 
from its maximal level. This can be summarised as 
Social velfare maximisation is related to social conflict 
minimisation. Evidence of increasing social conflict is 
prima facie evidence of non7optimality of social velfare. 
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The precise nature of this relationship is as yet unspecified and 
its specification provides an opportunity for further research. 
In particular, such a specification would inlcude a statement of 
the conditions under which it would be true. A first development 
of such a specification is presented below in Appendix 7.1 "A 
conflict minimisation hypothesis". 
7.4.4 Conflict minimisation and equity 
Myerson [1981J9 Yaari [1981J, Rohrbaugh, McClelland & Quinn 
[19801, McClelland & Rohrbaugh [19781, Rawls (1974; 1971 & 19581 
and Sen [19731 are a number of writers who introduce the notion 
of "equity" (or "fairness" or "justice") into the analysis of 
social choice. In the following, equity and conflict minimisation 
are equated. Equity is important to the literature on criteria 
because of. the irrelevance result set out above in Appendix 6.2 
"Social welfare maximisation and the irrelevance of Pareto- 
optimality". 
Samuelson discusses two distinct concepts of equity which he says 
"have lived on in unpeaceful coexistence within Western man these 
last two centuries" [1969, pp. 100-1011. 
On the one hand Samuelson sees inc omes (or wealth) being 
allocated in' order to maximise welfare. Such an allocation 
process involves redistributions so making one or more 
individuals- less well-off in order to increase other individuals 
(and, the aggregate) well-offness. 
On the other hand, Samuelson, sees individuals as comprising -an 
inviolable core of rights the property-to which is absolutely 
unassailable. Arguably these are not inconsistent. For clearly 
when individuals are considering actions based on preferences 
then issues become matters of degree. Some (but not allI) 
individuals appear to be prepared to sacrifice a little of their 
wealth in order to improve the wealth of others. They make these 
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sacrifices with no evidence of conflict between the parties and 
so we infer that their own preferences are (at least in the sense 
of this partial analysis) being optimised. However, if these 
same altruistic individuals were coerced into sacrificing all of 
their wealth, they (but perhaps not allO would appeal to the 
existence of their own core of inviolable rights. Each 
individuars core preferences would of course not necessarily be 
equal to the core preferences of others. Nevertheless, we can 
see that Samuelsonýs dilemma stems (in terms of our analysis) 
from a false dichotomy. There are not two different types of 
equity, but simply two different levels of conflict. The 
individual who feels that his inviolable core of rights is being 
threatened (or has been violated) will embark on a pattern of 
conflict behaviour different from the individual whose 
pref erences have been of f ended only at the margin. The f ormer 
might well take to the streets and be violent, the latter might 
well simply curse. The notion of conflict is addressed again in 
the present study below in Section 12.4 "Power". 
By what -mechanisms can society, either spontaneously or by means 
of some social agency, minimise conflict? The above discussion 
gives an insight into the nature of some of the constraints on 
preferences by which the social welfare function can be 
determined. There exists a class of constraintso theng that 
operate to determine the given level of conflict associated with 
any social welfare function. Following Riker [19801, discussed 
below in Section 12.3 "Political institutions"l these constraints 
can be characterised as institutions and, as has been seen, some 
of these institutions are fundamental to human existence. Other 
institutions are, although arguably equally fundamental, more in 
the nature of artifacts which can be engineered at will. 
Consequently, it is this latter class of institutions which 
society can use, in a process of social engineerings to minimise 
coýiflict. Thornton [19791 has characterised the audit as an 
institution and other charact eri sat ions are to be found in the 
literature of political theorists. For example, Croham says, of 
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the UK Civil Service 
"f ear of producing social inequity is deeply ingrained in 
Whitehall" [Croham 1981, p. 2141. 
It is arguable that the professional accounting standards setting 
processes could equally well be characterised as a conflict 
minIMIsing social institution. 
7.4.5 "Plilltiol" of socLal choke theorv for the study of 
Professional accountLnx--standards settLnit PrOcesses 
A first implication for the study of professional accounting 
standards setting processes is that, given Arrow's four 
conditions, conflict will always exist between individuals in 
respect of (a) the existing set of professional accounting 
standards; and (b) any proposals to change that set of 
professional accounting standards. Hakansson [19811 illustrates 
this with an example of a taxi firm. This result applies 
regardless of whether accounting standards are implicit, as in 
much of conventional accounting practice, or explicit, as in the 
requirements of legislation or the requirements of professional 
institutions. Examples of explicit requirements can be found in 
the UK 1948 Companies Act and in the Statements of Standard 
Accounting Practice published by the UK accounting bodies. 
A second implication is that the resolution of that conflict will 
involve the constraining of individual preferences in some 
undefined way. It has already been noted above that, in an 
important sense, the exploration of the constraint structure can 
be seen as part of the objective. of the present study. 
Chapter 7 Page 28 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
A third implication is that, if social welfare maximisation is a 
criterion in any sense embedded in the professional accounting 
standards setting processesl then there might be conditions under 
which conflict mitiimising behaviour would be expected. The 
discussion above in Section 3.10 "Criticisms of the Accounting 
Standards Committee" suggests that the ASC might be behaving in 
this way and so development of the conflict minimisation 
hypothesis is an important area for further research. 
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7.5 SUMARY 
The preceding sections have reviewed previous research relevant 
to the problem of identifying' economic processess other than 
information economics, which might contribute to an explanation 
of UK professional accounting standards setting processes. These 
economic processes have been considered under the headings of 
rational choice theory, agency theory and social choice theory. 
An understanding of these other economic processes underlying the 
incidence of the economic consequences of changes in professional 
accounting standards is important. It facilitates an 
understanding of the factors which determine the preferences of 
individuals and so their participation in the professional 
accounting standards setting processes [Watts & Zimmerman 19781. 
The rational choice theoretic research is essent'ally analytic in 
nature. It has demonstrated, on the basis of a reasonable 
individual expected utility maximisation criterion, that it is 
not possible to construct any set of professional accounting 
standards selection criteria which would guarantee maximisation 
of an individual's expected utility without that set of criteria, 
in someway, taking account of that individual's preferences 
[Demski 19731. This result has been debated by Chambers [19761 
and Cushing [19771. If the more restrictive assumption is made 
that the individual's preference function is additively 
separable$ then it is sufficient to select professional 
accounting standards sequentially without considering the effects 
of interaction with existing professional standards 
[Bromwich. 19801. Recognition of heterogeneity of preferences in 
a multi-person context immediately establishes a conflict between 
individuals, or classes of individuals, with no subsequent 
agreement on the desirability of any given accounting information 
set [Beaver & Demski 19741. 
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The agency theoretic research is also analytic in nature, but 
empirical work has been conducted based on the analytic 
framework. Management's own wealth is seen to be dependent upon 
professional accounting standards through such factors as non- 
pecuniary benefits and remuneration contracts which are based on 
the firm's income. In particular, managements are characterised 
as having incentives to enter into contracts to publish audited 
accounting information [Watts 19771. Having entered into these 
contracts, management then has incentives to either support or 
oppose proposals to change professional accounting standards. 
These incentives are dependent on characteristics of the firms. 
It is an open question whether or not the agency framework can 
adequately predict managements' position in relation to specific 
proposals [Fama 1980j. In the case of inflation accounting, the 
behaviour of management in the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes has been shown to be consistent with 
agency theoretic predictions (Watts & Zimmerman 19781 but a 
replication in the UK failed to generate unambiguous, evidence 
[Sutton 1980]. 
.v 
In brief then, under the existing institutional arrangements$ 
Public accounting information is essentially a supply-side 
phenomenon, with strong economic incentives for individuals to 
supply, but limited economic incentives for individuals to 
demand. Having contracted to supply accounting information, 
managements have additional incentives to prefer some accounting 
information over other accounting information. In a multi- 
person, utility-maximising setting, there is no set of criteria 
by which a unique solution can be determined to the problem of 
choice among alternatives for accounting information. 
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The social choice theoretic research seeks to analyse the 
structure of choices which are made under these conditions of 
indeterminacy. Arrow first identified a minimum set of conditions 
under which this indeterminacy would hold [Arrow 19511 and so 
implicitly identified the need for additional constraints. one 
such constraint,, the "single-peakedness" of preferences, had 
already been identified by Black [1948]. In general terms, 
Arrow's first condition, that all logically possible orderings of 
the alternative social states are admissible, is the one 
condition subject to v, iolation by additional constraint. The 
inadmissibility of some alternative social states can be 
illustrated simply by drawing attention'to the existence of laws 
prohibiting some alternative behaviours. 
Embedded in the social choice theoretic research is the social 
welfare maximisation criterion [May & Sundem 19761. It can be 
argued that social welfare maximisation is related to social 
conflict minimisation and that evidence of increasing social 
conflict is i)rima facie 
, evidence of non-optimality of social 
welfare. The equity (or fairness or justice) criterion 
[Samuelson 1969; Rawls 19581 can be equated with a conflict 
minimisation criterion and there is evidence that such a 
criterion is institutionalised in the UK Civil Service 
[Croham 19811. 
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7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter 6 "Information economics" and Chapter 7 "Other economic 
processes" have together demonstrated that there are gains 
available to individuals who hold private accounting information 
and can control the subsequent publication of that 
information. The existence of these gains arguably provides 
sufficient incentive for individuals to hold preferences in 
favour of some classes of accounting information as against other 
classes. Such is the economic rationale for participation in 
professional accounting standards setting processes. 
The economic rationale f or participation is not suf f icient to 
explain the resultant choices of professional accounting 
standards. Firstly, the aggregation of individual preferences is 
indeterminate and, secondly, there exists no unique social 
preference function by which that indeterminacy can be resolved. 
It follows that the general problem of the present study (namely, 
the exploration of factors which might be used to explain the 
processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined) can be characterised as an investigation of a social 
choice process in which non-economic criteria play an important 
part. Such is the rationale for the existence of a political 
dimension to professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Given that there is no unique solution to the problem of choice 
amongst alternatives for accounting informations there is a 
natural and clear interest in the structure of the presents 
existing, solution. Two important contributions have been made 
by the dissertations of Sutton [1980]l reviewed in the present 
chapter, and Johnson [19791, reviewed above in Chapter 6 
"Information economics". 
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Firstly, Johnson identifies different institutional arrangements 
under which professional accounting standards might be selected. 
Among the objectives of those arrangements, the usual economic 
criterion of Pareto-optimality is central although non-economic 
alternatives are clearly seen to be*possible. 
Additionally, Johnson's review suggests the following areas for 
further research specifically based on existing professional 
accounting standards setting processes: 
1 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate the Pareto-optimality criterion? 
2 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes overcome incentives , to misrepresent 
preferences? 
3 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate a power dominated objective? 
Secondly, Sutton has demonstrated that the theoretical frameworks 
being developed in a predominantly US orientated literature have 
potential application to the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes. Sutton also argues that an adequate 
explanation of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes must take into account the political nature of those 
processes. Such an argument is supportive of the discussion in 
Chapter 5 "Professional accounting standards, the political 
dimension and economic consequences". 
Clearly, before substantial progress can be made in investigating 
UK prof essionai, accounting standards setting processes it is 
important to review the empirical studies which seek to 
investigate and explain that political dimension. Such a review 
is undertaken in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards setting 
processes". 
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APPENDIX 7.1: A CONFLICT MINIMISATION HYPOTHESIS 
Development of a conflict ininimisatiou hypothesis 
DEFINITION 7.1.1: Assume a society, Sq of individuals, k, with 
individual preference functions, P k' mapping the set, Cs of 
commodities onto individuals, j. Then we can write 
{(j, c)} 
where j is the j th individual, and 
k. 
c. Js the amount of the i th commodity allocated to the 
th inHvidual under kýs preference function, P k* 
Clearjy, Pk can be presented by a simple matrix whose elements 
are c. .. Ij 
DEFINITION 7.1.2: Assume there exists a social welfare function, k W, mapping the commodity allocations, c,,, onto the real line. 
Then we can write 
wk 
where wk. : Ls the welfare measure of the amount of the i th 3. ] 
comriodity allocated to the j th individual under k's 
preference function, P k* 
DEFINITION 7.1.3: A non-trivial "state of equity" can be said to 
exist when 
k1 
wij- W : Lj 
wý0 an, Ij 
dý! 0, and 3. j 
w! 0 3. j 
for all individuals, j, k and 1, belonging to S, and for all 
commodities, cip belonging to C. 
In words, a non-trivial "state of equity" exists when the welfare 
measure of the amount of the i th commodity allocated to the j th 
individual is the same under the preference functions of all 
individuals. 
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DEFINITION 7.1.4: Conversely, we can define a "state of conflict" 
to exist when 
k1 kl 
V 13 - wij, - 
dij 
for at least one pair of individuals, j, k or 19 belonging to S, 
and for at least one commoditys ci, belonging to C. 
Clearly, d ýl is a measure of conflict. Ij 
On the observability of conflict 
It is possible to distinguish between observable conflict and 
unobservable conflict by assuming the existence of a threshold 
below which conflict is unobservable. 
DEFINITION 7.1.5: Confli 9h can be said to be unobservable 
if 
there exists some valueg eijs such that 
0<d kl < eý! ij 13 




ASSUMPTION 7.1.1: All conflict is observable. That is 
e 
kl 
tends to zero. ij 
That isp we assume dkijl ý 0. 
13 
Assumption 7.1.1 has empirical meaning in that it is only 
possible' to minimise a variable to the extent that it is 
observable or otherwise measurable. Once a variable becomes 
unobservable, either directly or indirectlys then it is for all 
practical purposes equal to zero. 
APPlication-to the linear veighted-social welfare function 
In the most general of terms,, and following McClelland & 
Rohrbaugh (1978), the social welfare function can be 
characterised as the linear weighted sum of two independent 
variables, efficiency and equity, as follows 
aU + bE ,a+b-1 and 
0<a, b <1 
where U is usual utilitarian concept of efficiency, that is 
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Pareto-optimality; and 
is any selected concept of equity. 
Clearly, this characterisation admits the possibility of equity 
being weighted to zero, in which case the social welfare 
function becomes the usual efficiency criterion of economic 
theory, 'that is, Pareto-optimality. Additionally, it admits the 
possibility of efficiency being weighted to zero, in which case 
the social welfare function becomes strictly egalitarian. Within 
this framework, an interesting research question becomes one of 
determining the deviation from the "centrist" weightings of 
b-0.5 
Somewhat less agreement exists amongst theorists on the 
specification of a criterion for equity than on the 
specification of a criterion for efficiency. Pareto-optimality is 
universally adopted as a workable efficiency criterion. 
THEOREM 7.1.1: It follows that there exist conditions under which 
the problem of maximising the socia welfare function, W, 
corresponds to a problem of minimising d 
ý, 
that is minimisation 
of conf lict. 
ij 
Further, research needs to be conducted to identify and explore 
these conditions. 
Exploration of conditions for-conflict minimisation 
to equal social velfare maximisation 
Efficiency and equity are dependent to the extent that they are 
both functions of individual preferences. That is both. 
U- f(P) and E- g(P) 
where f and g are the functional operators translating individual 
preferences, P, into efficiency and equity respectively. 
By inverting the functions and putting f*-f g-1 then U-f* (E). 
Substituting into the linear weighted social welfare function 
g iýr es 
W-a. f * (E) + b. E , a+b -1 and 
0<a, b <1 
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Now if we define the social welfare function as a mapping onto 
the interval (0,1) of the real line, then we can define a 
conflict function, D-1-E. which satisfies the properties of 
Definition 7.1.4 above. Substituting again, we get 
a. f 
* (1-D) + b. (l-D) 
which is a maximum when 
df d2f 
-- - -b/a and -2 +ve 
dD dD 
These conditions clearly def ine a curve convex to the origin and 
a point on that curve for which the slope is -b/a. 
Further elaboration of the relationship between social welfare 
maximisation and conflict minimisation is not central to the 
present study and will not be undertaken here. It is, however, 
put forward as a promising area for further research. 
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Chapter 8 Page 1 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
CHAPTER 8 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE POLITICAL DIMENSION IN 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES 
8.1 IMMODUCTION 
This chapter reviews empirical studies of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes in which the political 
dimension is the primary focus of interest. 
The context within which professional accounting standards are to 
be found is characterised as one of heterogeneous interest 
groups, collectively known as the constituency. An important 
feature of the studies reviewed is their interest in the nature 
and preferences of the constituency. 
The study of the political dimension in professional accounting 
standards setting piocesses is at an early*stage of development. 
Because of this, no attempt is made in this study to offer a 
comprehensive criticism of each individual study. In particular, 
it would be unrewarding because every piece of empirical work in 
such an ill-dever6ped area must necessarily be suject to 
inadequacies of data generation and data analysis. Such 
generalisations as are made are restricted to the underlying 
approach to the theoretical analysis and its relationship to the 
data analysis. 
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8.2 EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE POLITICAL DIMENSION IN 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES 
Watts & Zimmerman LWZ 19791 characterises professional accounting 
standards setting processes as being embedded within a wider, 
political, environment in which intentional wealth and welfare 
redistributions are made [p. 280J. This political environment 
includes the activities of the legislature; regulatory agencies, 
such as the US SEC. the UK Department of Trade and the UK 
Monopolies and Mergers Commission; and professional accounting 
standards setting bodies such as the US FASB and the UK ASC. 
Within such a framework WZ 1979 characterises two separate groups 
of individuals, namely the regulators and the regulated. The WZ 
1979 thesis is, essentially, that rational self-interested 
individuals belonging to either group have incentives to adopt 
accounting theories which support their positions. On the one 
hand regulators have incentives to demand theories that enable 
them to make predictions about the consequences of their 
regulations; and on the other hand, the regulated have incentives 
to demand theories which favour the positions they adopt in 
supporting or opposing proposals Lpp. 281-28ý1. 
Given that there exists a demand for differing accounting 
theories and given that 
"there exists a large number of individuals vho are able to 
supply a vide diversity of theories .... at relatively lov 
costs then supply vill be very responsive to demand" [p. 2861. 
With this assertion. ' WZ 1979 proceeds to argue that there exists 
a market for accounting theories. Existence is demonstrated 
empirically by investigating three issues, namely depreciation 
accounting *by early railway companies; the effects of taxation 
legislation on depreciation accounting; and the effects of 
government intervention both in the US and in the UK. 
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In addition to the more fundamental criticism of the theoretical 
underpinnings of this study. and others made by Christenson 119831 
and reviewed above in Chapter 7, "Other economic processes", a 
number of other criticisms can be made of the WZ 1979 study. 
Firstly, the arguments used to deduce the hypothesis that there 
exists a market for accounting theories are often assertive. For 
example, a crucial assumption that "the iDredominant contemporary 
demand for accounting theories (the demand for accounting in a 
regulated economy) is the demand for justifications" [p. 286, 
emphasis addedj, is not'argued fully. Only the existence of such 
a demand is argued; its predominance is asserted. 
Secondly, the empirical evidence presented is insufficient to 
adequately distinguish the events by which the hypotheses can be 
tested. For example, WZ 1979 predicts that new accounting 
theories will emerge, or existing accounting theories will 
change, "when a new law is passed which impinges on accounting 
practice" [p. 2891. The implication here is clearly that the 
legislative intervention causes the theory shift. However, in 
the cited case of the UK railway company legislation and the 
depreciation accounting literature, the first recorded literature 
preceded the 1844 legislation by three years, whereas the in US 
the first recorded literature succeeded 1837 legislation by 13 
years. Such evidence appears to be internally inconsistent and 
worthy of alternative explanation not offered by the study. 
WZ 1979 is sensitive [p. 2891 to criticism of the empirical 
evidence and presents such evidence as a preliminary stage of 
theory development. At the time of writing no further studies 
have been conducted to present additional evidence of tests of 
the hypothesis that there exists a market for theories. 
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The WZ 1979 study is importants however, because of its 
characterisation of the accounting environment as a political one 
in which rational, self-interested, individuals use arguments, or 
accounting theories, to support their positions on specific 
proposals. This framework clearly extends to proposals to change 
professional accounting standards and, as such, offers a 
contribution to an understanding of the factors which explain how 
professional accounting standards setting processese 
Some studies of the political nature of the US professional 
accounting standards setting processes are now reviewed in 
detail. 
An investigation by the Financial Accounting Foundation [FAF 
19771, which is the governing body of the US FASB and is 
established as a trust, sought to survey opinion concerning the 
FASB. The present study is not concerned with the substance or 
the 'results of that survey, although its findings of the survey 
are reproduced in Appendix 3.6 "Findings of the US Financial 
Accounting Foundation's survey of opinion on the US Financial 
Accounting Standards Board" as comparative material. Of interest 
is the fact that, in conductng their survey, the FAF adopted a 
framework which emphasised "constituency relationships". Within 
this framework, the report discusses analogies with "democratic", 
"legislative" and "political" procedures. Each such procedure is 
rejected in turn by the authors as not describing the US 
accounting standards setting processes adequately. The argument 
is quoted in full below 
'Ithe US accounting standards- setting processes are not 
democratic) because standard setting requires some perspective 
(and so) it would not be appropriate to establish a standard 
based soley on a canvass of the constitutents. Similarly, the 
process(es) can be described as legislative because (they) must 
be deliberative and because all views must be heard. But the 
standard setters are expected to represent the entire 
constituency as a whole and not be representatives of a 
specific constituent group. The process(es) can be described 
as political because there is an educational effort involved in 
getting a new standard accepted. But it is not political in 
the sense that an accommodation is required to get a statement 
issued. " [p. 19] 
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From this quotation it is clear that the US professional 
accounting standard setters see the outcomes of the US 
professional accounting standards setting processes as being 
dependent, at least to some extentg on the preferences of 
individuals. Recall that this is supported by the review, in 
Chapter 6 "Economic processes", of the rational choice theoretic 
research, and in particular Demski [19731, which argues that the 
goal of maximisation of individuals' expected utilities implies 
that individuals' preferences be taken into account. 
Following on almost directly-from the publication of the FAF 
survey's emphasis on individual preferences through its 
"constituency relationships" frameworkq the following four US 
research studies, Porter (19791, Sharp [19791, Burke [19781 and 
Klein [19781, each sought to investigate the nature of those 
relationships. 
Burke (19781 surveyed attitudes in the US towards participation 
in the accounting standards setting processes of the FASB. Burke 
argued that both FAF [19771 and Metcalf [1977] had called for a 
greater understanding of participation in the US accounting 
standards setting processes and that no existing research had 
been conducted into attitudes towards participation. Using a 
mail questionnaire designed to elicit attitudess Burke presented 
some 100 statements to the respondents and asked them to state 
whether or not they agreed. The sample was designed to cover all 
occupational groups as a basis for distinguishing between those 
which had participated in the FASB processes and those which 
chose not to do so. No particular hypotheses were being tested 
and 
"overall, the search vas directed at obtaining information 
potentially useful in developing an information base" Lp. 321. 
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From the results, Burke concludes that the respondents generally 
showed strong positive attitudes which "augors well for the 
profession", [p. 73J. Limitations of the study identified by 
Burke included potential misrepresentation by respondents; 
inability to predict behaviour from attitudes, except to the 
extent that attitudes are the subject of interest, such as would 
be the case with written or spoken behaviour. On the problem of 
predicting behaviour from attitudes sees for examples Bentler 
Speckart [1979J. 
Burke's study is subject to the criticism that, by design, it 
contributes virtually nothing to theory construction. Such 
limitations as no testing of hypotheses and no predictive value 
of results are recognised by Burke. Suggestions for further 
research in effect, ask others to infer meaning into the data 
reproduced in the form of appendices*to the dissertation 
Nevertheless, the Burke study is of value for two reasons. 
Firstly, it demonstrates that there is some varihbility in the 
structure of preferences on the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes themselvess that iss the narrative 
questio n of which processes should be adopted is not a trivial 
problem. 
Secondlys and more importantly, it demonstrates somewhat vividly 
the inadequacies of attitude or preferences research, when 
conducted in isolation from a theoretical framework. Such a 
framework might possibly be constructed either by surveying 
attitudes repeatedly over time to determine what factors might 
influence preferences; or by including a survey of attitudes 
within a more comprehensive study of inter-related factors. This 
latter research method was adopted by Klein [19781 who sought to 
investigate the influence of outside parties on the FASB. 
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Klein 11978J analysed stated preferences in the responses to the 
US exposure draft "Financial reporting for segments of a business 
enterprise", published by the FASB in September 1975. As with 
Burke's study, no testable hypotheses were developed. Motivation 
for the study was based on a desire to answer the question "Is 
the nature of the US financial accounting policy-making process 
such as to explain the consistent appearance of severe 
criticism? ". No evidence of the existence of severe criticism 
was provided. In discussing the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes, Klein models those processes as set 
out below in Figure 8.1 "Klein's 'Message flows' model of 
accounting standards setting processes". 
.V 
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FIGURE 8.1 XLEIN-S I'MSSAGE nOWS" MODKL OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
SETTING PROCESSES 
EXPOSURE ---------- >1 INTERESTED j< --------- I ENVIRONMENT 
DRAFT (ED) PARTIES 
EXPECTATIONS -------------- > EVALUATION OF 
















Source: Klein [1978, p. 91 "The influence of outside parties on 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board" 
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Klein [19781 characterises accounting standards setting 
processes modelled in Figure 8.1 "The influence of outside 
parties on the Financial Accounting Standards Board" above, as 
primarily uncertain and multidimensional. He argues as follows 
1 uncertainty derives from a lack of information about the 
alternatives available and the possible future states. 
Howeverg Klein cites Thompson [1967, p. 134J as arguing that, 
even in cases of complete information, the decision is only 
analytical if decision makers have homogeneous preferences. If 
preferences are heterogeneous then the decision is political 
rather than analytical. This is consistent with the analysis 
of Beaver & Demski [1974] reviewed in chapter 6 "Economic 
processes" above; 
2 multidimensionality derives from "well known", but unspecified, 
dimensions. Impliedly, Klein has in mind such factors as time, 
available alternatives, economic consequences, individuals 
preferences and future states* 
Given the primary factors of uncertainty and multidimensionality, 
Klein adopts the Thompson & Tuden 119591 typology of 
organisational decision-making styles, discussed in greater 
detail in the present study in Chapter 13 "Organisational choice 
processes", as a convenient method of classifying issues faced by 
the US FASB. Klein's representation is reproduced below in 
Figure 8.2 "Klein's 'FASB issues typology and manners of 
resolution"'. 
I 
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Disagreement Consensual Innovative 
resolution search 
(Judgement) (Policy Delphi) 
Source: Klein [1978, p. 331 "FASB issues typology and manners of 
resolution". Based on Thompson & Tuden [1959, p. 781, 
reproduced below as Figure 13.1 "Thompson & Tuden's 
typology of decisions". 
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Klein 119181 discusses this typology of issues by suggesting that 
1 an issue located in Cell III "Consensual resoltuion" can be 
relocated into Cell I "Analytical resolution" by increasing 
the information set or by simplification of the issue; 
2 an issue in Cell II "Political resolution" can be identified 
when arguments are seen to be consistent but preferences are 
polarized; and 
3 the US accounting standard setting processes are located in 
Cell IV "Innovative search"s that is 
"for' these issues the FASB is forced to take the role of a 
policy Delphi, employing innovative search techniques in 
order to alternatively acquire and disseminate information 
regarding (1) a definition of the issue, (2) the variously 
perceived relationships between suggested solutions and 
expected impacts, and (3) the different impact preferences" 
Ep. 35j. 
Clearly, Klein sees the role of information as being important in 
US accounting standards setting processes in as much as (a) these 
processes may in fact be located in any of. the four "cells"; and 
(b) the role of information is highlighted as being important to 
cells III and IV. Within this tramework, Klein characterises the 
written responses to exposure drafts as containing information, 
or messagess which the FASB can use to resolve issues. Klein's 
study aims to discover the information contained in those 
messages and then to determine whether or not that information 
influencedq that is, is reflected in, the final outcome. 
In order to operationalise that objective, Klein selected the 
technique of content analysis. A programme of seven crucial 
stages was utilised and these are set out below in Figure 8.3 
"Klein's stages in content analysis". 
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FIGURE 8.3 KLEIN'S STAGES IN CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Starte Operational Procedure 
1 Choose messages Use responses to exposure 
draft on segmental 
reporting 
2 Choose characteristics to Use "general". "topical" 
be detected in message and "fundamental". 
Variables, 151 in total, 
derived from 1 in 10 
pilot survey of responses 
and from literature 
review 
3 Define context units Use sentence or paragraph 
and recording units for context unit and word 
or sentence for recording 
unit 
4 Construct a dictionary Each variable represented 
by expression such as 
"statement present 
indicating... " 
Develop a coding scheme 116 out of the 151 
variables represented by 
binary relations, 0 or 1, 
for which the mean of all 
responses is meaningful 
Select judges Klein used only himself 
7 Code the responses Read the responses and 
code them 
Source: Klein [1978, pp. 50ffl 
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From the subsequent data analysiss using the frequencies of. 
occurrence, Klein selected as "interesting" those variables for 
which 
1 the proportionate occurrence was greater thans or equal to, one 
half; and 
2 the proportionate occurrence for at least one sub-group was 
greater than, or equal to, two thirds, while the proportionate 
occurrence for at least one other sub-group was less than, or 
equal to, one third. 
Clearly, in making such selection criteria, Klein is using an 
implied heuristic procedure to identify variables for which 
either there exists general agreement on the relative importance; 
or a degree of conflict exists. Using the above criteria, the 
following seven"interesting" characteristics of the responses 
were identified [pp. 157ff] 
1 users of accounts predominates being 85% of all responses; 
2 there was a pervasive concern about regulations and federal 
agencies; 
3 prominent technical criteria were "comparability" and 
"relevance". Users of accounts expected an increase in 
comparability but, overall, respondents expected a fall in 
comparability; 
4 respondents were generally reluctant to report segmental 
information in quarterly statements; 
5 users of accounts raised different functional issues from those 
raised by preparers of accounts; 
6 respondents belonging to the accounting profession were from 
either the major (Big, 8) accounting firms or from 
representative associations. ' There was no real response from 
small accounting firms; and 
7 the major (Big 8) accounting firms were concerned with 
information production problems, whereas the other (as distinct 
from small) accounting firms were more concerned with 
information disclosure problems. 
Similarly, the following three "interesting" relationships were 
identified 
I although FASB board members all have backgrounds from the major 
(Big 8) accounting firmst the positions Of those accounting 
firms were not reflected in the final accounting standard; 
2 of the ten key issues raised by respondents, four were 
reflected in the final accounting standard. These served to 
enhance the clarity and implementation of the proposal; and 
3 respondants requests for a statement distifiguishing between 
which disclosures are "desirable" and which are "required for a 
fair presentation" were not met. 
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From the above Klein draws the following conclusions [pp. 162-170J 
1 the exposure draft is more'than a proposal. It is a means by 
which the FASB can (a) "test market" a'proposal; (b) extend 
its boundaries; and (c) update its' own information on 
interested parties; 
2 the FASB is more than simply a rule-maker. It serves to buffer 
those who prepare accounting information from (a) Government 
agencies; and (b) users of accounting information. It also 
serves to pre-condition users and preparers to new 
requirements; and 
3 "the process oes invites criticism. The fact that this 
criticism exists is not so important as the manner in which it 
is handled" [p. 170, emphasis in original]. 
It is difficult to see how Klein's results support his 
conclusions for they are not based on his data. They are better 
interpreted as well-informed comment. 
Klein identifies limitations to his study as including the 
subjectivity of his own coding of the content analysis. This he 
tried to control by (a) using a panel to verify his coding; and 
(b) testing his own coding over time for consistency. Neither 
were completely satisfactory. The panel could not cope with the 
tasks and his own identification of variables produced a greater 
number on a second trial. Klein also identified further areas for 
research as follows 
1 repeat his study over more issues; 
2 study the attitudes of respondentss FASB board members and FASB 
staff members; 
3 examine the process of conflict resolution; 
4 analyse the sensitivity of the content analysis to changes in 
the parameters; and 
5 use his description of the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes as a source of testable 
hypotheses. 
Klein's study is subject to similar criticism as that addressed 
to the Burke [1978] study. Both are primarily concerned with 
attitude testing and both fail to develop any testable 
hypotheses. 
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Klein [19781 can be distinguished from Burke [19781 in that the 
former attempts to develop a theoretical framework within which 
the results of the study can be considered. The framework is 
that of the Thompson & Tuden [1959J typology of organisational 
decision-making styles. Klein has made a valuable contribution 
in identifying this framework, which this present study discusses 
in greater detail in Chapter 13 "Organisational choice processes" 
below. Unfortunately, having identified the framework, Klein 
fails to explore its relationship with the results of his study. 
The results are simply presented with no further discussion of 
their implications for the framework. 
Klein's results are analysed here in terms of that framework. 
This analysis is not to be found in Klein's study and can be 
regarded as an extension of that work. 
Firstly, Klein's second and third "interesting" relationships 
identified quite clear evidence that there is a relationship 
between the "written messages" and the "Accounting standards 
setting body" components of his model presented above in Figure 
8.1 "Klein's "Message flows' model of accounting standards 
Setting processes". From this can be deduced that the model is 
potentially valuable in explaining those processes, and that 
some, but not all, preferences expressed at 'the "written 
messages" stage are translated through to the "Accounting 
standard" stage. Implicits thens is an element of conflict 
between those whose preferences are met and those whose 
preferences are not met. Klein does suggest that the process of 
conflict resolution be examined further. 
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Secondly, Klein characterises the activity within the "Accounting 
standards setting body" stage of his model as organisational 
decision-making. This is implicit in his use of the Thompson & 
Tuden typology of organisational decision-making styles. Klein 
did not explicitly test this implied characterisation. The 
results nevertheless provide evidence that, it such a 
characterisation is valid then, the heterogeneity of preferences 
locates the accounting standards setting processes in either Cell 
II "Political resolution" or Cell IV "Innovation search" of 
Figure 8.2 "Klein's 'FASB issues typology and manners 
resolution"'. Clearly, it is important to further investigate 
the nature of professional accounting standards setting processes 
characterised as organisational decision-making processes and 
this is discussed more fully in the present study in Chapter 12 
"Organisational choice processes". 
Porter [19791 is the third of the four studies which seek to 
develop the "constituency relationships" framework of FAF [19771. 
Following May & Sundem [19761, Porter characterises the US 
professional accounting standards setting processes as a policy- 
making process* Porter asserts that the primary function of the 
Policy-makers, that is the FASB, is that of conflict resolution. 
An historical perspective is developed in which the lack of an 
explicit and constitutional authority to set accounting standards 
is argued to be problematic. In attempting to resolve that 
problem, the US accounting profession [the AICPAJ has handed 
authority to the FASB but Congress has asserted itself as a 
higher authority on such issues as accounting for investment 
credits and accounting by oil and gas producing companies. Those 
issues were discussed earlier in the present study in Chapter 3 
"The Accounting Standards Committee". Section 3.8 "International 
comparisons". 
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Porter argues, citing Greenwood [1957, p. 46j, that the literature 
of the sociology of the professions suggests that, in general, 
technical decisions are kept within professions such as the 
accounting profession but that there is always a threat of veto 
or withdrawal of concurrence by some higher authority, namely the 
State 
"because of this possibility of revocation, the views of 
interested parties ... continue to have importance in the 
standard setting function". [Porter 1979, p. 441. 
Porter sees the quest by the FASB for a conceptual framework for 
accounting standards as a reaction to the criticisms of those 
parties who could potentially withdraw their support. Such a 
reaction is clearly seen by Porter as consistent with the 
sociology of the professions literature. This, according to 
Porter, is increasingly being seen as a naive reaction by writers 
such as AAA [1977j, Armstrong [197610 Horngren [1976,1973 & 
19721, Moonitz 11974J, Seidler [19741 and Gerboth [1973,1973 & 
1972J. Somewhat similar conclusions were drawn in a UK study of 
the topi6 in Macve [1981J. 
From the US debate focussing on the quest for a conceptual 
framework for accounting standardsp Porter sees three distinct 
schools of accounting thought 
1 the analytical school, represented by Chambers [19731; 
2 the political school, represented-by Gerboth [19731; and 
3 the quasi-political schools represented by Horngren [19761. 
Porter sees the "quasi-political" school as arguing for political 
selection amongst analytical alternatives. The selection 
subsequently being enforced by sanction. Porter*s argument 
continues [p. 471 that the institutional problem, of a 
professional choice always being subject to veto by others, 
implies that professional accounting standards setting processes 
can never be strictly judicial, that is analytic, and must be 
quasi-political. From such a perspective, Porter adopts March & 
Simon (1958J as a framework for analysing the process of conflict 
resolution. This use of March & Simon [1958J can be compared 
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with Klein's use of the Thompson & Tuden [19591 framework to the 
extent that both are concerned with organisational decision- 
making processes. As already noted, the present study undertakes 
a further analysis of organisational decision-making processes in 
Chapter 13 "Organisational choice processes". 
Porter uses the March & Simon [l9j8j analysis to classify 
Lp. 60] sources of conflict under the three headings of 
1 intra-individual conflict. Being 
(a) unacceptability of alternatives; 
(b) incomparability of alternatives; and 
(c) uncertainty of consequences of alternatives; 
2 intra-group (or profession) conflict. Being 
(a) dependence on limited resources; 
(b) pressure to achieve uniformity; 
(c) variations in goals; 
(d) subjective operationalisation of various goals; and 
(e) interaction of different goals and perceptions; and 
3 in 
, 
ter-group (or constituency) conflict. Being 
(a) dependence on limited resources; 
(b) pressure to achieve uniformity; 
(c) variations in goals; 
W subjective operationalisation of various goals; and 
(e) interaction of different goals and perceptions. 
The etfects of the inter-groupq or constituency, sources of 
conflict will be, in Porter's view, more extreme than in the case 
of intra-group, or profession, sources because of the increased 
population heterogeneity. 
Additionally, Porter uses the March & Simon [19b8l analysis to 
classify (p. 601 processes of conflict resolution under two 
further headings 
1 analytic conflict resolution. Being 
(a) problem solving when objectives are shared; and, 
(b) persuasion when higher-order objectives are shared; 
2 political conflict resolution. Being 
(a) bargaining when no, objectives are shared but 
arena is agreed; and 
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Citing Wyatt [1977 p-941 in support, Porter asserts that the 
professional dimension of accounting standards setting processes 
ensures that the bargaining aspect of the conflict resolution 
process will be ignored by the accounting profession and, in the 
US, by the FASB. The result is a policy-making process which is 
a mixed bargaining and analytic process and which has earlier 
been labelled a "quasi-political" process. This can be 
contrasted with the Hussein [1981 & 19771 characterisations of 
the process, as a mixed diffusion of innovation and bargaining 
process, reviewed above in Chapter 5 "Professional accounting 
standards, the political dimension and economic consequences. " 
I 
Porter's analysis immediately generates [p. 651 two hypotheses for 
subsequent testing, namely 
H, Analysis of constituency responses will reveal the source of 
political pressure and the preferred solution; and 
H2 The FASB will not proceed against its constituency advice when 
the issue is one about which the constituency has strong 
feelings and is united. 
Developing the policy-making perspective, ýorter deduces two 
further hypotheses. 
Firstly, the professional accounting standards setting processes 
are said to be like an open system (for example, Lowe, PuxtY & 
Tinker [19791 and Bertalanffy [19681), in which different 
constituency groupings are affected by different issues. The 
policy-makers exercise their own value-judgements about "whose 
input is relevant" [p. 66, emphasis in original], and may well 
balance issues with others either current or future, a practice 
known as log-rolling and -discussed further in Chapter 12 
"Political choice processes". Future issues may include 
reconsiderations-of-existing issues, and an incrementalist policy 
(for example, Gerboth (19721 and Lindblom L1959J) may 
incorporate such reconsiderations. In professional accounting 
standards setting, consideration of constituency responses might 
correspond to testing policy increments for acceptability. From 
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this analysis, Porter generates [p. 691 the third hypothesis for 
subsequent testing, namely 
H3 Constituency coalitions shift as issues change, therefore 
policy decisions between specific issues will not necessarily 
be consistent and cohesive. 
Secondly, Porter repeats Gergen's [1968, pp. 184ft] argument that 
identification of influential individuals in a policy-making 
process is important to explaining that process but in itself 
problematic. Such an identification can be approached by 
modelling three relevant characteristics of individuals involved 
as follows 
1 issue relevance, which depends to a greater or lesser extent on 
the way in which an issue can modify the individual's 
status QUO9 This is clearly the "economic consequences" 
argument discussed above in Chapter 5 "Professional accounting 
standards, the political dimension and economic consequences"; 
2 sub-phase resource which depends on which sub-phase(s) of the 
policy-making 
; 
rocess the individual has resources 
concentrated. Gergen indentified the following sub-phases 
(a) initiation - participants are very influential 
(b) staffing and planning - planning reduces alternatives; 
(c) communication and publicity - role of media in accounting 
is small; 
(d) institutional sanction - in the US: AICPA & SEC; 
(e) intra-elite organising - coalition formation; 
(f) financing - not important in accounting; 
(g) sanction and control - enforcement and audit.. 
3 personal efficacy, which depends on the individual's own 
personality factors such as leadership characteristics. 
From this last analysis, Porter generates the fourth hypothesis 
for subsequent testing, namely 
H Groups will act in their own self-interest and resist any 4 
accounting standard which has a perceived negative impact. 
This last hypothesis is clearly consistent with the Laughlin & 
Puxty [19811 arguments, reviewed above in Chapter 5 "Professional 
accounting standards, the political dimension and economic 
consequences", that firms will aggressively deal with anything 
that threatens'survival. 
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In order to operationalise the objective of testing the 
hypotheses, HI to H41 Porter followed Klein [19781 and selected 
the technique of content analysis, citing both Klein [19781 and 
Holst3*.. [1969J as principal references, applied to the stated 
preferences to be found in the written responses to a proposed 
professional accounting standard. The issue selected by Porter 
was that of accounting for troubled debt restructurings;. this 
issue resulted in the publication of US accounting standard 
SFAS 15 "Accounting by debtors and creditors for troubled debt 
restructurings" (FASB 19771. This was chosen by Porter because 
its controversial nature suggested a significant level of 
conflict. 
Porter's results are presented in the fom of extensive 
reproduction of tables of sumarised data. Each table is 
supported by brief commentary. At no stage are the hypotheses H, 
to H4 tested, a remarkable omission in view of the care with 
which they were argued. Such non-quantitative results as are 
presented take the fo= of the following answers to the indicated 
questions [pp. 213 -2201 
I Who? Bankers' response rates were high and non-bankers' 
response rates were low relative to the proportions found in 
the FASB mailing list; 
2 Why? Bankers' perceived a negative impact on their financial 
statements implying a high level of conflict, whereas non- 
bankers perceived minimal impact on their financial. statements 
implying a low level of conflict; 
3 How? Bankers used no analytical argument, presenting only 
declarative statements, whereas non-bankers used a, higher 
degree of analysis. In particular, accountants did not use 
economic consequence arguments whereas non-accountants did; - 
4 What7 Non-accountants objected to the piecemeal introduction 
of "value accounting" whereas accountantss who possibly 
perceive "value accounting" as a pervasive issue, tended not to 
comment on pervasive issues; 
5 With what effect? A major change, between the initial proposal 
for a "value accounting" solution, and the final published 
standard of an "historic accounting" solution, was observed 
although the data was not sufficient to determine whether this 
was due to "political action". Minor changes were also 
observed which were probably aimed at improving implementation. 
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From the above results, Porter argues [pp. 222-2281 that the 
following implications hold 
1 certain elements of bargaining or political actions are 
present. The study was not able to determine whether changes 
were analytic or bargained; 
2 the policy-making body, that is the FASB, should expect public 
criticism because of the existence of conflict; 
3 because coalitions shift with shifting issue-relevance "then 
policy decisions, to the extent that they are affected by 
bargaining, will not necessarily be either consistent and/or 
cohesive" [p. 2251; 
4 if bargaining is a necessary part of the proce , 
ss, but is 
concealed in an analytic argument, then expectations of 
consistency and cohesiveness will be raised unrealistically; 
5 analysis and research is only of limited use in the process; 
6 there is no solution to which the process tends because the 
majority of responses were from vested interests and few 
responses were analytic or evidential in nature; 
7 group conflict (intra-profession or constituency) might be 
reduced by agreement on objectives, such as might be the aim of 
the US quest for a conceptual framework. Group conflict can 
ultimately only be resolved by force or by bargaining lp. 228J 
and so the policy-making function must be one of mediation 
amongst bargainers in which all participants fully understand 
the nature of the process. 
Porter identifies the study's limitations as arising from 
1 the use of only written responsess other communication channels 
might be important; 
2 the use of only one issue as a case study; 
3 the use of only one input to the process, other participants 
might be more influential at other input stages; 
4 the inherent subjectivity of the content analytic research 
method. 
From these limitations, Porter suggests that 
1 other issues be investigated; and 
2 the whole process be studied, so including sub-phases 
identified from Gergen [19681. 
The framework developed in Porter's (19791 study is important 
because it builds on the contributions of the studies of Burke 
119781 and Klein [19781. The organisational decision-making 
framework for analysing the policy-making process, introduced by 
Klein .s use of the Thompson & Tuden 
organisational decision making styles, 
Porter's use of the March & Simon [19581 
(19591 typology of 
is complemented by 
analysis of conflict 
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resolution in organisations. 
Clearly, characterising the policy-making process as an 
organisational process is meaningful in the sense that these two 
studies have shown how it illuminates our understanding of the 
processese Further, Porter has introduced the importance of the 
literature of the sociology of the professions in the sense that 
it indicates that there are limitations on the extent to which 
technical decisions can be kept within professions. The present 
study investigates this literature more fully in Chapter 14 
"Professionalisation processes". 
The results of Porter's study are important because, 
notwithstanding the failure of the analysis to offer direct 
testing of the hypotheses generated, they do offer evidence, from 
the stated preferences of bankers, in support of ihe fourth 
hypothesis, namely 
H4 Groups will act on their own self-interest and resist any 
accounting standard which has a perceived negative impact. 
Criticism of the Porter study, beyond the limitations already 
identified, can be made on the grounds thats as with the Burke 
and Klein studies, no comprehensive survey of the organisationals 
political or sociological literature had been undertaken in order 
to discover generalisations to which the professional accounting 
standards setting processes might correspond. Rathers isolated 
conceptst 'of organisational conflict resolution [March & Simon 
19581, technical decision-making by professions IGreenwood 19571 
and 'influential individuals, or "leverage points"s in policy- 
making processes [Gergen 1968j, are introduced without discussion 
of the primary theoretical frameworks within which they are 
embedded. Such an approach does not provide evidence of either 
substantive support for these concepts within their own 
frameworks; or of an integrated framework within which to 
adequately research professional accounting standards setting 
processese 
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Sharp [1979J is the last of the four studies to be reviewed here 
which seek to develop the "constituency relationships" framework 
of FAF [1977J. Like Porter, Sharp argues that the professional 
accounting standards setting processes can be characterised as a 
policy-making process. Following the March & Simon E1958J 
distinction between analytic and bargaining decision processes, 
Sharp distinguishes two types of policy-making process, namely 
scientific and political. Scientific policy-making is argued to 
rely on objective measurement and has the advantage that 
"incorrect theorising can be identified and rejected". Political 
policy-making is argued to rely on judgement and so has the 
disadvantage that issues cannot be resolved scientifically. 
Sharp asserts that accounting policy-making focusses essentially 
on four primary questions 
1 what should be communicated? 
2 what should be measured? 
3 how should it be measured? and 
4 how should it be communicated? 
Sharp goes on to classify these questions and their solutions as 
political, political-cum-scientific, scientific and scientific 
respectively. Sharp then asserts that political solutions should 
not be sought when scientific enquiry is capable of yielding 
solutions. In so doing the following advantages are attributed 
to scientific solutions. They 
"l lead to more optizaal stable resolution than political 
solutions; 
2 give rise to a rational and defensible systext of thought; 
3 in general are more resource efficient than political 
solutions; and 
4 reinforce the position of the professional accountant as 
opposed to viewpoints or attitudes vhich ignore scientific 
evidence" lp-11-121. 
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Sharp argues that the above implies that the political questions 
should be answered first and then followed by the scientific 
questions. Such a procedure justifies, in Sharp's views an 
investigation of the accounting policy-making constituencies as 
the determinant of the political solutions. Sharp asserts that 
the accounting constituency is "pluralistic" and 
"it becomes critical to identify the constituencies which do or 
should interact with the accounting policy process and to 
assess the attitudes and preferences of those constituencies. 
This is the intent of the study" [p. 15J 
Sharp's study seeks to identify groupings within the 
constituency. Firstly, a wide variety of occupational groupings 
was selected for survey. Secondly, a wide variety of potential 
or actual issues was selected upon which individuals surveyed 
were asked to express preferencess percqptions and expectations. 
Both the occupational groupings and the issues surveyed were 
identified by a process described by Sharp as "brainstorming" in 
which the researcher, assisted by others, simply listed all 
possible, items which came to mind. A questionnaire survey 
generated a 22% response rate and late responses were used as 
surrogates for non-respondeýýs in a test for any potential bias 
in those non-respondents. Such a test is elaborated in Oppenheim 
119661. 
Sharp analysed the data under three separate heads. 
Firstlys "reality testing" was used to describe analysis of the 
degree to which respondents agreed on the issues represented by 
the questions asked. The results were presented in the form of 
some 50 tables and Sharp concluded [p. 185J that low levels of 
agreement were found. This gave Sharp cause for concerns 
although for reasons unspecifieds and it was argued that perhaps 
different groups interpreted the questions difterently. This 
could be interpreted simply as heterogeneity of not only 
preferences. but also perceptions. 
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Secondly, "strength of preference" was used to describe analysis 
of the part of the questionnaire seeking statements of 
preterence. Respondents were asked to reply on a scale from 
"strongly advocate" to "strongly oppose". Sharp used the factor 
analysis facility of the SPSS programme [Nie et al 19701, and 
identified four factors which he interpreted as follows 
1 the Government should not have a significant and direct role in 
accounting (and auditing) standards setting and monitoring; 
2 accounting (and auditing) standards should be left primarily to 
the company and its auditor; 
3 the quality of audit work, accounting, auditing and reporting 
standards, should be set and monitored by a private sector 
consortium or association or by peer review; 
4 accounting, auditing and reporting standards should be based on 
a conceptual framework and an economic reality, not on the 
basis of political bargaining amongst interest groups. 
Additionally under this head, Sharp used cluster analysis, citing 
McRae 119701 as principal reference, and concluded that "for 
these issues and these respondentst cohesive, identifiable 
viewpoints did not exist apart from the collective preference 
profile" [p. 2021. In other words, Sharp found a substantial 
degree of agreement on preterences amongst the respondents. 
Finally, "policy recommendations" was the head under which Sharp 
used a policy Delphi process [for example, Wedley, Jung & 
Merchant 1979J in which a panel of "experts" was used to 
generate a series of policy recommendations on the issues 
investigated above. The results of this policy Delphi were 
presented in Sharp's Exhibit 6.2 "Delphi recommendation 
consensus" which is not reproduced here. 
Sharp identifies the study's limitations as 
I attitudes were being surveyed, and they are not fixed over 
time; 
2 differences may have arisen in question interpretation. This 
may have been reduced by using several questions for each 
issue; 
3 statements of preferences were elicited without regard to costs 
of realisation; 
4 responses may have been biased by uncontrolled factors such as 
length of the questionnaire and contemporary publication of the 
Metcalf report [Metcalf 19771. 
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Sharp's study is important because it attempts to distinguish 
between a scientific and a political approach to the 
determination of professional accounting standards. Although 
Sharp's treatment is not ot any great depth, and as such is 
subject to the criticism addressed to the Klein [19781 and the 
Porter [19791 studies regarding the use of isolated concepts from 
other discipliness it does suggest that the two approaches 
require further analysis to determine the limits of each. 
Crin. cisms of Sharp's study, beyond the limitations already 
identified, centre primarily on the characterisation of the study 
as an attitude survey. As such, criticism addressed to Burke's 
study applies also to the Sharp study. The evidence contributes 
little to theory construction. Additionally, Sharp's 
dichotomous characterisation of the US professional accounting 
standards setting processes, into either scientific or political, 
represents only a subset of the possible characteri sat ions 
identified by Klein L1978] on the basis of Thompson & Tuden 
[1959J. This suggests that the Sharp framework omits some 
potentially valuable subtlety of explanation. It is useful to 
contrast this framework with that ot Buckley L19801. 
Buckley [19801 presents a different analysis Of the US accounting 
standard setting process. He classifies all possible processes 
into three mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes, namely 
"cons t itutional"g "legal" and "scientific". He also deduces from 
economics and sociology that groups act in their own self 
interest and he uses- this hypothesis to argue that the US 
accounting profession has adopted the "constitutional" pattern of 
process. He seems to argue that this is empirically self- 
evident. The value of Buckley's work is that he presents a novel 
approach to the analysis of the US accounting standard setting 
process. However, the importance of his conclusions, namely that 
a changing environment requires a switch into a different class 
of process (into "scientific" process) rest on the degree to 
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which his initial classification 
describe the alternatives available. 
the US process contains elements 
analysis can perhaps be developed if 
as separate components which can be 
greater degrees, at the option of 
the design of the process. 
can be said to adequately 
Even his own description of 
of all these. Buckley's 
we regard his three classes 
combined, each to lesser or 
those capable of influencing 
At the time of writing, a number of US studies are being 
published which, in addition to those studies which have followed 
the lead of FAF [19771 in investigating the nature of the 
US professional accounting standards setting constituency, are 
beginning to investigate other aspects of the political dimension 
in professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Newman [1981A & 1981B] is one example which sought to study the 
relationships between the voting patternss through coalition 
formation; and voting strengths, through power indices, in the 
FASB and its predecessor the APB. Newman's studies provide 
evidence that the major US accounting firms (the Big 8) possess 
disproportionately large voting strength, but the evidence on 
coalition formation was ambiguous. A criticism. of Newman is 
elaborated in Anderson [1982J which argues that a study of 
coalition formation in isolation from the remaining aspect of the 
political process is necessarily inconclusive. Anderson suggests 
attention also be directed to pay-offst ideology and agenda- 
setting. Clearly, Anderson's criticism is consistent with, and 
supports the criticisms-above, of Porter [1979Js Sharp 119791 and 
Klein [19781 'on the grounds that the use of isolated concepts 
from other disciplines is potentially misleading. 
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It is clear that further research work in the US on the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards setting processes 
will be relevant to the present study. 
A UK study [Hope & Gray 1982J has sought to investigate the power 
relationship between the constituency of the ASC and its policy 
outcomes. Relying on Lukes [19741 
, 
discussion of power, the study 
concentrates on the issue of determining policy which resulted in 
the publication of UK accounting standard SSAP13 "Accounting for 
research and development" in December 1977. After a brief and 
informal review of the written submissions received on the 
proposals, ED14 and ED17, the researchers seek to infer a strong 
relationship between a single industrial interest group, the 
aerospace industry, and the substantial changes made between 
initial proposal and final outcome. The study identifies the 
source of the vested Lnterests that iss the economic consequences 
as being related to UK Government financed research and 
development contracts. 
Hope & Gray L19821 is important because it provides evidence 
that 
1 the US analysis has direct application to the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes; and 
2 the written submissions on UK proposals may be insufficient to 
completely explain the relationship between constituency 
preferences and final outcomes of the processes. 
Limitations identified in the study include isolation of the 
written submission from all other aspects of the process; and 
use of one issue which may or may not be representative of the 
processes generally. Limitations of the study not identified by 
the researchers include the lack of rigour used in the analysis 
of the written submissions. This is particularly critical. No 
summary statistics are provided of the data presented in their 
Table 1 "Analysis of repsonses to accounting treatment and 
disclosure issues of ED14". This table is used as the basis for 
arguing that the industrial sector (distinguished from accounting 
firms and government departments) exerted a greater influence 
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over the outcome than other groups. It is well known that the 
chi-square statistic [Nie et al 1980, pp. 243-245; Hamburg 1977, 
pp. 312-335; Siegel 19561 is available as a measure of the 
significance of such a suggested telationship. Using chi-square, 
their results are not significant at the 0.20 level (chi- 
square - 13.26, degrees of freedom - 11). Additionally, the use 
of the concept of power as the primary theoretical construct on 
which to base the analysis and subsequent conclusions is 
problematic. This problem is discussed in greater depth in the 
present study in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". 
Chapter 8 Page 31 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
8.3 SUHMARY 
The empirical studies of Hope & Gray [19821, Newman 
[1981A & 1981B], Porter [19791, Sharp [19791, Watts & Zimmerman 
(WZ) [19791, Burke [19781, Klein [19781, FAF [19771 and Watts 
119771, have each investigated the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes. That 
dimension is political in the sense that preferences amongst 
individuals are not homogeneous and choices are made by some non- 
economic procedure designed to be responsive to those individual 
preferences. 
In the overtly political environment of US regulation, vested 
interests adopt accounting theories to advocate their positions 
before Congress, the SEC and the FASB [WZ 19791. An attitude 
survey has shown that, in general, the various interest groups 
that make up the constituency [FAF 19771 of the FASB approve of 
the role of the FASB as a policy-making body and participate in 
its processes willingly and positively [Burke 19781. 
In the issue of determining US Policy On segmental reporting 
("SFAS14"s FASB 19761 it was found that characterising the US 
professional accounting standards setting processes as an 
0 rganisational decision-making process was useful [Klein 19781. 
Further, that study generated evidence of 
1 heterogeneity of preferences within the constituency; and 
2a partial relationship between the written expression of those 
preferences and the outcome of the process. 
In the issue of determining US policy on troubled debt 
restructurings ["SFAS15"j, FASB 19771 it was again found that 
characterising the US professional accounting standards setting 
processes as an organisational decision-making process was 
useful, but that additional considerations of conflict resolution 
and of sociology of professions are important (Porter 19791. 
That study generated further evidence of 
1 heterogeneity of preferencess that is, conflict; 
2a partial relationship between written preferences and outcome; 
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and 
3 strong evidence in support of an underlying assumption of self- 
interested behaviour. 
The relationship between apolitical style and a scientific, or 
technical, style of policy-making process has been discussed as 
background to a f4her US attitude survey [Sharp 19791. That 
study concluded that the political and scientific styles are 
inseparable. Further evidence of heterogeneity of preferences, 
and of perceptions, was generated along with new evidence of some 
homogeneity of preferences on the four higher-order issues 
following 
1 the Government should not have a significant role in the 
accounting standards setting processes; 
2 accounting standards should be left primarily to the company 
and its auditor; 
3 the quality of accountants' work should be a private7sector 
responsibility; and 
4 accounting standards should be based on a conceptual framework 
and on economic reality. 
In a study of power and coalition formation in the US 
professional accounting standards setting processes, that is 
voting strengths and voting patterns, evidence has been generated 
that the US Big Eight professional accounting firms possess 
disproportionately great power but that this is not unambiguously 
translated into winning coalitions [Newman 1981A & 1981B]. 
The potential applicability of the US analytic famework to the UK 
has been demonstrated LSutton 19801 but there is evidence that 
the relationship between written preferences and final outcomes 
may not be as strong in the UK as in the US [Hope & Gray 19821. 
The choice pr'oce"ss has been characterised by Porter [1979J and by 
Klein [19781 as being, in part, an organisational choice process. 
In this characterisations concepts of decision-making and 
conflict resolution, to be found in the literat ure of 
organisation theorists, have been adopted. Extending this 
characterisation, Sharp has suggested that this choice process is 
both political and scientific in nature. Porter has suggested 
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that the professional dimension implies that scientific, or 
technical, choices will be kept within a profession but will 
always be subject to external approval, modification or veto. 
The usefulness, and validity, ' of a self-interest assumption 
applied to participants in the professional accounting standards 
setting processes has been addressed in the studies of Porter 
L1979j, WZ [19791 and Watts [19771. In particular, these 
studies have found that the evidence is consistent with such an 
assumption; the results of Porter's study of bankers' 
participation in the US accounting for troubled debt issue, 
being noteworthy. 
Some of the above work has been in the nature of an attitude 
survey. Importantly, emphasis has been placed on the nature and 
structure of the "constituency" of the professional. accounting 
standards setting processes. For example, FAF [19771 argued that 
the US constituency was inadequately understood. Burke, Klein, 
Porter and Sharp each investigated the preference structure in 
response to the FAF argument. The contribution of these studies 
to theory construction is restricted because relationships 
between attitudes and behaviour are little understood 
[Bentler & Spekart 19791. However, these studies have proven 
useful to the extent that they have provided evidence of the 
heterogeneity of preferences which underly the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards setting processes 
Further, the studies of Porter [19791 and Klein [19781 have 
established usefulness of the technique of content analysis as 
applied to the written comments on Exposure Drafts submitted to 
the accounting standards setting body. 
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8.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical studies to date have provided a valuable 
introduction to the study of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes, but a 
substantial contribution to theory construction is, as yet, 
undeveloped. In a sense, it is as if we know that the political 
dimension exists but we do not yet know what it means. 
In particular, the contributions of other disciplines, from which 
some explanatory concepts have been adopted, have been 
inadequ*ately explored. Rather, isolated concepts have been 
introduced with little discussion of their origins. The present 
study seeks to redress that defect in Part III "Review of 
literature from disciplines other than accounting and economics" 
in order to more fully appreciate their meaning and potential 
application to UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes* 
The precedents set by Porter [19791 and Klein [19781 suggest that 
a fruitful empirical study based on UK data could be conducted by 
the use Of content analysis of present written comments on 
Exposure Drafts. The preliminary work conducted by Hope & Gray 
[19821 on UK data has provided strong support for the usefulness 
of such an analysis. The present study addresses this task in 
Part IV "Evidence from the empirical study of UK data". 
The major task of the present-study, thens is to contribute to an 
elaboration of the "political dimension". To explore the 
complexity of he underlying models through the review in Part III 
and to explore the implications of the political dimension in 
action in Part IV. 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNT33IG 
AND ECONOMICS 
9.1 Conclusions drawn from previous research in accounting 
and economics 
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CHAPTER 9 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING 
AND ECONOMICS 
9.1 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM PREVIOUS RESEARCH IN ACCOUNTING AND 
ECONOMICS 
The problem of investigating UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes has been substantially illuminated by the 
changing perspective of previous research studies. The 
description of the UK ASC provided above in Chapter 3 "The 
Accounting Standards Committee" encompassed not only an 
accounting activity of specific technical matters being resolved 
by a profession's- own co ittee of experts* but also an 
accounting activity with economics political and professional 
dimensions. Clearly, some of those dimensions are reflected in 
the literature. 
The economic dimension is the most strongly represented in the US 
literature; the political dimension less so. However, the 
professional dimension seems not to be represented. No US study 
has sought to investigate the way in which the accounting 
profession, as a profession, influences the accounting standards 
setting processes. The reason for this apparent lack of interest 
in the implications of the professional dimension is perhaps not 
difficult to identify. The US institutional arrangement changed 
in 1973 when the FASB, as an independent body, took over the 
processes of setting accounting standards from the US accounting 
profession. Prior to that date, there was no serious US research 
interest in accounting standards setting processes Per se. 
Chapter 9 Page 2 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SE17ING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
Of importance to the problem of investigating UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes is the understanding that 
there are private gains available to those who both hold private 
information and can control the subsequent publication of that 
information. The existence of these gains arguably provides 
sufticient incentive for individuals to hold preferences in 
favour of some classes of accounting information as against other 
classes. Clearly, it is possible to characterise management as 
holding private information and so they have incentives to seek 
to control its subsequent publication. A professional accounting 
standards setting programme will necessarily restrict 
managements" freedom to exercise that control and so incentives 
exist for management to resist such a programme. The fundamental 
mechanism generating f 3. nancial statements -implies that some level 
of professional accounting standards is inevitable. The 
interesting qu. estion is how they are actually determined. Such 
is the economic rationale for participation in professional 
accounting standards setting processes. 
The economic rationale for participation is not sufficient to 
explain the resultant choices of professional accounting 
standards. Firstly, the aggregation of individual preferences is 
indeterminate and, secondly, there exists no unique social 
preference function by which that indeterminacy can be resolved. 
It follows that the general problem of the present study (namely, 
the exploration of factors which might be used to explain the 
processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined) can be characterised as an investigation of a social 
choice process in which non-economic criteria play an important 
part. Such is the rationale for the existence of a political 
dimension to professional accounting standards setting processes. 
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An important re-interpretation of the present study has emerged 
from the social choice literature, namely thatq in one sense, the 
study contributes to an investigation of the structure of 
constraints on individual preferences. Given that there is no 
unique solution to the problem of choice amongst alternatives for 
accounting information, there is a natural and clear interest in 
the structure of the present, existing, solution. Two 
contributions have been made by the dissertations of Sutton 
L19801 and Johnson [19791. 
Firstly, Johnson identifies different institutional arrangements 
under which professional accounting standards might be selected. 
Among the objectives ot those arrangements, the usual economic 
criterion ot Pareto-optimality is central although non-economic 
alternatives are clearly seen to be possible. Additionally, 
Johnson suggests the following areas for further research 
specifically based on existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes: 
I to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate the Pareto-optimality criterion? 
2 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes overcome incentives to misrepresent 
preferences? 
3 to what extent do existing professional accounting standards 
setting processes incorporate a power dominated objective? 
Secondly, Sutton has demonstrated that the theoretical frameworks 
being developed in a predominantly US orientated iiterature have 
potential application to the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes. Sutton also argues that an adequate 
explanation. of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes must take into account the political nature of those 
processes* Such an argument is supportive of the discussion in 
Chapter 5 "Professional accounting standardas the political 
dimension and economic consequences". 
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Some empirical studies to date have provided a valuable 
introduction to the study of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes, but a 
substantial contribution to theory construction is, as yet, 
undeveloped. 
In particular, the contributions of other disciplines, from which 
some explanatory concepts have been adopted, have been 
inadequately explored. Rather, isolated concepts have been 
introduced with little discussion of their origins. The present 
study seeks to redress that defect in Part IV "Review of 
literature from disciplines other than accounting and economics" 
in order to more fully appreciate their meaning and potential 
application to UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes. 
The, precedents set by Porter [19791 and Klein [19781 suggest that 
a fruitful empirical study based on UK data could be conducted by 
the use of content analysis of written comments on Exposure 
Drafts. The preliminary work conducted by Hope & Gray [19821 and 
Sutton [1980] on UK data has-provided strong support for the 
usefulness of such an analysis. The present study addresses 
this task in Part IV "Evidence from the empirical study of UK 
data". 
This 'area 'of research is yet in its infancy and some gaps are 
evident*' For example, no researcher has attempted to 
systematically observe several stages of the UK professional 
accounting standard setting process; the only information we have 
to date comprises anecdotes from participants and bland 
-procedural statements from official publications. No researcher 
has attempted to systematically test hypotheses over a broad 
range of accounting issues; the inflation accounting issue has 
provided a strong attracti on and possibly introduced a systematic 
bias into the results to date. No researcher has convincingly 
studied the roles, or perceptions, of participants in the 
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processo Finally, only two studies have used the bank of data 
available in the UK as the letters of coment to the ASC. These 
letters are filed, on public record, at the Library of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & Wales. The two 
studies have addressed one issue each, one of which was inflation 
accounting. 
Changes in professional accounting standards, such as the 
publication of Statements of Standard Accounting Practice by the 
UK professional accountancy bodies, have important wealth and 
welfare generation and redistribution properties. It follows 
that an understanding of how professional accounting standards 
decisions are made represents an important issue of social 
policy-making. The underlying economic processes are well 
understood. This contrasts with the underlying political 
processes, which are poorly understood and little researched by 
accountants. 
Two questions arise naturally from the previous research 
1 are the theoretical constructss -from disciplines other than 
accounting and economics, that have been identified in the 
previous research capable of contributing to a comprehensive 
explanation of professional accounting standards setting 
processes in the UK? 
2 what is the relationship between the written statements of 
preference and the final outcome in the UK? 
In order to begin to answer these questions, evidence of two 
types appears to be called for 
1 evidence that the theoretical constructs from disciplines other 
than accounting and economics are adeq*uately supported by the literature of these disciplines and have implications which are 
meaningful in the context of professional accounting standards 
setting processes in the UK; 
2 empirical evidence of professional accounting standards setting 
processes in the UK. 
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A substantial investment is required in understanding the 
political processes. The remainder of the present study is 
devoted to systematically gathering those two classes of 
evidence through the two-fold approach of 
1 reviewing analyses from the Literature of disciplines other 
than accounting and economics. This investment is undertaken 
and documented in Part III "Review of literature from 
disciplines other than accounting and economics"; and 
2 generating empirical evidence from professional accounting 
standards setting processes in operation in the UK. This 
investment is undertaken and documented in Part IV "Evidence 
from the empirical study of UK data". 
A major contribution of the present study, then, will be to 
elaborate the "political dimension" by exploring the complexity 
of the underlying models (in Part III) and exploring the actual 
effects of the political dimension (in Part IV). Both of these 
can be interpreted, in one sense, as contributions to an 
investigation of the structure of constraints on individual 
preferences. 
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PART III REVIEW OF LITERATURE FROM DISCIPLINES OTHER THAN 
ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
Chapter 10 Introduction to review of literature from disciplines 
other than accounting and economics 
Chapter 11 Scientific choice processes 
Chapter 12 Political choice processes 
Chapter 13 Organisational choice processes 
Chapter 14 Professionalisation processes 
Chapter 15 Conclusions drawn from review of literature from 
disciplines other than accounting and economics 
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CHAPTER 10 INTRODUCTION TO REVIEW OF LITERATURE FROM DISCIPLINES 
OTMM THAN ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
10.1 Introduction 
10.2 Review of literature from disciplines other than accounting 
and economics 
.0. 
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CHAPTER 10 INTRODUCTION TO REVIEW OF LITERATURE FROM DISCIPLINES 
OTHER THAN ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the preceding Part II "Review of previous reseach in 
accounting and economics" it was shown that the problem of 
investigating UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes has been substantially illuminated by the changing 
perspective of previous research studies. The description of the 
UK ASC provided above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards 
Committee" encompassed not only an accounting activity of 
specific technical matters being resolved by a profession's own 
committee of experts, but also an accounting activity with 
economic, political and professional dimensions. Clearly, some of 
those dimensions are reflected in the literature. 
The economic rationale for participation is not sufficient to 
explain the resultant choices of professional accounting 
standards. Firstly, the aggregation of individual preferences is 
indeterminate and, secondly, there exists no unique social 
preference function by which that indeterminacy can be resolved. 
It follows that the general problem of the present study (namely, 
the exploration of factors which might be used to explain the 
processes by which UK professional accounting standards are 
determined) can be characterised as an investigation of a social 
choice process in which non-economic criteria play an important 
part. Such is the rationale for the existence of a political 
dimension to professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Some empirical studies to date have provided a valuable 
introduction to the study of the political dimension in 
professional accounting standards setting processes, but a 
substantial contribution to theory construction is, as yets 
undeveloped. 
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In particular, the contributions of other disciplines, from which 
some explanatory concepts have been adopted, have been 
inadequately explored. Rather, isolated concepts have been 
introduced with little discussion of their origins. The--present 
study seeks to redress that defect in this Part IV "Review of 
literature from disciplines other than accounting and economics" 
in order to more fully appreciate their meaning and potential 
application to TJK professional acc'ounting standards setting 
processes* 
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10.2 REVIEW OF LITERATURE FROM DISCIPLINES OTHER THAN ACCOUNTING 
AND ECONOMICS 
Two analyses lead to a consideration of literature in Chapter 11 
"Scientific choice processes". Firstly, the argument that 
professional accounting standards setting processes are both 
scientific and political. Secondly, Chapter 12 "Political choice 
processes" will distinguish between rational policy, 
organisational process and bureaucratic politics as three 
different models of political decision making. It will argue 
that the rational policy model is the rational selection of an 
alternative from. among a number of alternatives in order to 
maximise the objectives, or criteria, of a "decision unit"; this 
is the scientific choice model. 
The chapter reviews the formal decision theoretic model of 
choice. Secondly, the role of measurement is explored and then 
related to the accounting environment. Finally, the problem of 
the non-uniqueness of decision criteria is addressed. 
The increasing recognition being given to the "political 
dimension" in the literature on the professional accounting 
standards setting . processes 
leads to a consideration of 
literature in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". 
Firstly, 'the chapter identifies a characterisation of political 
process as decision-making and reviews the implied models. 
Secondlys the study of political institutions is explored; and 
finally, consideration is given to the usefulness of the concept 
of "power". 
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Two analyses lead to a consideration of literature in Chapter 13 
"Organisational choice processes". Firstly, the characterisation 
of the US professional accounting standards setting processes as 
being, in part, an organisational choice process. Secondly, 
Chapter 12 "Political choice processes" will distinguish between 
rational policy, organisational process and bureaucratic politics 
as different models of political decision making and argue that 
the organisational process model is implied in much political 
analysis. 
The review identifies a classification of implied models of 
organisational choice. It then proceeds to explore the model of 
choice in ambiguity as of potential interest to the study of 
professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Three analyses lead to a consideration of literature in Chapter 
14 "Professionalisation processes". Firstly, the argument that 
professionalisation processes encourage professions to strive to 
keep technical, or scientific, decisions away from intervention 
by outsiders; such decisions being said to be subject to 
intervention by veto. Secondly, Chapter 12 "Political choice 
processes" will argue that the concept of morality has permeated 
much political analysis and that the concept may be implied in 
partial: structurings of preferences in the process of 
professionalisation. Thirdly, Chapter 13 "Organisational choice 
processes" will argue that the "judgemental" choice process is 
linked to the professionalisation literature to the extent that 
choices are made by individuals in the roles of professionals in 
bureaucracies. 
The review explores the framework implied by the notion of 
professionalisation, firstly, by tracing the development of a 
literature which defines a profession. Secondly, it explores 
characterisations of a professionalisation process; and finally, 
it investigates ways in which constraints on that process 
determine its possible outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 11 SCIElffIFIC CHOICE PROCESSES 
11.1 IlMODUCTION 
Two analyses lead. to a consideration of the literature of 
scientific choice processes. 
Firstly, in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards setting 
processes", it was shown that Sharp [19791 distinguishes between 
scientific and political styles of decision making. Sharp argues 
that professional accounting standards setting processes are both 
scientific and political. 
Secondly, in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes", it will be 
s hown týat Allison (19691 distinguishes between rational policy, 
organisational process and bureaucratic politics as three 
different models of political decision making. Allison argues 
that the rational policy model is the rational selection of an 
alternative from among a number of alternatives in order to 
maximise the objectives, or criteria, of a "decision unit"; this 
is the scientific choice model. 
The review first addresses the underlying formal decision 
theoretic model implied by the scientific choice process 
characterisation. It then uses some measurement theoretic 
arguments to help explore the relationship between this model and 
the accounting environment. 
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11.2 DECISION 
"all organisms are constantly, day and night, engaged in problem 
solving" [Popper 1973, p. 242, paraphrased by Mace 1977, p. 2721. 
Formal decision theory views the choice process from a well 
defined problem-solving viewpoint. A problem is seen as an 
ambiguity in which a set, Q, of alternative actions is available 
to the problem solver. Additionally, there exists a body of 
knowledge, K, which can be applied to the ambiguity in order to 
generate a solution, q(i) belonging to Q. No q(i) can actually be 
specified until a criterion, 0, is imposed on the set of pairs 
(q(i), K) belonging to (Q, K) (for example, White [1969, p. 31). 
So thens a firm m*3. ght be faced with a problem of disclosure in 
which alternative actions are 
q(l) - disclosure of profits generated in geographical 
location X 
q(2) - no disclosure of profits generated in geographical 
location X 
The firms knowledge set, K, includes a model of the behaviour of 
the local national government of X and this model predicts that 
the outcome of disclosure would be the imposition of penal taxes. 
The outcome of non-disclosure would be the avoidance of this tax 
burden. Further, the tirm has a long term objective function 
which implies minimisation of all tax burdens and this objective 
function becomes the criterion by which the problem is solved. 
The important point here is that q(2), or no disclosure of 
profits generated in geographical location X, is uniquely 
determined by the three element 'Set (Q, K, e). In these cases the 
problem, Q, is said to be decidable. It often happens that a 
problem is not decidablet' that is, there is no unique q(i) 
belonging to Q which is deducible from (Q#Kpg). Nevertheless, it 
one or more q(i) can be eliminated as being ranked lower than the 
remainder of Q under criterion e, then Q is said to be partially 
decidable. In cases where no such eliminations can be made, then 
the problem is said to be undecidable and selection of any q(i) 
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from Q is described, in the decision theoretic 
pure choice. So then, it is possible to dis 
choice and decision. The former is not 
specification of a rule for uniquely determining 
taken and so cannot be delegated. Decisions, 
decision theoretic sense, can be delegated. 
13. teratureg as 
tinguish between 
subject to the 
the action to be 
in this strict 
Symbolically, the decision is often represented by 
(Q, K)---->q(i) eQ 
where 
K, and q(i) have the above meanings; 
-----> means "implies"; and 
e means "belonging to" 
Accepting as axiomatic Popper's assertion that all organisms are 
constantly involved in problem solving is intuitively appealing 
for it can be seen, in all walks of everyday life, how it might 
apply. Each individual has the problem of when to get up in the 
mornings, how to travel to work, how to perform tasks at work 
etc. Similarly on a group basis, human activity can be 
characterised as problem solving. Much has been written about 
the behaviour of man in the organisational context. For example, 
Pettigrew L19731 studied the behaviour of individuals in a 
firres development of its computerised system; an example of 
problem solving behaviour -in the context of the organisation 
itself. Cyert & March [19631 characterise the firm as a 
collection of individuals and groups of individuals who each 
engage in problem solving behaviour. The aggregate effect of 
this collective, though not necessarily cooperative, problem 
solving is then seen as the firm's problem solving behaviour. 
Similarly, the selection 
, 
of professional accounting standards 
might be as the rational decision of which characterised 
alternative to select given a criterion and a body of knowledge. 
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Every individual, group or organisation, then, is engaged in 
problem solving. In order to systematically solve problems, 
decision tbeory requires an ambiguity, a body of knowledge and a 
criterion. So, for any given problem it can be assumed that the 
ambiguity is given (otherwise there would be no problem) and that 
the criterion is given. Assuming that the criterion is given is 
considered as non-problematic, because if this were not the case 
then any subsequent search for a criterion would really 
constitute a sub-problem for which there must be some higher 
order criterion. The assumption essentially is that the ultimate 
criterion is well defined and the search for any second order (or 
problem-specific criterion) reduces to a search of the body of 
knowledge. The criterion, then, is assumed to be contained 
within the body of knowledge. We shall explore the implications 
of this assumption will be explored later. 
What, then, constitutes the body of knowledge? Intuitively, it 
can be argued that this must be the body of facts available to us 
as input to our decision process. The only relevant facts will 
be those concerning the outcomes of each of the alternative 
actions Available and the possibility of additional alternatives. 
Unfortunately, man lives in a complex and largely unknown world 
and so his possession of facts concerning the outcomes will be 
imperfect. In order to reduce this imperfection, and so. reduce 
the uncertainty of the impact of the environment generally, man 
theorises and measures. In a perfect worlds all that would be 
necessary would be to measure the outcome itself on some 
measurement scale consistent with the criterion function. The 
decision is then instantly determinedo subject only to 
computational resource. A review of much of the decision 
theoretic literature demonstrates that this simplified approach 
to determining decidability has been the objective of many 
writers. This body of literature has been concerned with either 
constructing rules for measuring outcomes (for example, Ackoff 
[19621, Shackle [19611, Koopmans [19601, Chipman [19601s Debreu 
(19581, Luce and Raiffa [1957], Milnor [19571, Savage [19541, 
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Wald [1954j, Neumann and Morgenstern [19531, Marschak [19501, 
Carnap [1947j, Von Mises [1941j) or with devising criteria for 
deciding amongst outcomes whose measures are assumed to be 
available (for example, White [1969, p. 28j). 
It has been observed above that man lives in a complex and 
largely unknown world and so in the face of a potentially hostile 
environment he theorises and measures. By theorising, 
uncertainties are reduced as predictions are made about outcomes, 
Theory construction is an essential component of the development 
of the body of knowledge It is useful to investigate the role of 
measurement in theory construction. This is undertaken in the 
following section. 
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11.3 MEA UREMENT 
Ellis 11966, pp. 125-1261 argues that the construction of, and 
choice between, measurement scales is guided by a general need to 
generate models of the environment which are as simple as 
possible. It is important to note that it is always possible to 
generate many difterent measurement scales which measure the same 
property of whatever object happens to be of interest. However, 
in determining the relationships between various properties these 
measurement scales will give rise to formal expressions of these 
relationships which differ in their complexity. An example from 
the accounting environment can help to clarify this. 
Consider the inter-period allocation of taxation costs (for 
example, Comiskey & Groves 11978D. There are (at least) two 
genrally recognised methods of measuring the taxation cost in any 
given period, namely current and deferred. There are, of course, 
numerous different variations of these two basic methods and 
recognising this simply strengthens the argument here. In the 
late 1970*s in the UK there was debate concerning the deferral 
method. This was generally known as deferred taxation and had 
been 
, 
mandated by the accounting standard SSAP11 "Accounting for 
deferred taxation". SSAP11 recognised two difterent approaches 
to the measurement of deferred taxation, namely a deferral method 
and a liability method. In both cases an accrual was to be set 
up for the future reversal of a current timing difference. The 
controversy concerned whether or not all future reversals should 
be accrued. It was argued that there are some future reversals 
which are either so remote in probability or in timing that their 
accrual would make the financial statements difficult to 
interpret. Here then, we see an example of a desire for a 
measurement scale which would make theory construction, by the 
users of financial statements, less compl. ex. As it happens, 
those who argued for change were successful and a new accounting 
standard, SSAP15 "Accounting for deferred taxation" was published 
in place of its predecessor. 
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Formal measurement theory (for example, Mock [19761, Ijiri 
L1975J, Pfanzagl [1971J, Vickery L1970Js Ellis [196619 Torgerson 
11958J, Hempel [1952J, Stevens [1946]), Bridgman [19311 and 
Campbell [1920J, is concerned with the development of knowledge 
by observation of the real world, or more precisely, what we 
understand the real world to be. A real world is assumed to 
exist, it contains objects of interest each of which posesses 
properties and we speak of the properties of these objects. 
Relationships are assumed to exist between these properties and 
theory construction is the attempt to describe these 
relationships and formally express them in one language or 
another. Measurement is the association of the specified 
property of a specified object with a number (or measure) in 
such a manner that some relationships between those numbers and 
the associated measures of other properties preserve the 
relationships between the same properties of differing objects. 
Such a relation-preserving association is known as a homomorphism 
[Mock 1976, p. 13 and Pfanzagl 1971, p. 261. Use of the numbers so 
generated in formally expressed relationships (that is, theory) 
enables the corresponding property of some, as yet unmeasureds 
object to be predicted by determining its own associated number 
(or measure). By the use of complex relationships between 
several properties then predictions can be made about properties 
which have not been measured at all during the prediction 
process. Some measurement of those properties will have. been 
necessary at the theory construction stage. 
These points can be illustrated by considering manufacturing 
costs. 'Say a firm has manufactured a product for several years 
and knows that fixed manufacturing costs are E50,000, variable 
manufacturing costs are MO per units sales price is Ep per unit 
and that in'the past profits have been equal to 
E(p - 25U)q - 50jOUO 
where q is the number of products sold. 
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Clearly, in developing this theoretical relationship the 
manufacturer has'needed to measure fixed costs, variable costs, 
sales price, profit and quantity. However, in order to predict 
his profit next year all he needs to do is measure his next 
year's sales price and sales quantity. He may do this by some 
estimating procedure. Nevertheless, he has theorised the 
existence of a relationship between profit, sales price and sales 
quantity. These are all properties of his object of interest, 
which is his manufacturing process, and the numbers he assigns to 
them preserves the underlying relationships. 
Having sketched the elements of measurement theory we can now 
proceed to consider the implications of the inter-relationship 
between measurement and theory construction. This consideration 
is based on Ellis 119661 who argues the following. 
Stevens [1946J has distinguished between different measurement 
scales on the basis of their mathematical properties. He argued 
[p. 6781 that the empirical relationships preserved in a given 
measurement scale may also be pres. erved in a second scale when it 
can be shown that there exists a mathematical transformation from 
one into the other. For example, most accounting measurement 
scales give us the same information whether they are expressed in 
terms of pounds sterling or pence sterling Also, the temperature 
scales*of Centigrade and Fahrenheit give us the same information 
because one can be transformed into the other by a simple linear 
equation. The class of scales which preserve the underlying 
empirical relationships under a given mathematical transformation 
is said to be. "invariant" with respect to that transformation. 
For example, it can be said that the Centigrade, Fahrenheit and 
Absolute (or Kelvin) temperature scales are linearly invariant. 
Chapter 11 Page 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
Take the linearly invariant class of temperature scales. They 
have found much usefulness in the natural sciences because they 
each possess theoretical import in the sense of Hempel 
[1952, p. 491. That is, they possess some substantive meaning in 
relation to our understanding of the world. In Ellis' 
terminology, they generate simpler theories than their 
alternatives. However, Ellis shows [pp. 9p-1031 that it is 
important to understand that although temperature is viewed in 
terms of this linear, and so equal-interval., property there is no 
implication about any underlying linearity, or equal-interval 
property, of the empirical temperature system. For example, 
there could have been generated-a logarithmic temperature scale 
in which the absolute zero measure is minus infinity. This would 
have considerable intuitive appeal on the basis that physicists 
have demonstrated that it is impossible to ever reach the 
absolute zero of temperature although we can get closer and 
closer to it. However, the particular theories which have today 
been built around the linearly invariant temperature scales would 
be more complex if they were based on logarithmically invariant 
scales. For this reason the logarithmic temparature scale is not 
used. Similar arguments can be developed concerning the other, 
so called fundamental, scales of the natural sciences. Ellis 
[pp. 104-110J considers the deceptive nature of the time scales 
and Einstein is well known for having changed perceptions of mass 
and length. 
The implication of the above argument, then, is that the 
particular measurement scales which we choose have the effect of 
determining the form of our theories; and, conversely, once we 
have determined the form of our theories then our measurements 
are constrained by those theories. That is, we view the world in 
terms of our theories, but these do not necessarily reflect any 
static and permanent base for interpretation* Consequently the 
demand for measurements might changes not because their 
predecessors have been demonstrated to be wrong but because our 
theories of the 'world have changed. Alsol the supply of 
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measurements might change because of changes in the technology of 
measurement and so, in 
' 
turn, our theories might subsequently be 
modified. For example, Tinker [19801 and Williams & Findlay 
[1980J argue that neoclassical economic theory heavily underlies 
both current accounting measurements and theory. Further, Tinker 
argues that under. a different framework of economic theory, such 
as politicai economys then a different regime of accounting 
measurements would be likely. 
Now, if the environment can be characterised as one of changing 
patterns of demand for, and supply of, measurement scales then we 
are led to enquire as to the existence of criteria for choosing 
between these scales. Above we have followed the decision 
theoretic argument to a consideration of measurement theory and 
found a fundamental criterion for such a choice. This is 
simplification of theory construction. However, this is 
problematic because, in order to operationalise that criterion) 
we need a body of theory before we can start the process of 
simplification. Such a body of theory arguably evades the social 
sciences today and consequently it follows that 
there can be no strong, theory-oriented, criteria for choice 
amongst accounting measurement scales. 
The decision and measurement theoretic approach leads us to 
expect to find theory oriented such criteria exhibited, at best, 
weakly amongst other criteria derived from non-decision theoretic 
arguments. 
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11.4 ON THE ACCOUNTING ERVIROWN ENT 
The accounting environment is one of largely ill-developed 
theories on which there is no universal acceptance of the 
supremacy of any one over the others [Hopwood 1983; 
Watts & Zi=erman 1979J. Economic theory is perhaps the nearly 
most developed discipline which impacts on the accounting 
environment, but the range of others is impressive. Disciplines 
such as sociology, managerial and organisational behaviour, 
political science and accounting itself are all fields in which 
there is a noticeable lack of any unified theoretical aproach to 
understanding. 
In such an environment, we would expect that developments and 
changes in each of the disciplines which can be said to have an 
impact on accounting would themselves have some consequence for 
the development of accounting theory. This can be illustrated by 
the way in which the development of the theory of organisational 
behaviour has changed the way in which accountants see the role 
of the formal accounting system within an organisation and. its 
inter-relationships with informal information systems. 
Considering the number of disciplines which impact on. accounting 
and the high rates of change within many of them, then we would 
expect the rate of change within accounting theory to be 
similarly high. 
The argument of' the preceding section predicts that there Vould 
be a changing pattern of demand for accounting measurement scales 
resulting from this changing theoretical background. Clearly, 
this shifting demand pattern can be observed. It can be argued 
that the shift within the inflation accounting debate towards a 
two-tier income statement with a gearing adjustment reflects the 
influence of developments within economic theory by Godley & 
Cripps [1975J and others in the 1970's (see, for example, 
Whittington 11981J). Also, the increasing demand for measures of 
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the cost society suffers as a result of the industrial activity 
of individual firms reflects an increasing understanding of the 
role of the firm in the natural ecology and in the social 
structure compiled with theoretical elaborations of the role of 
externalities in markets. 
In addition to a constantly changing pattern of demand for 
accounting measurement scales we also observe a constantly 
developing pattern of supply. As was noted in the preceding 
section, supply changes can arise as a result of the dynamic 
nature of measurement tecnnology. These changes are 
distinguished from any changes which might arise from demand 
shifts as hypothesised by Watts and Zimmerman (19791. 
Technological changes in the accounting environment can arise 
from either external sources or internally. An example of an 
externally generated change might be the data processing 
revolution which has made available more complex management 
information systems than was possible in the days of manually 
maintained accounting systems. An example of an internally 
generated change might be the introduction of inter-period 
taxation allocation on the deferred taxation principle discussed 
earlier, or experiments by some in new fields of accounting 
[Skerratt (Ed) 1981, pp. 180-1841. 
Given that the accounting environment can be characterised as one 
of constantly changing theoretical and technological 
relationships, it is an unsurprising aberration that accounting 
practices themselves are also constantly changing. 
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11.5 ON THE UNIQUENESS OF DECISION CRITERIA 
It was assumed above in Section 11.2 "Decision" that the 
decision criterion is unique and determinable. At an elementary 
level this causes no real problem in as much as for many 
decisions the criterion is an established part of the knowledge 
set. Such is the case for many decisions in the natural sciences 
and for some decisions in the social sciences. For example, a 
subordinate manager may be given a criterion such as maximisation 
of short run cash flows. However, it was shown in the preceding 
section that accounting measurement scale selection involves not 
only ambiguity of alternative actions, but also ambiguity of 
criteria. Further, it follows directly from Arrow L1963 & 19511 
that, if criteria are characterised as preference functions t hens 
a uniquely determined criterion is only a possibility where 
individual preferences are severely constrained [Riker 1980J. 
Clearly then, in a social environment we need to relax the 
assumption of uniqueness of criteria. This has a devastating 
effect on the application of scientific choice processes to 
social analysis because$ whereas as we have seen measurement 
scale selection is only weakly determined in the case of a unique 
decision criterion of theory simplification, when decision 
criteria themselves are non-unique then the systematic 
determination of measurement scale selection may even become 
indeterminate. 
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11.6 SUHMARY 
Formal decision theory characterises a decision as a selection of 
one alternative from amongst more than one, that is, in a 
situation of ambiguity. The selection is made by a unique and 
determinate criterion and is subject to an extant body of 
knowledge [White 1969J. 
Formal measurement theory is the elaboration of the framework by 
which the body of knowledge is determined and extended in the 
form of theories [Hempel 1952]. The evidence of scientific 
theory construction suggests'that measurement scales themselves 
are selected against the criterion of theory simplification 
[Ellis 19661. However, the accounting environment is largely one 
of diverse and ill-developed theories [Hopwood 19831. Theory 
simplification can offer only a weak selection criterion in such 
an environment. Accounting measurement scale selection can not 
yet call upon formal measurement theory for the provision of a 
rational selection criterion. 
Given the tailure ot formal decision and measurement theory to 
generate a unique selection criterion then the multiple criteria 
can be characterised as individual preference functions. Their 
aggregation into a unique preference function (or criterion) is 
indeterminate [Arrow 1963 & 19511. 
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11.7 CONCLUSIONS 
If professional accounting standards setting processes are 
characterised as selections of accounting measurement scales, 
then clearly no recourse can. be had to the formal scientific 
processes of choice between difterent alternatives. To a large 
extent this conclusion offers itself as a formal rationalisation 
for the adoption of a political dimension to the investigation of 
professional accounting standards setting processes. The 
corollary is that professional accounting standards setting 
processes are not strictly technical. 
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CHAPTER 12 POLITICAL CHOICE PROCESSES 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
A consideration of the literature of political choice processes 
stems from the increasing recognition being given to the 
"political dimension" in the literature on the professional 
accounting standards setting processes. This was discussed in 
depth above in Chapter 5 "Professional accounting standards, the 
political dimension and economic consequences", but it is worth 
recalling here that contributions to that literature include 
Thomas [1983j, Bromwich & Hopwood (Eds) [1983jo Burggraaff 
[1983j, Hope & Briggs [1982j, Hope & Gray [19821, Solomons [1983, 
1980 & 197819 Beaver [19811, Hakansson [1981j, Hope [19791, Watts 
& Zimmerman [1979 & 19781, Henderson & Peirson [19781, Kirk 
[19781, Standish [19781, Zeff [19781, Watts [197718 Armstrong 
[19761, Horngren [1976,1973 & 19721, Moonitz L19741 and Gerboth 
11973A; 1973B & 1972J. Although this increasing recognition is 
clear, the accounting literature is limited in as much as it does 
not address the nature of models implied by such a 
characterisation. One or two ideas, such as "power" 
[Hope & Gray 19821 and "coalition formation" [Newman 1981AJ, have 
been identified but only in isolation from their underlying 
frameworks'. This chapter seeks to redress the resulting 
imbalance. 
Full justice can not adequately be accorded to the work of 
political scientists in this brief'review. However, an overview 
of their literature is essential to a proper understanding of 
their theoretical constructs and the potential usefulness of 
those constructs in contributing to any theory which seeks to 
explain professional accounting standards setting processes. For 
the purposes of thisýreview, the political science literature is 
characterised, as being subdivided into three separately 
identifiable schools, namely those on decision making, political 
institutions and power respectively. 
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12.2 DECISION MAKING PROCESSES 
One approach to the analysis of political events is taken by the 
decision making school. This school views complex events, such 
as the withdrawal of USSR missiles from Cuba, as the outcome of 
decisions. These decisions are assumed to be rational in the 
sense that they are susceptible to explanation. The problem is 
to discover that explanation. Clearly, such a framework has 
potential application to professional accounting standards 
setting processes if we characterise the professional accounting 
standards setting body as a decision making body in the sense 
that it decides which professional accounting standards shall be 
adopted. Such a characterisation has been proposed by LeRoy 
Lewis [19781, Gerboth [1973 & 19721, Hussein [1981 & 19771, Watts 
& Zitamerman (19791, May & Sundem [19761, Most & Winters (19771 
amongst others. 
Lindblom [19591 argued that professional administrators, charged 
with reponsibility for a subset of political decisions, find the 
traditional "root and branch" approach of comprehensive 
rationality an impossibility in operation. The information 
demands of comprehensive rationality are beyond human capability 
and resources are limited. The alternative of "successive 
limited comparisons" is the only operational method of choice. 
Lindblom further argues that the incremental approach is the only 
desirable method in a political environment because it involves 
moves based on the status quo, so implicitly considering the 
feasibility, in political terms, of alternatives. Within this 
framework, Lindblom saw the objectives of the administration as 
being defined by policy plans rather than vice-versa. Also, 
attempts to rationalise the events leading up to a given action 
would always fail if viewed as'being rational comprehensive. 
Rather, the incumbent administrator is the sole custodian of an 
historical rationalisation because only he has access to the 
irregular path of incrementalism. Lindblom's view of decision 
processes seems to be implicitly based on Simon's (19551 notion 
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of bounded rationality springing from limited knowledge. 
Lindblom's thesis is further elaborated in Lindblom [1977 & 19651 
to encompass not only "incremental" strategies, but al so 
"disjointed incrementalism" and "partisan mutual adjustment". 
Disjointed incrementalism is the use of incrementalism by 
subunits of the larger unit when those subunits are allowed to 
proceed independently of the other subunits. 
Partisan mutual adjustment is the use of small bargaining games 
in which subunits determine their own actions either by internal 
bargaining or by bargaining with other subunits. The concept of 
partisan mutual adjustment is considered later in the discussion 
of Allison's concept of "bureaucratic politics". In his later 
work, Lindblom further argued that, as a mechanism for 
aggregating preferences, partisan mutual adjustment is sensitive 
to "power" distributions. He observes that in the US the 
preferences of major corporations are very much favoured by the 
process. 
Padget 119801 critices the incrementalist model by exploring more 
closely Simon's notion of bounded rationality. He argues that 
the concept is an appealing one for students of US government 
budget research, but questions the usefulness of the 
incrementalist model. The incrementalist model$' as 
operationalised. by Davis, Dempster & Wildavsky [19661, is a 
simple linear model in which a given proportion of the base, such 
as last year's budget, is adjusted by some incremental term. 
Padget argues that this is not sufficiently rich to capture some 
of the features of the US Governmental budgeting process and he 
advances a' variation which he calls "serial judgement". In 
serial judgement, last year's budget is still taken as the base 
but next the decision maker determines the direction of 
adjustment, 'as either up or down, after which stochastically 
generated alternatives are serially assessed. The first 
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alternative to meet satisficing criteria is the one which is 
selected. Padget provides evidence in support of his model as 
against the linear incremental model, and notes that the serial 
judgement model generates a probability distribution of outcomes 
with a pronounced tail; the interpretation being that there is a 
non-zero probability of occasional radical outcomes. 
Snyder, Bruck & Sapin 119541 (SB&S), in a seminal work, have 
argued that the foreign policy-making of governments can be 
viewed from a decision making perspective. They argue that a 
decision unit is capable of being identified, as either an 
individual or a small group, and that the decision unit can be 
characterised by a set of preferences and an information set. 
The determinants of foreign policy action -are, then, the 
determinants of preferences and of information. These are said 
to be (a) spheres of competence; (b) conmunications and 
information; and (c) motivation [p. 101. The decision unit is 
seen to be characterised as an organisation and so the 
organisational decision theoretic literature of the day 
necessarily has been subsumed into SB&S's framework. Their. view 
is essentially a rational comprehensive view, as is evidenced by 
their attempts to identify all the factors which determine each 
of their three fundamental determinants. For example, the 
determinants of motivation are seen [pp. 153-1731 to be captured 
by a consideration of 
I the functions and objectives of the total foreign policy- 
making structure and of any substructure; 2 the objectives of particular units; 3 socially defined norms and values internal to the decision 
unit; 
4 socially defined norms and values external to the total 
decision-making structure and internalised in the decision 
maker; 
5 material needs and values of the society or any segment 
thereof not internalised in the decisi6on-=king; and 
6 personality. 
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Although not made explicit in their essay, SB&S seem to have an 
implicit general systems theory framework. Other examples of the 
general systems theory framework can be found in Gray 119811, 
Mattessich 119781, Tinker & Lowe [19771 and Bertalanffy [19681. 
Such an implied framework is evidenced by SB&S's use of terms 
such as "objectives of the total toreign policy-making structure" 
and their discussion of the role of information and feedback 
[p. 1321. 
Roseman [1967J has criticised SB&S- Firstly, he notes that the 
SB&S definition of the decision unit as an individual or small 
group was a dramatic break from the tradition of conceptualising 
the State as the decision unit. The effect of the break was to 
give researchers a new vocabulary and a new focus for attention; 
but the framework itself was devoid of a theoretical basis. The 
existence of a decision making event or process was posited, a 
string of potential variables identified, but no expression of 
relationships between these variables, no testable propositions. 
For this reason, Roseman argues that the SB&S framework is 
nothing more than a new definition of the focus of attention, 
important in itself but insufficient to support a body of 
research. 
Bachrach & Baratz L1963J contribute to the decision making 
literature and their contribution has been recognised in the 
accounting literature by Gray & Hope [1982J and Sutton [1980J. 
Importantly, they introduce the concept'of a "non-decision"; that 
is, a structural feature of the values of individuals which they 
call the "mobilization of bias" [p. 6411. This has the effect of 
ensuring that some issues never reach the point of requiring 
decisions. Bachrach & Baratz argue that non-decisions can be 
studied in the same framework as that for decisions. 
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Allison [19691 is a seminal review of decision analytic 
explanations of foreign policy processes. Allison argues that 
all foreign policy analysis subsumes an implied model of decision 
and he exposes three such implied models, illustrating them in 
the context of the Kennedy administration's handling of the Cuban 
missile crisis in 1962. The main argument is that each of the 
three models focuses on different variables, has different 
information requirements for researchers, generates a different 
explanation of the observations and oUtcomes, and generates 
different predictions. The three models identified are as 
follows 
I rational policy model, in which the outcome of collective 
choice is interpreted as the rationally selected alternative 
among a range of alternatives. The selected alternative is the 
one which maximises the objectives of the decision unit and the 
problem for analysts is the discovery of the implied 
objectives. The research requirements of this ' model are said 
to be minimal; 
2 organisational process model, in which the outcome of 
collective choice is interpreted as the execution of the 
standard operating procedures of participating organisations 
(the source of this view is credited by Allison to Cyert & 
March [19631). The problem for decision maker and analyst is 
to discover which standard operating procedures are feasible in 
specific circumstances. The research requirements of this model 
are said to be high; 
3 bureaucratic politics model, in which the outcome of collective 
choice is interpreted as the aggregate of the solutions to a 
large number of bargaining games in which individuals are 
* 
the 
players. In this way, decision making is shared by all the 
players who each contribute only as much 'as circumstances and 
resources permit. "But the issues are of first order 
importance 
. ...... Thus responsible men are obliged to 
fight 
for what they are convinced is right" [p. 7071. This model, 
Allison notes [p. 708j, is not often found in the literature 
because the values of academic researchers and of politicians 
are so different as to make the "politicking" inherent in the 
model difficult for academics to accept. The "penchant for 
intellectual elegance" ensures that more structural models, 
such as the rational policy model, will be utilised 
preferentially. Also, the research requirements of this model 
are said to be higher than those of the other two. 
Allison's rational policy models elaborated. best by Synder, 
Bruck-& Sapin [19541, is essentially an implied model of rational 
choice. This implied model is considered more fully above in 
Chapter 11 "Scientific choice processes" of the present study. 
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Allison's organisational process model is essentially an implied 
model of organisational choice. This implied model is considered 
more fully below in Chapter 13 "Organisational choice processes" 
of the present study. 
Allison's bureaucratic politics model, elaborated best by 
Lindblom 11977,1965 & 1959j, is essentially, argues Allison, 
that of the bargaining game; and the players in the games are 
individuals. There are many games and the supply of games is 
structured by "regular channels" and "deadlines", the latter 
forcing "issues to the attention of busy players" [p. 708J. The 
characteristics of the player are important. Dominant is the 
player's location in the administrative structure, usually as the 
head of a significant department or organisation. This position 
affords the player 
1 resourcesq which he can invest in securing his preferred 
outcome. Such resources will include his personal skills and 
the capacity for action which his organisation or department 
commands; and 
2 perceptions and preferences, which will determine his 
interpretation of an issue and his potential for identifying 
possible outcomes. 
Not only are the games channelled in the timing of their 
occurrence and in the selection of players to fit the game, but 
also the subsequent actions are channelled in determining who 
acts and how. - Such channels being determined by the 
organisational distribution of task responsibilities and 
resources. Finally, the outcome is characterised as a stream of 
outcomes of individual games, the aggregate of which may not 
necessarily have been the subject of any one game, individual 
preferenceýor even individual preception. 
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The above characterisation of Allison's bureaucratic politics 
model occurs elsewhere. Firstly, the use of a bargaining game is 
the same as that of Lindblom's [19651 concept of partisan mutual 
adjustments. Secondly, the "garbage can" model of organisational 
choice developed by Cohen, March & Olsen [19721 (CM&O), and 
considered in Chapter 13 "Organisational choice pr ocesses". is 
structurally the same. CM&O [p. 21 aknowledge Allison [19691 as 
one of the inspirations for their model. 
Lustick [19801 has re-considered the usefulness of the 
developments in modelling decision making choice processes which 
have moved away from the rational comprehensive, or synoptic, 
view. He uses Lindblom's concepts of disjointed incrementalism 
and partisan mutual adjustment as examples of a more general 
consideration of increased decentralisation of decision in a 
complex task environment. Lustick then identifies four 
conditions under which non-synoptic decision making can, at best, 
be discounted in comparison with synoptic decision making and, at 
worst, result in failure in the sense of generating inappropriate 
or even disastrous outcomes. 
Firstly, complex task environments can be characterised as having 
causal links between issues or problems. If issues which are so 
linked happen to be of very different orders of magnitude, then 
decentralised decision making may be problematic because the risk 
exposure of the decision maker may be of a low order of magnitude 
whereas the risk exposure of a second, disjoint, unit may be 
increased by a higher order of magnitude. Lustick provides 
[pp-344-346J an example of environmental pollution caused by 
sulphur dioxide on the one hand and nuclear power on the other 
hand. The argument is that sulphur dioxide pollution is itself 
incremental and so individual polluters can be encouraged to 
experiment in finding the best solution knowing that individual 
failures represent an acceptable cost of searching for a long-run 
solution. On the other hand, in regulating the safety standards 
of nuclear power stations, policy makers are ill-advised to 
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permit decentralised decision making because the costs of even 
one failure could be very high. The pollution from a nuclear 
power station disaster is not incremental but rather step-like. 
I 
Secondly* again characterising the complex task environment as 
having causal links between issues or problemss Lustick focuses 
Lpp.: 346-348J on. the degree to which that environment can be 
decomposed. The argument is that if these causal links can be 
clustered into discrete groupings, either over time or over other 
characteristics of issues, then the environment is decomposable 
and the boundaries of the disjoint decision makers can coincide 
with' the naiural environmental boundaries. Ift on the other 
hand, there is no such decomposition structure then decentralised 
decision making can be problematic because "error messages" will 
be difficult to interpret. Lustick provides [p. 3471 an example 
of the use of water resources. If water r esources are 
decomposed, say in a naturally occurring set of numerous 
reservoirs, then error messages received by one unit can be 
rapidly interpreted as relating to that single water supply. On 
the other hand, if there is only one non-decomposable water 
supplys as in the case of one major river, then error messages 
received say downstream could relate to errors anywhere upstream 
from that point. The point of the argument being that the 
disjoint units are unable to learn from their experience, and 
such learning is part of the primary justification for 
decentralisation. 
Thirdly, Lustick Ipp. 348-350J argues that disjoint incrementalism 
is a luxury that decision makers with limited resources cannot 
afford. Essentially9 decentralised decision making is'argued to 
be an investment of resources in trial and error coping 
strategies in which the costs of the failures can be absorbed. 
If these error costs cannot be absorbed, say in an organisation 
with no slack (in the sense of Cyert & March [19631), then the 
value of decentralisation must be discounted. Lustick points to 
evidence that, at the time of the 1930's depression, many major 
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US corporations which have survived switched from a decentralised 
to a centralised decision structure. 
Finallys Lustick identifies the unequal distribution of power as 
problematic for decentralisation models. Lustick's argument 
supports the Lindblom [19771 discussion of this problem in the 
context of the power balance held by US corporations and how it 
ensures their preferences are given priority. 
Lustick's reconsideration of non-rational comprehensive models 
has been considered at length. He argues [p. 3441 that an 
evolutionary process will ensure that surviving decision 
strategies will be those which are matched to their task 
environments by moving along an "incremental-synoptic" scale to a 
point determined by the characteristics of that task environment. 
That in itself is not such a revolutionary idea (c. f. 
"contingency theory", for example, Otley [1980J). Lustick's 
contribution is to identify factors by which that environment can 
be characterised. Single dimensional complexity, however 
measured, is insufficient a characterisation. Also he implicitly 
alerts us to the need for some higher order synoptic explanation 
of the decision process. Such an explanation might be offered by 
the next section. 
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12.3 POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
Some students of politics have been much troubled, and so 
stimulated, by Arrow's "Possibility theorem" [Arrow 1963 & 19511. 
Frohock L1980J has argued that a long concern of political 
thought, namely morality, has a place in the interpretation and 
development of Arrow's work. Morality is presented as a core 
concept in early notions of the nature of values. This is 
. 
contrasted with the value structure of individuals in Arrow's 
society. These individuals are seen by Froftock [p. 3821 as bearing 
the legacy of Hobbess Mill and Bentham. Their values are 
isolated from each other in the determination of collective 
choice and such choice can be no more than the sum of the parts. 
Frohock's concern with the morality embedded in individuals' 
preferences stems from his desire to "avoid the impossibility 
results of Arrow's theorem" [p. 3731. It is interesting to note 
that Frohocks following many other writers, refers to Arrow's 
Impossibility, theorem, interpreting the theorem as a negative 
statement. On the other hand, Arrow called the theorem his 
Possibilty theorem. Adopting the positve terminology invites 
consideration of the positive implications, namely the 
conditions which need to be modified (to an extent not analysed 
by Arrow) before collective choice is determinable. For the 
purposes of the present study it is unnecessary to invoke the 
concept of morality, but sufficient to recognise its potential as 
a partial structuring of preferences. If morality exists it is 
assumed to be captured by other routes, , such as the 
consideration, in Chapter 14 "Professionalisation processes", of 
professions and the altruism attribute. 
4 
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Riker [1980, p. 4321 notes that an early tradition of study of 
political institutions gave way in recent times to a study of 
tastes and values, that is, preferences. Such study is 
attributed to a Christian belief in the sovereignty of belief and 
is said to be enshrined, in Benthamite "radicalism" 
[Bentham 18231, as a view ot democracy as "a device to combine 
individual values into decisions of government". Arrows arguing 
differently, implies that preferences need to be constrained in 
order to determine collective choice as an outcome of the social 
welfare function. Today's democracy is no more than one of a 
number of possible devices for constraining those preferences. 
Riker (19801 traces the steps by which the study of tastes and 
values by students of politics has leds or has started to lead, 
to a renewed study of institutions. Drawing attention firstly to 
"the great amount of research on public opinion (which concerns 
the nature of tastes and values), political socialisation (which 
concerns the creation of tastes and values), and representation 
(which concerns the incorporation of tastes and values in public 
decisions)" [p. 433j, he then draws attention to the work of 
economists who, through their microeconomic price theory 
popularised an interest in, and search for, equilibrium concepts. 
Political equilibrium was soon discovered in Black's single- 
peakedness constraint on preterences in committee voting 
structures [Black 1948J. Riker reviews the subsequent work of 
McKelvey 11976j, Fishburn [1973j, Plott (1967J and Black & Newing 
[19511 and concludes [p. 443] that the sufficient conditions 
identified to date for a stable voting equilibrium, based solely 
on preferences, are so restrictive that disequilibrium in the 
real world is assured. Further, that when equilibrium breaks down 
it does so completely. This characterisation of the political 
world is seen as significant by Riker because it implies 
1 the political world is characterised by an inherently 
unstable preference structure; and 
2 any observed stable equilibria must derive from institutions 
rather than from preferences. 
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Consequently, the study of institutions is advocated by Riker as 
crucial to an understanding of equilibria and of the mechanisms 
by which certain preferences can be systematically included or 
excluded, that is, constrained. In such a study Riker remarks 
that what is 
"scientifically interesting is the interaction among the several 
participants in a system to discover the particular kinds of 
outcomes that are both feasible and likely, given a particular 
institutional arrangement". [p. 4441 
Such a framework of analysis does not admit the traditional 
attention of students of politics to the concept of "power". 
The concept of power is traditionally debated as meaning 
different things to difterent researchers and implies a well 
defined relationship of causation. In contrast,, the 
institutional analysis is concerned with identifying structural 
patterns of preference constraint rather than inferring that, in 
some sense, intent or causation underlies those patterns. A more 
detailed consideration of the concept of power and its 
relationship to this study is provided below in Section 10.4 
"Power". 
Shepsle [19791 has considerably advanced the analytic framework 
for a study of the institutional preference constraining 
mechanism. Supporting Riker, Shepale notes that equilibria of 
preference structures are dependent upon extraordinarily severe 
restrictions of preference [p. 281.. To further explain the 
process of collective choice and collective action, Zeckhauser & 
Weinstein argue that 
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"The relatively infrequent appearance of cyclical majorities in 
functioning legislatures cannot be explained by some geometric 
property of individual's preferences ..... matters such as 
procedural rules and institutional constraints provide key 
insights into real-world social choice phenonema" [1974, p. 6641. 
In' one guise, the problem of procedural rules has been the 
subject of study for a number of researchers, namely those 
interested in agenda control and voting strategies. Their 
problem has been, in one sense, the identification of agendas and 
voting rules which are strategy proof. For example, 
Satterthwaite [1975] and Gibbard [1973J both show that no pure 
voting scheme is strategy proof. That is, by forming coalitions 
or misrepresenting their preferencess some voters can always win. 
Plott & Levine [19781 and Levine & Plott [19771 modelled, and 
tested on a real-world decision, the influence of agenda design 
on the outcome of voting. McKelvey [1981J has demonstrated the 
existence of an optimal agenda, that is one which maximises the 
probability of a specified outcome occurring, and further 
developed a dynamic programming model for its determination. A 
development which could be of consi . derable importance to agenda- 
setters were it not for the fact that McKelvey has not been able 
to avoid the Gibbard and Satterthwaite results of non-strategy 
proofness; he has assumed naive voters, that is voters who do not 
vote strategically. 
An important 
-contribution from Shepsle is a model, of the 
institutional rule structure itself, which adopts the following 
definitions. [1979, pp. 3.1-35J 
I committee systems' as a collection of subsets of the number of 
members of a decision making institution; 
2 jurisdiction, as a set ot orthogonal base vectors or dimensions 
which spans the space of 'alternatives; 
3 proposals, as changes relative to the status quo; 
4 amendment control rulesý as modifications which a parent body 
may make to the proposal of a committee; and 
5 germaneness rules$ as the restriction of parent body 
modifications to some subset of all possible alternatives; for 
examples those which relate only to the jurisdiction of the 
committee generating the proposal (a jurisdictional 
germaneness rule). 
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From this set of definitions, Shepsle's analysis [pp. 35-511 
demonstrates that both preference-induced and structure-induced 
equilibria exist, and that the former is a subset of the latter , 
that is, there can be structure-induced equilibria that do not 
correspond to preference-induced equilibria but not vice versa 
[p'. 3/1. An important assumption made in generating this result 
is that each "committee" only has "jurisdiction" over one of the 
orthogonal base vectors or dimensions. Shepsle notes [p. 521 that 
Slutsky 1197-7j has extended this result to include jurisdictions 
over any linearly independent set of vectors which span the 
alternatives space; that is the committees need not be restricted 
to one dimension at a time, but no two committees can have 
jurisdiction over a common dimension. Slutsky notes "equilibrium 
need not be Pareto-optimal" lp. 312l because, inter alia, 
information about preferences is incomplete in the sense that 
some points might exist which are preferred unanimously but which 
cannot be attained as a result of the jurisdictional 
restrictions. Buchanan & Tullock 11962J had already identified 
this problem and had suggested that "log-rolling", that is, 
trading votes across issues would tend to circumvent the 
jurisdictions. Two points arise 
1 that log-rolling, by attempting to circumvent the very 
structure that has induced the equilibrium, may itself be 
destabilising; and 
2-that a free-market in log-rolling trades, including cash 
"payments, 
is likely to be inconsistent with many preference 
structures and so be itself "ruled out". 
Mackay & Weaver 119781, address the application of structure 
induced equilibria as they are found in monopoly bureaus$ that is 
public agencies charged with the exclusive supply of some public 
goods. Mackay & Weaver's concern is that the particular 
structure induced equilibria to be found accord, in many cases, 
"too much'# (in some undefined sense) "power" to the agenda 
setters. Accordingly, they suggest changes to these institutions 
designed to ensure an increased variety in proposal generation. 
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Reflecting for a moment on one of Arrow's four conditions, namely 
that all logically possible orderings of the alternative states 
are admissible [1963, p. 96J. The above argument implies that it 
is this condition which is being relaxed in order to generate 
equilibria of social choice. This can be sumnarised as 
equilbiria of social choices are determinable by majority vote if 
the set of preferences over all logically possible orderings of 
the alternative states is constrained by an institution of rules 
allocating jurisdictions and amendment rules to sets of decision 
makers. 
Many writers use the term "institution" to describe the set of 
rules itself and Riker notes "that institutions are probably best 
seen as congealed-tastes" [1980, p. 4451. 
Riker notes that the sort of study of institutions suggested 
above has been undertaken, independently, by students of the US 
Congress. Such students include Mayhew [19741, Rhode & Shepsle 
[19731, Manley L197019 Davidson L19691, Fenno [19661, Huitt 
[19541 and Truman [1951J. A brief, and informal, survey 
indicates a vast literature on this topic and so a richness of 
theoretical and methodological insight of immense value to 
students of the professional accounting standards setting 
processes. 
An alternative approach to the problem of identifying stable 
preference constraints has been presented by Thompson & Faith 
[19811. They assume the existence of a "punishment" relationship 
[1981, pp. 372-373] defined on individuals such that every 
individual but one has somebody who can punish him. Under such a 
regime they conclude that "any solution to social interaction 
under truly perfect information is dictatorial in the sense of 
Arrow" [p. 3741. Although Thompson & Faith argue to the contrary, 
this result seems 'to be a trivial one stemming directl)r from the 
assumption of punishment which, through a chain of punishment 
relationships, is equivalent to many intuitive definitions of 
dictatorship. Nevertheless, this dictatorial model is used by 
Thompson & Faith as the basis for a discussion of the histories 
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of human civilisations in terms of difterent dictatorial 
solutions brought about by different technologies of punishment. 
Such a discussion is at an exceptionally general level and seems 
not to be supported by other writers. In view of its generality, 
early stage of development and lack of intuitive appeal, the 
dictatorial model is not considered further in the present study. 
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12.4 POWER 
The concept of power has been much debated by students of 
politics; examples include McLachlan [19811, Wrong [19791, Lukes 
[19741, Pfeffer & Salancik [1974J. Salancik & Pfeffer [19741, 
Poulantzas L1973J, Tedeschi & Bonoma [1972J, Dahl [19701 
McFarland L19691, Riker [1964J and Bachrach & Baratz L19621. In 
addition, -the concept has been introduced into the accounting 
literature by writers such as Gray & Hope [1982J and Newman 
11981B]. 
Lukes [19741 provides a review ot much of this debate and 
concludes that power is a concept of three dimensions, namely 
I power of making decisions in situations of observable 
conflict Ep. 151; 
2 power of making non-decisions in situations of observable 
conflict; and 
3 power of suppressing latent conflictst that is real, but 
unobservable conflicts [p. 24J. 
On the other hand, Riker [196419 which was not reviewed by Lukes, 
also provides a review of much of the debate and concludes 
[pp. 343-3451 that power is a concept most usefully analysed as 
being of two dichotomous dimensions, namely 
1 whether the relationship is dyadic or ný-person. That iss if the 
relation is between two persons or more than two; and 
2 whether the relationship is ego-oriented or alter-oriented; 
that is, if the individuals are assumed to behave in their own 
self-interest or altruistically. 
Riker extends this analysis by positing an equivalence between 
the two dimensions he has identified and two different concepts 
of causality. Here he distinguishes between 
1 "recipe" causality, that is, A causes b; and 
2 "if and only if" causaiitys that is* A and b are always 
associated with each other. 
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In the present study there is neither the opportunity nor the 
competence to critically evaluate the opposing views of power, 
It is nevertheless important to demonstrate how the concept 
relates to the analysis. 
Firstly, the Lukes analysis adopts preference conflict as a 
necessary condition and distinguishes between observable conflict 
and unobservable conflict. Further, implicit in the Lukes' 
analysis is the notion of action enabling one or more of those 
preferences to dominate one or more other preferences. Such 
action is either overt, as in "making decisions"; covert, as in 
"making non-decisions"; or structurally induced, as in 
"suppressing Latent conflicts". Clearly, underlying Lukes' 
notion of power then is a notion of causality. That, in some 
sense, by engaging in one of the identified types of action, A 
causes b. In this sense the conflict is redundant because it is 
implied in the causation process, that is, if preferences were 
such that b would have occurred anyway then a can hardly be said 
to have caused b. At this level of analysis there is a useful 
common factor between the Lukes and Riker concepts. They both 
imply casuality, that is, demonstration of a casual mechanism is 
a necessary condition for the demonstration of a power relation. 
We are leds then to ask whether or not causality itself is a 
useful- concept and are immediately drawn to a philosophical 
debate. 
One solution to the problem of determining the nature 
* 
of 
causality is to argue that it is a non-operational concepts that 
is we cannot observe causation. What we can observe is 
correlation, even strong correlation. But although we can infer 
a statement such as jL is related to h, we can never say a causes 
b. We can never know that there is not some other, as yet 
unidentified, factor which has intervened to cause k or, 
alternatively, that ]L causes a. Such a problem is well 
recognised by students of statistical inference, for example 
Hamburg [1977, p. 4021; and by others$ for example Rosenthal & 
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Rosnov 119759 p. 351, Kabovitz & Hagerdorn [19711 and Kaplan 
[1964J. The implications then, is that we can never observe 
power. That is not to say that power, like causation, does not 
exist; simply that we cannot observe it and we should not be too 
ready to infer power, like causation, when we do observe strongly 
correlated variables. 
Hempel 11952, pp. 39-50] argues that theory construction is often 
facilitated by the use of uon-operational conceptal that is,. a 
concept which is strictly unobservable Per se. The role that 
these non-operational concepts play is one of connecting together 
operational concepts. The physical sciences are rich with 
examples. In thermodynamics, Ifentropy" is strictly uiobservable 
but acts to unify much of thermodynamic theory; in classical 
mechanics "momentum" is similarly strictly unobservable but 
serves to unify the theory. Perhaps "power" can play such a 
theory unification role in social and accounting theory. This may 
be the case; for, although it is strictly unobservable Per se, 
the concept has clearly proven to be of value to many writers in 
political science. 
For the purposes of the present study it is not necessary to 
adopt a power concept. Indeed, it can be positively unhelpful in 
its necessary implication of a causal mechanism which may not be 
well founded empirically. Social and accounting theory are 
nowhere near as rich and complete as theories of the physical 
sciences and the usefulness of a non-operational "connecting" 
concept can only be, established if there is a body of concepts to 
be so connected. 
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12.5 SUBMARY 
On the one hand, there is the literature which seeks to identify 
the process by which political decisions are made. The processes 
have been characterised as. incremental and disjoint [Lindblom 
1977 & 1959J and susceptible to occasional radical outcomes 
[Padgett 1980J. An alternative characterisation is that of 
comprehensive rationality [Synder, Bruck & Sapin 1954J. Debate 
has focussed on which of the two models is the "best ftt". 
Lustick 119801 offers a "contingency theory" solution which 
suggests that environmental characteristics determine where a 
given political decision process is placed on a disjoint-rational 
scale. Allison 11969J suggests that decision processes =ght 
also be characterised as organisational in the sense that they 
suggest the automatic execution of standard operating procedures. 
The definition of a decision is extended by Bachrach Baratz 
L19631 to include a "non-decision". 
On the other hand, there is the Literature which seeks to 
identify the existence of equilibrium concepts. Stimulated by 
Arrow's [1963 & 19511 "impossibility" result, the problem is to 
identify. constraints on individual preferences sufficient to 
generate equilibria in political choice [Riker 19801. The study 
of morality in politics once served this function implicitly 
[Frohock 19801 as did the study of political institutions 
LRiker 1980J. Black 11948J first identified a set of constraints 
sufficient for equilibrium. Shepsle 119791 models the sets of 
constraints ai a committee system with jurisdictions, proposalss 
amendment 'Control rules and germaneness rules. Within the 
Shepsle models equilibrium results can be obtained and the 
trading of votes across issues, ("log-rolling") introduced by 
Buchanan & Tullock 11962]. is seen by Slutsky L19771 as a useful 
adjunct. The interest by some researchers (for example, Levine & 
Plott [19771) in agenda control is captured by the Shepsle model. 
There is a substantial body of empirical research addressing the 
study of institutions which closely resemble the committee 
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system. This body of research (for example, Manley [1970js Fenno 
L19661 and Trim-an [1951D is concerned with the US Congress. 
The concept of "power", much debated by political scientists 
[Lukes 1974; Riker 19641, is not an operational concept in the 
sense that its existence can be unambiguously observed. 
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12.6 CONCLUSIONS 
A study of the literature of political choice processes has led 
to two separate, and important, sub-sets of political literature. 
On the one hand, there is the literature which seeks to identify 
the process by which political decisions are made. The search 
has been much stimulated by developments in the organisational 
decision process literature. The study ot that organisational 
literature below in Chapter 13 "Organisational choice processes" 
is a natural supplement to this finding. 
On the other hand, an entirely separate body of literature exists 
which seeks to identify the existence of equilibrium concepts. 
The search is directed by the formal analysis developed from the 
seminal work of Arrow [1963 & 19511. A significant body of 
literature which investigates the operations of the US Congress 
is beginning to be related to the formal analysis by key works 
such as Shepsle [19791. 
The relationships between the above frameworks and the 
professional accounting standards setting processes have not yet 
been made explicit. 
Firstly, the professional accounting standards setting processes 
could possibly be modelled as an organisational type of decision 
making process. The review in Chapter 13 "Organisational choice 
processes" seeks to contribute to this. 
Secondly, the Shepsle [1979J characterisation of a political 
institution as a committee system appears to be closely related 
to the description set out above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting 
Stanýards Committee". In particulars the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes are established as a 
committee system in which the various working parties of the ASC 
has its own jurisdiction based on a set of proposals contained in 
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an Exposure Draft. Implied ainendment control rules might exist 
whereby the governing bodies are constrained in the modifications 
they can make. Again, implied germaueness rules might exist 
whereby some alternatives are excluded completely from 
consideration. 
The Shepsle committee system framework was characterised above as 
a model of the way in which preferences are structured in order 
for stable equilibrium to exist. In particular, it was stated 
that 
equilibria of social choices are determinable by majority vote 
if the set of preferences over all logically possible orderings 
of the alternatives is constrained by an institution of rules 
allocating jurisdictions and amendment rules to sets of 
decision makers. 
So then, fruitful areas of research lie in the exploration and 
elaboration of this Shepsle committee system model. One area 
would be the refinement and formalisation of the description of 
the UK professional accounting standards setting processes as a 
Shepsle committee system. Another area would be the exploration 
of the way in which majority votes are constrained within the 
processes* This can be made operational by determining how 
majority votes are reflected in the outcomes of the process. In a 
Senses an exploration of this latter aspect constitutes the 
empirical part of the present study presented in Part IV 
"Evidence from the empirical study of UK data". 
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CHAPTER 13 ORGANISATIONAL CHOICE PROCESSES 
13.1 IMMODUCTION 
Two analyses have led to a consideration of the literature of 
organisational choice processes. 
Firstly, in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political 
dimension in professional accounting standards setting 
processes", it was shown that both Porter [19791 and Klein [19781 
characterised the US professional accounting standards setting 
processes as being, in part, an organisational choice process. 
Secondly, in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". it was 
shown that Allison [19691 distinguishes between rational policy, 
organisationai process and bureaucratic politics as different 
models of political decision making. Allison argues that the 
organisational process model is implied in much political 
analysis. 
Additionally, authors such as Hopwood [1983 & 19781, Cooper, 
Hayes & Wolf [19811 and Hofstede [19811 argue for. an 
organisational perspective for the study of accounting. 
The review shows that -the models of organisational choice 
processes offer considerable promise for the investigation of the 
professional accounting standards setting processes; such promise 
being put forward as a suggestion for'further research. 
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13.2 ORGANISATIONAL CHOICE PROCESSES CLASSIFIED 
13.2.1 Introduction 
Theories of organisational choice processes are integral parts of 
theories of organisations to the extent that the latter can be 
characterised as theories of how organisations choose the actions 
they take. For example, Weber [19471 was seminal in developing 
the concept of organisations as bureaucracies. A bureaucratic 
organi'sation makes its choices by recourse to rule and procedure 
formulated over time and as the result of a rational 
comprehensive decision process. Such a decision process was also 
discussed above in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". A 
single organisational goal is assumed and all action is directed 
to achievement of that goal. Behaviour, beliefs, preferences and 
actions not consistent with the rational comprehensive decision 
process are, by definition, aberrant and to be eradicated by 
further rule and procedure. The power to enforce is assumed to 
be absolute. Taylor [19111 was equally important in elaborating 
this rational comprehensive decision process paradigm. Taylor's 
"scientific management" analysed human productive action in 
order to isolate and bureaucratise the essential productive 
component. Any non-essential action was ruled out and so, the 
critics of Taylor argue the productive process "de-humanised". 
The works of Clegg and Dunkerley [1980J and Perrow [19791 trace 
the evolution of _organisation 
theory from its early rational 
comprehensive paradigms to more subtle understandings of today. 
That is not to say that organisation theory is in any sense a 
genuinely evolutionary body of thought. Hofstede has argued that 
organisation theory is culture bound in the sense that theorists 
will reflect the values of their own culture in their 
explanations of the phenomenon of organisation [1981, pp. 30-341. 
Considerable change is taking place in the understanding of 
organisational choice processes. The earlier bureaucratic models 
of Weber and Taylor have been supplanted by behavioural models of 
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March & Olsen [19761, Cyert & March [19631, March & Simon (19581 
and Simon [19551. These latest models of the choice processes 
within organisations attempt to explain features of 
organisational behaviour which have, under earlier models, been 
hitherto regarded as pathological. For example, the concept of a 
unique organisational goal is no longer subsumed into 
organisational models, after Simon's [19641 notion of a set of 
constraints; individuals are no longer assumed to be rational 
comprehensive decision makers since Simon's [19551 notion of 
bounded rationality; organisations are no longer seen to be 
bureaucracies since Cyert & March's [19631 notion of coalitions; 
problems are no longer the sole basis for choices since Cohen, 
March and Olsen's [19721 "garbage can" model of choice; and 
action is no longer the outcome of choice since March's [19711' 
technology of foolishness. 
In order to be systematic with regard to the apparent revolution 
and chaos of thought on organisational choice processes, it is 
instructive to follow Klein [19781 and adopt the seminal analysis 
of ditferent types of decision provided by Thompson & Tuden 
[19591 (T&T). T&T argue that decision processes can be 
characterised by two variables 
1 the degree to which the participants in the processes agree on 
the causal relationship between alternative actions and future 
states of the world; and 
2 the degree to which the participants in the processes agree- on 
their preferences for those future states of the world. 
By taking the elementary dichotomous case of each of these 
variables, that is in each case participants either agree or 
disagree, T&T were able to generate [p. 781 the four-celled matrix 
reproduced below as Figure 13.1 "Thompson & Tuden's typology of 
decisions". 
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Agreement Computation Compromise 
Disagreement Judgement Inspiration 
Source: Thompson & Tuden [1959, p. 781 
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The above characterisation enabled T&T to focus initially on the 
structure of decisions; consideration of organisational structure 
was considered as conditional on decision structure. At risk of 
repeating T&T's own elaboration of the four decision cells, they 
will be discussed below. The T&T characterisation enables us to 
conceptualise organisational choice processes as following a 
pattern. It is, of course, possible to generate a less coarse 
measure of the degree of agreement than the simple dichotomous 
case. Such a refinement of measure may detract from the main 
objective of clarifying the problem and will not be considered 
here. Having identified a pattern, it can be seen how 
developments in the literature fit into this patterno 
13.2.2 ComputatiOn 
Computation was identified by T&T as the decision strategy 
corresponding to agreement between participants on both (a) their 
preferences for future states; and (b) the causal relationships 
between actions and those future states. Such agreement implies 
sufficient information on other potential variables, such as the 
range of alternatives or technology. Under such conditions, 
decisions can be systematised completely and T&T argue [p. 791 
that the organisational form most appropriate to such a class of 
decision is Weber's bureaucracy. As noted earlier, Weber [19471 
and Taylor 119111 represent the rational comprehensive decision 
process based organisation literature. The T&T computation 
decision structure implies the scientific choice process model 
considered more fully above in Chapter 11 "Scientific choice 
processes". 
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13.2.3 Compromise 
Compromise was identified by T&T as the decision strategy 
corresponding to disagreement about preferences when there is 
agreement about causation. They envisage bargaining as being the 
appropriate mechanism for making these decisions. The compromise 
decision structure can be represented by both the political 
choice literature and the "bargaining" literature. The former is 
considered more fully in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". 
The bargaining literature is extensive and, in general terms can 
be characterised by three main approaches, namely the game 
theoretic (for example Harsanyi [19621, Luce & Raiffa [19571, 
Nash [19531, Von Neumann & Morgenstern (19441) the economic (for 
example Coddington [19661, Cross [19651, Pen 119521) and the 
manipulative (for example Walton & McKersie [19651, Ellsberg 
[19591, Schelling [19561). Such a three-way characterisation can 
be found in Young [1975] where much of the above has been 
collected. 
In the organisation literature, Cyert & March's [1963] model of 
organisation as a collection of coalitions is captured by this 
compromise decision structure, as is Simon's [19641 notion of the 
constraining effect of a multiplicity of goals. The Cyert & 
March model is worth a little elaboration at this stage because 
of its importance in the iiterature and because it recurs later 
in our consideration of political choice processes. Cyert & 
March criticised the usual economic assumptions about the nature 
of the business firm as being essentially based on the rational 
comprehensive model. Cyert & March set out to describe how 
decisions are actually made in the firm. Seeing firms as 
coalitions of individuals, and of groups of individuals, each 
with their own conflicting goals, Cyert & March argued that the 
only way in which firms can manage the inherent conflicts is to 
treat them sequentiallys that is in response to specific problems 
as they arise. Over time a firm develops the ability to become 
an adaptive institution in the sense that it learns from 
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experience and builds up a standard operating procedure which is, 
in a sense, the repository of the cumulatIve body of experience. 
Additionally, the firm in time deveiops "organisational slack", 
that is surplus resources, which act as a crucial buffer to both 
internal conflict and environmental shocks. The decision process 
itself is described in terms of Simon's bounded rationality model 
which is applied to decision problems sequentially. This 
sequential treatment of problems then is a core concept in the 
Cyert & March model. 
13.2.4 Judstement, - 
Judgement was identified by T&T as the decision strategy 
corresponding to agreement about preferences when there is 
disagreement about causation. They suggest that such decisions 
be made by "wise and knowing men"s or "expert opinion", in a 
committee structured organisation. The judgement decision 
structure is perhaps best represented by the 
"professionalisation" literature so far as it concerns the role 
of professionals in bureaucracies (for example, May [19761, 
Montagna [19681, Vickers [19651, Freidson & Rhea [19631 and 
Bea-David (1958]). This literature, which is considered more 
fully below in Chapter 14 "Professionalisation processes". 
captures, for example, professional decisions in the law courts$ 
universities and hospitals. It is clearly of potential 
application to the committee structured professional accounting 
standards setting processes described above in Chapter 3 "The 
Accounting Standards Committee". 
The judgement decision structure further captures Simon's [19551 
bounded rationality model. Simon's decision maker does not find 
preferences problematic, but does tind causal relationships 
problematic because he only has sufficient information on which 
to construct probability estimates of future states. 
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13.2.5 Inspiration 
Inspiration was identified by T&T as the decision strategy 
corresponding to disagreement about preferences and causation. 
They see this combination of disagreements as problematic and 
argue that in such circumstances appeal is usually made to some 
higher authority such as a god or other charismatic leader. 
This inspirational decision structure. T&T found perplexing, 
remarking "the group in this situation is nearing disintegration" 
[P-81J. In contrast, it is just this situation about which the 
recent developments by Feldman & March [1981J, March and Olsen 
J1976J, Cohen, March & Olsen [19721, and March [19711 have been 
concerned. This recent body of literature argues that 
organisations finding themselves in this environment are far from 
disintegration but have evolved decision strategies which make 
survival a feasibility. 
Cbapter 13 Page 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
13.3 CHOICE IN AMBIGUITY 
Let us now concentrate on the fourth decision structure in T&T, s 
analysis. We will no longer refer to this as "inspirational", 
for some of the analytical tools are available to justify a less 
perplexed approach than was the case in 1959. Rather, we will 
refer to "ambiguity" following March & Olsen [19761. 
A brief consideration is in order to justify concentrating on 
this one case to the exclusion of the other three. Recall that 
this study is concerned with an investigation of how professional 
accounting standards for external financial reporting by 
organisations are chosen. The choice processes are embedded in a 
complex social structure in which there is interaction between 
several interest groups as described above in Chapter 3 "The 
Accounting Standards Committee" (for exampleg Hopwood [1983]). 
Trivially, there will be disagreement on the preference structure 
of these choice processes. Less trivially, there is 
disagreement on the causal relationships between choices and 
future states. But even that second disagreement seems to be a 
given of social systems. In Chapter 11 "Scientific choice 
processes" above, it was argued that much of social theory is 
inadequate to demonstrate strong causal relationships between 
today's choice and tomorrow's state of the world. In accountancy 
there is to be found no exception. Accounting professionals, by 
virtue of belonging to a profession, profess to have greater 
insights into such relationships than most. A survey of the 
theoretical accounting literature, such as Dopuch & Revsine 
[19731 or "Statement on accounting theory and theory acceptance" 
[AAA 19771, demonstrates, at its most charitable, this insight to 
relate to matters other than causal relationships. At a 
philosophical level, the social sciences just may not be amenable 
to the identification of causal relationships in the classical 
sense, but here is not the place to pursue that debate (see, for 
example,, Sheldrake [1982]). Suffice it to note that where causal 
relationships are not identifieds then disagreement on the 
I 
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nature of those relationships is to be expected. Of course, such 
disagreement is not guaranteed. It is possible that by 
homogeneous education, socialisation, religion and the rest, we 
may come to homogeneous beliefs. But to assume heterogeneous 
beliefs is, today, realistic. 
Indirect support for the interest in choice in ambiguity is also 
provided by the contributions to the accounting literature by 
Cooper, Hayes & Wolf [1981J and Hofstede [19811. Both 
contributions argue that a model of choice in ambiguity is 
important to understanding the role of accounting information 
systems within organisations. 
What, then, is the model of choice processes in ambiguity? 
Perhaps the most interesting. recent development is the "garbage 
can" model of Cohen, 'March & Olsen [19721$ hereafter CH&O, 
elaborated in March & Olsen [1976]. In the garbage can model, the 
organisational choice process is characterised as comprising four 
main elements, namely choice opportunities, participants, 
problems, and solutions. 
Choice opportunities are central to the model and are occasions 
when the organisation is expected to make choices, or as CH&O 
state "these are occasions when an organisation, is expected to 
produce behaviour that can be called a decision" [p. 31. 
Participants are individuals who participate in the choice 
process, No assumptions are made about their individual goals, 
or preferences; about their rationality; or about the degree or 
nature of their involvement. 
Problem are issues which are considered to be problematic and 
may include ideological, social and personal issues along with 
the more conventional resource allocation issues. 
Solutions are artifacts or ideas. which can be viewed as answers 
to problems. No assumptions are made about the problem to which 
the solution may be an answer; or about whether or not a problem 
has yet been defined to which the solution might correspond. 
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The framework constructed by CM&O then assumes widespread 
ambiguity. The organisation is seen as not knowing what its 
problems are, what the solutions are that are available to match 
those problems, or who the current or potential participants are. 
Choice opportunities are seen as opportunities in the sense that 
the organisation has the opportunity to discover some of these 
unknowns, to discover who the participants are, to discover what 
the problems are and to discover what solutions are available. 
If a choice opportunity happens to result in a match between a 
problem and a 'solution, then it will appear to have made a 
decision; but no such matching is guaranteed in the garbage can 
model. 
The concept of a choice opportunity# or, as CM&O call it, the 
"garbage can", can now be elaborated. An extreme example arises 
in the event of a natural catastrophe. Take a fire that destroys 
a manufacturing plant. A choice opportunity has come into 
existence. A string of problems arises: how to satisfy 
customers; how to replace lost production; how to ensure maximum 
compensation; how to make sure valued staff do not go elsewhere 
during reconstruction. Also a string of solutions arises: the 
latest technology can now be incorporated into the production 
process; the new production facility can be constructed in a 
different location with better transportation access; the 
beligerent trade union leader can be made redundant. Further, a 
string of participants materialises, as if from nowhere. The 
production engineer is the man with the suggestion for the latest 
technology; the local politician in the possible new location 
appears with "investment incentives"; the personnel manager who 
has had enough of the trade union belligerent. Yet, before the 
fire it is possible for none of these problems or solutions to 
have been active. The production engineer was coping with his 
outdated technology; the local politician didn't even know the 
organisation existed until he read about it in the press; the 
organisation was unaware of better transportation possibilities; 
and the personnel manager didn't dare mention the possibility of 
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ousting the trade union leader. All this of course is imaginary, 
but it is the basis of an understanding of a previously 
perplexing and intractible environment. . 
Furthermore, choice 
opportunities arise in much more mundane ways 
"contracts must be signed; people hired, promoted or fired; 
money spent; and responsibilities allocated" [CM&O, p. 31. 
The garbage can model is based on four independent variables 
1 the rate of flow of choice opportunities; 
The rate of flow of choice opportunities can be defined in 
terms of (a) the timing of its activation; and (b) the 
structure of problem access, that is the sorts of problems 
available to it. Clearly, there will always be some problems 
which cannot be considered "legitimate" in given choice 
opportunities; in the case of the fire damaged production plant 
the problem of determining an appropriate accounting policy for 
revenue recognition is likely to be not accessible to the 
choice opportunity. 
2 the rate of flow of problems; 
The rate of flow of problems can be defined in terms of (a) the 
timing of activation; (b) the structure of choice access, that 
is the sorts of choices under which the problem would be 
considered legitimate; and (c) the energy requirement, that is 
the total energy which participants would need to expend in 
order to "solve" the problem. 
3 the rate of flow of solutions; and 
The rate of flow of solutions can be defined in terms of (a) 
the timing of its activation; and (b) an energy discounting 
factors that is the amount of difficulty associated with the 
identification and matching of solutions with problems. So, a 
heavily energy discounting solution would be a difficult 
solution to operationalise. 
4 the rate of flow of energy from participants. 
The energy availability can be defined in terms of units of 
energy per participant. A highly paid executive can be 
expected to contribute more energy than a local politician who 
in turn can be expected to provide more energy than a machine 
tool operator. 
Having sketched the basic elements of the garbage can model, it 
is unnecessary to elaborate the model itself (CM&O, pp. 17-241 
here but rather, following CM&O. note that predictions from the 
model are in the form of characteri sat ions of the organisation 
being investigated. 
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The following characteristics were presented by CM&O [pp. 8-91 
1 decision style, being either decision by resolution, 
oveisight or flight; 
2 problem activity, being measured as the sum of the product of 
(a) the number of time periods each active problem was 
attached to a choice; and 
(b) the number of active problems attached to a choice; 
3 problem latency, measured as the sum of the product of 
(a) the number of time periods each active problem not 
attached to a choice; and 
(b) the number of active problems not attached to a choice; 
4 decision maker activity, measured as the total number of 
times decision makers have shifted between choices; and 
5 decision difficulty, measured as the sum of the product of 
(a) the number of time periods each choice was active; and (b) the number of active choices. 
In order to help keep track of the meaning of these 
characteristics, it can be seen that application of dimensional 
analysis (for examples Ellis [1966, pp. 139-1511 or Bridgman 
[19311) reveals that, while decision style and decision maker 
activity are dimensionless, problem activity, problem latency and 
decision difficulty are all measured in time periods. So the 
greater* the number of time periods the greater the problem 
activity, problem latency or decision difficulty of the 
organisation and, perhaps, its environment. 
Now consider what benefits the "garbage can" model has to offer 
students of organisational choice processes. Substantially, the 
model fillss or attempts to fills a definite gap in the 
literature identified as "inspiration" in T&T's [19591 
characterisation of decision styles. The literature (a) is 
replete with models of T&T's computational decisions and 
compromise decisions; (b) has some evidence of discussion of 
judgement models; but (c) prior to the garbage can, had no formal 
models of ambiguity, although works such as Thompson [19671, 
Lawrence & Lorsch [19671, Lindblom [19591 and general systems 
theorists such as Bertalanffy [19681 were contributions. The 
garbage can model provides a framework for the understanding of 
hitherto intractable decision processes. 
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Consider further what benefits the "garbage can" model has to 
offer students of professional accounting standards setting 
processes. Firstlys it has already been noted above that the 
ambiguity of preferences and of causal relationships is a partial 
characterisation of the environment of the professional 
accounting standards setting processes. Additionally, the 
ambiguity of decision maker activity is consistent with the 
Barrett (19781 description of attendance at ASC meetings and with 
the Westwick (19801 description of Government involvement in the 
UK inflation accouting debate. The ambiguity of the relationship 
between solutions and problems is consistent with the Whittington 
[19831 description of the UK inflation accounting debate. None of 
this is to say that the "garbage can" model is a perfect model of 
the UK professional accounting standards setting processes. 
Rather there are sufficiently close parallels to justify 
exploration of the usefulness of such a characterisation. 
Limitations of the garbage can model can be identified. 
Firstly, the model does not fit easily into other bodies of 
literature. In particular, its framework appears to be 
inconsistent with that of economic theory. 
Secondly, Thompson [19811 has produced evidence that in one 
specific decision process, embedded in an organisation of the 
type for which the garbage can model was developeds a simple 
rational utility maximising model has sufficient explanatory 
power. It is worth looking more closely at this conclusion. 
Thompson considered the result of another study in which it was 
concluded that PhD granting departments in US universities 
behaved as if they were maximising their prestige. Thompson 
conducted further tests of this hypothesis and re-affirmed its 
validity. Thompson concluded, as does Friedman (19531, that 
rational choice models, based on assumptions that patently do not 
accord with empirical findings, have sufficient explanatory power 
to justify their investigation and utilisation. The implication 
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being that other models, based on assumptions that do accord with 
empirical findings, are unnecessary elaborations. Of course, 
here we recognise a fam3. liar debate (for example, Christenson 
[19831) between instrumentalists and realists. Having drawn 
attention to this debate we will not pursue it here. Suf f ice it 
to note that where one draws the line b'etween sufficient and 
insufficient explanatory power is simply either a matter of 
belief or, alternatively,, the intended use of a theory. We live 
in a world of heterogeneous beliefs and utility functions. 
There is room for both. By implication then, Thompson's criticism 
of Cohen, March & Olsen is well founded, but for the purposes of 
the present study not relevant. The present study is founded on 
the belief that there is room for both approaches stemming from 
the heterogeneity beliefs and preference functions. 
Having detailed much of the basic garbage can model of choice 
processes in ambiguity, some of the elaborations that can be 
found in the literature can now be considered. One such is 
organisational learning in March & Olsen [19751. There it is 
argued that ambiguity causes participants not to know whether the 
outcomes of past choice processes are preferred or not preferred 
because there is limited information and understanding of what 
the outcomes actually were. Accordingly, in future choice 
opportunities the availability of a bank of learning experience 
is limited, and so reliance is placed on beliefs and the 
mechanisms by which beliefs are formed. Another elaboration is 
March [19711, in which the mechanism connecting choice with 
action is explored in terms of a "technology of foolishness". 
There it is argued that organisations facing ambiguous 
environments can learn to survive by adopting an experimental 
approach to action. In the face of little or no knowledge then 
an action selected arbitrarily (say from a set of proximate 
alternative actions) will not only suffice but also enable the 
organisation to test its environment. Even more information can 
be derived from a test in which the organisation acts openly 
hypocritically or foolishly; for then it is able to measure the 
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boundaries of its potential actions. Lindblom [19591 advanced 
similar arguments in favour of a scientific approach to "muddling 
through". 
Yet another elaboration comes with Feldman & March [19811 who 
discuss the role of information in such an organisation. There 
it is argued that not only does information serve a rational, 
decision oriented function, but also a symbolic function. 
Clearly, ' organisations must make some more nearly rational 
choices, even if these are fairly low-order choices such as 
designing queuing procedures or engineering design. Equally, 
organisations also make choices in the face of ambiguity when 
information is of little or no direct use. However, there are 
incentives to accumulate information considerably in excess of 
. 
the rational choice requirement. Such incentives include 
1 surveillance of the environment for surprises; 
2 maintenance of an office holder's power base where there is a 
division of labour between information gathering, by an 
"information gatekeeper", and information use; 
3 strategic misrepresentation; and 
4 symbolising that the gatherer possesses attitudes about 
rational choice which are socially and organisationally 
acceptable, so legitimising his, or his organisation's, 
position. 
Pettigrew's (19731 study of a choice opportunity in an 
.. 
organisation demonstrated the use of information by an 
"information gatekeeper" as a source of- power for influencing, in 
that case unsuccessfully, the choice process. A further 
elaboration can be found in March & Olsen [1976, Chap. 31 in which 
the part-time nature of the participants is discussed. Attention 
by participants to a choice opportunity is seen to be a complex 
phenomenon'itself. An entrance is simultaneously an exit 
elsewhere and so any understanding of the role of participants 
must concentrate on their time and attention budgets. For 
example, Becker [19651 has developed an economic theory of the 
allocation of time based on the*opportunity costs involved; 
Schoormant Bgzerman & Atkin [1981J9 and others, have considered 
the phenomenon of interlocking directorates and some organisation 
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members will, no doubt, base their time budgets on the perceived 
benefits to be obtained from such interlocks. 
As noted above, both Cooper, Hayes & Wolf [19811 and Hof stede 
[19811, have elaborated the notion of modelling choice in 
ambiguity in the accounting literature, Both contributions 
address the problem of explaining accounting information systems 
within the framework of organisational control. As such, they 
are not directly relevant to the purposes of the present study- 
but rather support the claim of potential usefulness to be gained 
from modelling choice in ambiguity. 
i 
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13.4 SUMMARY 
The literature of organisational choice processes is diffuse but 
of potential significance to the study of professional accounting 
standards setting processes [Hopwood 1983 & 19781. A useful way 
ot characterising the iiterature is based on aW classification 
of the underlying decision structure. Such an approach suggests 
the following four classes of decision [Thomson. & Tuden 1959J. 
The computation class of decision is represented by Weber [1947] 
and Taylor [1911J. Its underlying rational comprehensive 
framework is considered above in Chapter 11 "Scientific choice 
proces esil. 
The compromise class of decision is represented by Simon [1964] 
and Cyert and March [19631. Its underlying political framework 
is considered above in Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". 
The judgement class of decision is represented by Vickers [19651 
and Simon [19551. Its underlying "expert opinion" framework is 
considered below in Chapter 14 "Prof ess ionalisat ion processes". 
The "inspiration" class of decision is of most interest to the 
present study because it reflects most closely the environment of 
the professional accounting standards setting processes 
[Hopwood 19831. This class of decision has since been modelled as 
a "garbage can" process with the four main elements of choice 
opportunities, participants, problems and solution [Cohen, 
March & Olsen 19721. The "garbage can" model is not without its 
critics. In particular, it has been argued that the computation 
model is sufficient to capture the important features of many 
decision processes [Thompson 19811. On the other hand, it has 
stimulated interest in the accounting liter ature [Cooper,. Hayes & 
Wolf 1981; Hofstede 1981 and Hopwood 1978j; and some of its 
features seem to match the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes. 
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13.5 CONCLUSIONS 
It has been shown that there are dif f erent sorts of theories of 
organisational choice processes. Recent developments have moved 
away from theories centred on a rational comprehensive decision 
process, with their implied model of scientific choice process, 
in order to capture some of the hitherto more perplexing features 
of organisational behaviour. In an environment of ambiguity 
concerning preference structures and causal relationships choices 
become opportunities for re-interpreting the past; for re- 
defining or re-inforcing beliefs; for experimenting; or for 
asserting legitimacy; or *all of these things. Under such a 
choice process, action will not necessarily follow preferences 
and choices may be made without problems being solved. Such a 
view of the world is tantalising and so calls to be tested in a 
variety of circumstances. 
Nothing in the above has led to a substantive consideration of 
how professional accounting standards are determined. Yet what is 
clear is that the choice opportunity of the "garbage can" model 
could serve as a model for an accounting standards issue. Many 
of its featur*es seem to match the UK professional accounting 
standards setting processes and the exploration of such a model 
offers itself as a potentially fruitful area of research. 
Chapter 13 Page 20 
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES IN THE UK 
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14.4 Constraints on professionalisation 
14.5 Summary 
14.6 Conclusions 
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CHAPTER 14 PROFESSIONALISATION PROCESSES 
14.1 IMODUCTION 
Three analyses have led to a consideration of the literature of 
professionalisation processes. 
Firstly, in Chapter 8 "Empirical studies of the political 
dimension in 
. 
professional accounting standards setting 
processes"s it was shown that Porter [19791 argued that 
professionalisation processes encourage professions to strive to 
keep technical, or scientific, decisions away from intervention 
by outsiders. Such decisions are argued to be subject to 
intervention by veto. 
Secondly, in Chapter 12 
shown that Frohock [19801 
has permeated much poli 
argued that the concept 
preferences such as 
professionalisation. 
"Political choice processes", it was 
has argued that the concept of morality 
tical analysis. The subsequent review 
is implied in partial structurings of 
is the case in the process of 
Thirdly, in Chaptef 13 "Organisational choice processes", it was 
shown that Thompson & Tuden [19591 argued that four such choice 
processes could be distinguished. Of these, the "judgemental" 
choice process was seen to be linked to the professionalisation 
literature to the extent that choices are made by individuals in 
the roles of professionals in bureaucracies. 
The review explores the framework implied by the notion -of 
professionalisation. 
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14.2 ATTRIBUTES OF A PROFESSION 
There is a considerable body of literature on the nature of the 
professions. This literature has not been brought together in 
any recent survey article, but the essential threads of thought 
can easily be traced back, at least, to Flexner [1915J. Flexner 
identified [p. 19041 six criteria by which to test for the 
existence or otherwise of a profession. These criteria are 
1 an intellectual operation with individual responsibility; 
2a raw material derived from science and learning; 
3 application to a practical end use; 
4 an educationally communicable technique; 
5 self-organisation; and 
6 tendency toward increasing altruism. 
Since Flexner, the literature has tended to debate three 
different general aspects of professions. 
Firstly, it has continued the search for a minimal set of 
criteria for the identifiýation of a profession. 
Secondly, the literature has tried to identify a dynamic model of 
the process of professionalisation. Such a model would tend to 
imply that the process starts with some occupational group which 
in time acquires the distinguishing characteristics of a 
profession. The existence of such a process is a matter of 
debate. 
Thirdlys the literature debatess in one form or another, the 
sixth of Flexner's criteria, namely the tendency to altruism* 
This latter debate is often in terms of whether or not a 
specified profession is acting in "the public interest" either 
generally or in respect of some specified issue. Two examples of 
this latter debate are evidenced in 
1a UK Monopolies Commission report on the subject of "the 
general effect on the public interest of certain restrictive 
practices so far as they prevail in relation to the supply of 
professional services" [Monopolies Commission 1970]; and 
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2 the "consumerism" movements often attributed to Ralph Nader in 
the US in the 1960's, which rapidly encompassed the work of the 
professions (for example, Bloom & Greyser (19811 for a recent 
review; Kennedy [19801 for the medical profession; Medawar 
[19781 for the general business community; and Stamp [19691 for 
the accounting profession). 
Substantially, the matter of criteria for identifying a 
profession, is a search for a set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions which will define the term profession. Carr-Saunders 
& Wilson [19331 (CS&W), is a seminal work which considered a wide 
range of occupational groups and sought to distil the essence of 
professionalism. Its major contribution was to identify the 
chief distinguishing characteristic as 
"the application of an intellectual technique to the ordinary 
business of life, acquired as the result of prolonged and 
specialised training" [p. 4911. 
Additionally, CS&W was able to identify professional goals as 
including a protective motive aimed at distinguishing competence 
and- fostering a study of the technique (p. 3191. Further 
contributions to the literature have been made by Barber [19651, 
Hughes [19651, Wilensky [19641, Greenwood [19571 and Cogan 
[19551. Lubell [19781 has synthesised this iiterature and 
developed a listing of some eighteen criteria or attributes. 
These attributes are reproduced below in Figure 14.1 "Lubell's 
'Attributes of a profession"'. 
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FIGURE 14.1: LUBELL's "ATTRIBUTES OF A PROFESSION" 
1 Formal and educationally communicable body of knowledge 
2 Stringent educational facilities 
3 Control over educational facilities 
4 Occupational licencing or certification 
5 Self-regulation 
6 Exclusive jurisdiction within a well-defined technological 
domain 
7 Organised political influence 
8 Varying degrees of privileged communication 
9 Effective and enforcable code of ethics 
10 Service ideal (altruism) 
11 Social responsibility 
12 Professional subculture 
13 National and/or regional professional associations 
14 Professional mystique 
15 Occupational specialisation 
16 Well defined system of colleague referrals 
17 Delegation of functions with an organised professional 
hierarchy 
18 Career commitment of members 
.0 
Source: Lubell [1978, p. 26, Exhibit A "The Attributes of a 
Profession"]. 
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Lubell's attributes of a profession constitute the most 
comprehensive listing of such to be found in the literature. 
However,, as he points out, it has its shortcomings. 
Firstly, no mention is made of attempts to standardise practice 
per se. Of the eighteen listed attributes, only self-regulaton 
is in any sense close to such a standardisation programme. This 
is perhaps unusual in view of the existence of programmes of 
standard practices in the UK engineering profession since 1903 
and in the US accountancy profession since 1914; both of which 
are discussed above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards 
Committee". 
Secondly, Buckley 11972] has generated an alternative set of 
criteria, namely 
1 attributes which a profession offers; namely 
(a) expertise; and 
(b) altruism; and 
2 attributes which a profession accepts; namely 
(a) autonomy; and 
(b) authority. 
Thirdlyi Barber [1965, pp. 18-191 has argued that professionalism 
is a matter of degree. Barber's argument is essentially that 
there exists a scale upon which the degree. of professionalisation 
of various occupational -groups can be measured and interest 
centres on how close each group is to the maximal end of each 
dimension. In terms of Lubell's eighteen attributes then we have 
an eighteen-dimensional measure. This can be modelled as an 
eighteen-dimensional cube with each side ranging on a scale from 
[0,11 where 0 represents no evidence of the relevant attribute 
and 1 represents maximum evidence of the attribute. Non- 
professional occupational groups would be located near the origin 
in this "attribute-space" and increasingly professionalised 
groups tend. to the opposite corner. Vollmer & Mills [1966, 
p. vii], Barber [19651 and Greenwood 119511 all argue that 
"profession" is an idealised concept and there is no occupational 
group which actually has the co-ordinates [1,1 . ...... 1]. They 
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argue that the problem of interest is to determine where in this 
attribute-space each group is located and, in particular, how 
much they fall short of that ideal. 
A further criticism of Lubell's eighteen attributes arises from 
his literature dredging method. Many of the other writers seem 
to be content with an attribute space of only four to six 
dimensions, recall Flexner's six criteria and Buckley's four. 
Also Barber [1965, p. 181 used four, Greenwood [1957, p. 45] used 
five and Sir Henry Benson 119801 used seven. The possibility 
existss theng that Lubell's list suffers from redundancy. 
v 
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14.3 PROFESSIONALISATION PROCESSES 
The identification of attributes considered in the preceding 
section provides only a static model of the professional 
phenomenon. Now consider the matter of identifying a dynamic 
model of the process of professionalisation. Such an enquiry has 
been undertaken by Barber [1965, pp. 22-24], Caplow [1954, pp. 139- 
1401 and others. This literature again has been synthesised by- 
Lubell who developed a "Generalised professional continuum model" 
on which Figure 14.2 I'Lubell's 'Generalised professional 
continuum model"" following has been based. 
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FIGURE 14.2: LUBELLS "GENERALISED PROFESSIONAL CONTINUUm MDEL" 
Degree of professionalisation: 
Very ----------->Very high 
Non- Marginal Emerging Generally 
professional profession profession recognised 
occupation profession 
Degree to which: 
Systematic 
body of theory 
Knowledge Knowledge is based on abstract principles 
Training Training is affiliated to universities 
Orientation Research challenges. existing body of theory 
Professional 
authority 
Clientele Relationship is "client" rather than "customer" 
Direction Client is submissive to judgement of practitioner 
Sanction of 
the community 
Legitimisation Licencing delineates occupational jurisdiction 
Training Practitioners influence facilities and admission 
Re, eulation 
of ethics 
Altruism Code is explicit, systematic, binding and public 
service oriented 
Colleagues Relations are cooperatives egalitarian and 
supportive 




Practitioners are career oriented 
Involvement Practitioners are personally involved in their 
work 
Reward system Non-monetary symbols supplement monetary reward 
Very low< ------------------------------ >Very high 
Source: Based on Lubell [1978, pp. 30-32, Table 1 "A generalised 
professional continuum model"] 
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An examination of Figure 14.2 I'Lubell's 'Generalised professional 
continuum model"' shows that structurally there is a great deal 
of similarity between the dynamic model and its static 
counterpart. In both cases a number of attributes are identified 
and the "true professions" are conceptualised as having max=*sed 
some straightforward function of those attributes* The only 
structural difference between the two models is that in the 
dynamic model the "occupational groups" start with minimal 
measures of those attributes and they, in some sense, seek to 
move through this multi-attribute space progressively from the 
minimal corner to the maximal corner. In this progression the 
groups are said to pass through stages as "marginal professions" 
and "emerging professions". One thing that the literature seems 
to be clear about is that this progression is purposive [Wilensky 
1964, pp. 141-1461 and not simply the accidental outcome of some 
other unidentified process(es). For example, Hughes remarks that 
"professions are more numerous than ever before ..... 
professional status, more sought after" [1965, p. 11. 
Both Wilensky [1964, pp. 141-1461 and Caplow [1954, pp. 139-1401 
develop more satisfying dynamic models tha*u Lubell. Each has 
attempted to develop a description of the particular path which 
occupational groups trace through the attribute space as they 
progress. Contrast this with Lubell who simply argued 
(implicitly) that such a path, or paths, exist. In Figure 14.3 
"Professionalisation processes" following, are set out the 
process'es identified by Caplow and Wilensky. 
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Adopt a new name 
WILENSKY'S PROCESS 





3 Adopt a code of 
ethics 
4 Develop training 
facilities and 
agitate politically 






for reservation of 
functions 
Adopt a code of ethics 
Sources: Wilensky [1964, pp. 141-146] and Caplow [1954, pp. 139-1401 
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It can be seen from Figure 14.3 "Professionalisation processes" 
that each writer was able to generate a different sequence of 
stages in the process of professionalisation but that both agree 
substantially on what those stages are. To generalise then, 
there is no unique path in the attribute space. by which a group 
will progress from the minimal corner to the maximal corner. 
Rather, it is possible that there will be a set of paths in which 
each individual path corresponds to an occupational group. if 
this is the case, a more interesting question is to ask what are 
the determinants of each occupational groups own path. More 
specifically, given that an occupational group has reached a 
particular point in attribute space, what is it that determines 
its move on to another point. Here again Lubell's synthesis of 
the literature is of help. Lubell notes, following Wilensky 
[pp. 146-1501 and others, that there are a number of barriers to 
professionalisation. These barriers can be seen as constraints 
on the path in attribute space. 
D 
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14.4 CONSTRAINTS ON PROFESSIONALISATION 
Lubell [19781 classified barriers to professionalisation 
according to 
1 whether or not they arise within the occupational group; and 
2 whether they arise earlier or later in the sequence of 
professionalisation. 
In Figure 14.4 following is set out Lubell's "Paradigm of 
barriers to professionalisation". 
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FIGURE 14.4: LUBELLS "PARADIGM 
PROFESSIONALISATION" 
I 
Time frame lInternal constraint External constraint 
Earlier lInternal conflict 





Source: Lubell (1978, p. 46 Table 2 "A paradigm of barriers to 
professionalisation"I 
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It can be seen from Figure 14.4 "Lubell"s 'Paradigm of barriers 
to professionalisation"' that Lub ell saw 
1 internal conflict, competing occupations and legal barriers as 
persistent barriers to professionalisation, that is, as 
barriers which are always present; and 
2 technological limitations and public opinion as termLnal 
barriers, that is, as barriers which only arise in the later 
stages of professionalisation. 
There is a problem in Lubell's approach, however, because it is 
difficult to see how progress is made by an occupational group on 
its path to professionalism if it is faced by persistent 
barriers. Rather, the notion of constraints will be used in 
preference to the expression "barriers to professionalisation". 
It is relatively clear that constraints could operate on the 
possible directions of the path through attribute space to the 
maximal corner, with those occupational groups not able to 
satisfy those constraints being denied any path which converges 
on the maximal corner. 
As an example of how one of these constraints might operate 
consider Lubell's technological limitations, which he classifies 
as a terminal constraint. Initially, we should remark that it is 
the intellectual characteristic of an occupation which provides 
the opportunity for a terminal constraint rather than the 
technology itself, which changes and sometimes rapidly. Nows it 
is quite clear that'there are some occupations for whom the 
intellectual characteristic or knowledge base is limited. This 
does not apply tol says the clergy but it does apply to, say, 
motor mechanics. In the latter case, the knowledge base is 
limited in the sense that it is of a low degree of abstraction, 
training is not through university or affiliated colleges and the 
orientation of thought is not such that there are constant 
challenges to the existing body of theory. Clearly, in terms of 
the "generalised. professional continuum model" of Lubell, set out 
in Figure 14.2 above, motor mechanics are at the "very low" end 
of each of the first three attribute scales. With this in mind, 
it can be seen that it matters not at all how much motor 
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mechanics organise and associate and develop codes of ethics. 
The intellectual limitations are such that they will never be 
able to acquire maximal measures on at least three of those 
attribute scales. So then, the path followed by motor meýhanics 
over time through attribute space would start at the origin, that 
is, the minimal corner, and then progress approximately 
diagonally until it reached the intellectual constraint, in the 
form of a frontier on the surface, and from that point on it 
would be confined to that constraint surface. The constraint 
surface would be convex to the origin so that the 'path never 
reaches the maximal corner. 
The nature of these constraints can be examined more closely. 
Firstly, it is clear that some of the constraints are passive 
and unchanging in the sense that they are persistent and, for 
some, insuperable. We have seen how the intellectual 
characteristics ot the occupation of motor mechanics is just such 
a passive constraint. 
Secondly, it is also clear that some of the constraints will be 
active and changing in the sense that they are temporary and 
superable. Take, 
, 
for example, the internal conflict constraint 
identified in Lubell's paradigm of barriers. CS&W argued that one 
form of internal conflict will arise when the practitioners begin 
to develop specialisms. If the, professional association has not 
been constituted to recognise the existence of, say, newly 
emerging sub-crafts then as practitioners develop closer bonds 
within their own specialism they are'likely to perceive that the 
universal orientation' of the association is inadequate to meet 
their more specific needs. Internal conflict is likely to emerge 
as the specialists endeavour to generate changes within the 
existing constitutional arrangement or alternatively outside by 
the formation of splinter groups LCS&W, pp. 320ff]. The UK 
engineering profession is an example of a complex federal 
structure of associations which are all bound by a single 
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constitutional arrangement, Recall that the UK engineering 
profession is of additional interest because, as was discussed 
above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards Committee". it has 
its own standards programme. The UK legal and medical 
professions are examples of sub-crafts which were newly emerging 
in the llth Century and which were unable to reconcile their 
needs with the existing professional structure of the day, namely 
the monopolistic clbrgy. . The UK accountancy profession 
represents a current example to the extent that practitioners who 
work within industrial companies can be identified as a separate 
specialism (for example, Tricker [1983J). 
This second, active and changing, class of constraints then is 
very different from the first in the sense that it offers a 
mechanism for change operating on the professions. Internal 
conflict and public opinion in particular are strong change 
constraints. It was shown, in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards 
Committee", public opinion of the UK accountancy profession in 
the late 1960's operated as a change agent. Competing occupations 
are often equally effective as change inducing constraints. In 
the UK an example is the medical profession which sought to 
establish a register of medical practitioners in order to 
distinguish members of the profession from other occupations 
which offer advice, and remedies, based on bodies of knowledge 
alien to the established orthodoxy. The medics succeeded in 
their arguments and the General Medical Council was established 
as the registration authority. 
From the above arguments it can be seen that Figure 14.4, 
Lubell's "Paradigm of barriers to professionalisation" can be 
restated as Figure 14.5 "Constraints on professionalisation" 
f ollowing. 
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FIGURE 14.5: CONSTRAINTS ON PROFESSIONALISATION 
Effect of 
constraint lInternal constraint External constraint 
Operates as a IInternal conflict Competing 
change mechanism occupations 
Legal barriers 
Public opinion 
Does not operate 
as a change lIntellectual 
mechanism Ilimitations 
I 
Source: Original interpretation Of Lubell [1978] (Reproduced 
above as Figure 14.4) 
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It can now be seen that the process of professionalisation, in 
which a profession and its members are continually driven in the 
direction of an idealised conception of'profession, serves to 
constrain the preferences of individuals within the profession in 
a substantial and explainable manner. 
This is an important result becuase it relates directly to the 
material discussed above in Chapter 12 "Political choice 
processes". In that chapter it was argued, following Riker 
[19801 and Arrow (1963 & 1951], that when preference structures 
are heterogeneous then stable choice outcomes only exist when 
those preferences are severely constrained. So then, the 
literature of professionalisation processes throws light on one 
group of constraints. 
The nature of some of these constraints will now be explored to 
see how the constraining of preferences takes place. This 
requires a move away from the level of abstraction on which were 
discussed the constraints operating on the profession as it moves 
through a conceptualised attribute space. Rather, the attributes 
themselves will be discussed to see how some of them operate on 
the individual members of a profession in constraining their 
preferences. 
Hall [19481*has considered the stages of a medical career and has 
produced evidence that there exists a very complex socialisation 
process. This process starts early in the professional career, 
and often even before that through the medium of family and 
social contacts. At this early stage, Hall argues, an ambition 
is generated and this makes the prospective professional 
receptive to the institutional requirements he finds later. 
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Goode [19571 characterises professions as communities within 
communities. Amongst the several attributes of a community, he 
identifies in particular that its members are bound by a sense of 
identity; that they share a common set of values; and that the 
community perpetuates itself by using a training process which 
sends recruits through an adult socialisation process lp. 19410 
Goode argues that the attributes together comprise a complex 
social control process. For example,. he notes that the more 
successful members are usually those who have adopted their 
expected roles and behaviour; that the continuing controls 
include not only formal enforcement of discipline and codes of 
ethics but also subtle control of "prestige and career 
advancement" [p. 1971. Similarly, the client exercises a degree 
of control in the selection of practitioner and continuing threat 
of subsequent rejection. The state exercises a degree of control 
either by legislative or licencing requirements. Goode's 
elaboration of these control processes is important and is 
represented diagramatically as Figure 14.6 "Goode's model of 
social control of professional communities" following. 
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FIGURE 14.6: GOODES MODEL OF SOCIAL COjWrROL OF PROFESSIONAL 
CONNUNITIES, 
SOCIETY AT LARGE 
S iety controls by 
1 gislation, and infusion 






Professional colleagues control 
each other by discipline, 
evaluation and sponsorhip. 
Profession controls 
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McKinlay [1973] presents a view different from that of Goode 
[19571. Rather than being concerned with society's control of the 
professional community, McKinlay is concerned with the 
professional communities" control of society and in particular 
social change. Following Johnson (19721, he argues that the 
inventory approach to identifying the attributes of professions 
is deficient because it ignores the central theme of sociological 
enquiry, namely the understanding of power relationships. This 
main theme is implied to be less interested in formulating a. 
definition of the particular institutional guise, for example as 
professions, in which the power relations exist but more in 
exploring how the power base arises and how it affects broader 
social relations. McKinlay's main observation is that 
professions are substantially "to, be trusted in all. things" 
[P. 661 tha. t is, caveat emvtor (let the buyer beware) no ionger 
applies but is replaced by c1gdat emptor (let the buyer believe). 
McKinlay identifies four alleged sources of this power base of 
trust: firstly, the notion that professionals are responding to a 
"calling"; secondly, the altruism attribute; thirdly, the unique 
training and socialisation process; and fourthlys the inability 
of clients to properly evaluate the services being rendered. 
of these are argued (pp-66-70) to be fallacious but, because they 
have been accepted uncritically, the professions have been 
accorded a major power base. That power base then enables the 
professions toýexert substantial influence on social change. In 
particular, McKinlay argues (pp. 78-80) that where social change 
originates from outside the professions then the professions can 
adopt one of --three general strategies of "apparent support". 
"passive oversight" or "active obstruction". In each case he 
envisages that externally generated change is unwelcome. 
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The consumerism debate, referred to briefly above in Section 14.2 
"Attributes of a profession", also implicitly identifies the 
existence of a professional power base. For example, Kennedy 
[19801 discusses options open to the clientele of the medical 
profession, as a group of consumers acting collectively, for 
eroding that power base in the interests of enabling the client 
to critically evaluate performance and enable redress where 
performance is substandard. 
Burns & Haga [19771 offer yet another analysis Of 
professionalism. Like McKinlay 119731, and Johnson [1972]. they 
reject the inventory of attributes as an adequate 
characterisation of a profession. In their analysiss Burns & 
Haga adopt a reductio ad adsurdum approach and ask what it is* at 
the limits that enables the professional to command the continued 
custom of his client. IntlMidation is identified as that 
limiting factor and they assert that it is available "whatever 
authority threatens a profession's autonomy, whether they be 
employerss clients or other occupations" (p. 7091. Further, they 
argue that there are. Wo necessary and sufficient conditions for 
an occupation to be identified as a profession, namely 
"cruciality", in the sense that the profession's services are 
crucial to the clients; and "mystique", in the sense that the 
technical expertise is seen by the clients as "incomprehensible 
and consisting of things that ordinary isortals, in their lay 
perceptions cannot do" [p. 7101. 
So then, the discussion has moved substantially from a view of 
the professionalisation process as tracing a path through 
attribute space towards maximal measures on attribute scales. Nov 
being considered are fundamental social relations that exist once 
an occupational group becomes accepted, in a fairly general sense 
of acceptance, as a profession. There is a complex interaction 
of controls between the professional community and others. 
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Firstly, there is an identifiable structure of controls by which 
some of the component groups of society can control the 
professional conmunity. 
Secondly, the professional community itself has a power base 
which is sufficient for it to exercise its own control over 
some of the component groups of society. 
It is clear that the literature suggests there exists a complex 
pattern of controls which, rather than being unilateral as 
suggested by Goode [19571, are bilateral. Such a model can be 
presented very simply in terms of a modification of Figure 14.6, 
based on Goode [19571 In Figure 14.7 "A model of social and 
professional control" new arrows are added between the 
"professional community" and the other groups, in the opp . osite 
directions to the existing arrows. Also added is narrative to 
describe some of these new controls. 
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FIGURE 14.7: A MODEL OF SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL COMMOL 
SOCIETY AT LARGE 
Sociefy ýontrols by 
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Source: Original interpretation of Burns & Raga [19771, McKinlay 
[19731 and Goode [19571 
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From the above argument it can be seen that generally accepted 
professions exist within a complex structure of social and group 
controls in which the professions themselves have a substantial 
power base by which they are able to constrain the preferences of 
individuals outside the profession. 
The above statement is very clearly illustrated in the case of 
the professional accounting standards setting processes. In the 
UK9 Statements of Standard Accounting Practice operate to 
constrain the preferences of individuals outside the accountancy 
profession. In particular, they constrain managements of 
organisations to publish information as prescribed in those 
accounting standards. They also constrain others by the 
consequences of that information. The nature and effects of 
these constraints were discussed in depth above in Part II 
"Review of previous research", in particular in Chapter 5 
"Professional accounting standards, the political dimension and 
economic consequences". In a sense, the discussion of 
professionalisation processes in the present chapter has led to a 
consideration of UK professional accounting standards setting 
processes by a very different route to that adopted by the main 
body of the present study overall. This discussion in itself is 
noteworthy as a potential alternative framework for the studye 
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14.5 SUMMY 
The early literature on professions was concened with 
establishing characteristics which define a profession 
[Flexner 19151. That literature then developed into a discussion 
of a process by which an occupational group gradually requires an 
increasing n umber of those characteristics (Caplow 19541. Five 
stages to such a process might be 
1 develop a full time occupation; 
2 develop training facilities; 
3 establish a, n association with restricted entry; 
4 agitate politically for reservation of functions; and 
5 adopt a code of ethics [Wilensky 19641. 
Surprisingly, the literature does not address standardisation of 
practices Per se such as is represented by the professional 
accounting standards setting processes in the UK and the US. 
There are a number of constraints operating on the process of 
profe. ssionalisation which can determine the degree to which any 
occupational group acquires the mantle of professionalism. Some 
of these constraints operate as persistent barriers 
[Lubell 19781, whereas others operate as change mechanisms. 
These change mechanisms serve to constrain the preferences of 
individuals within the profession in a substantial and 
explainable manner through the operation of the 
professionalisation process [Goode 19571. As such, the 
professionalisation process is an important example of a 
preference constraint structure [Riker 1980J discussed above in 
Chapter 12 "Political choice processes". 
Additionally, the professions operate within a broader community 
in which the preferences of others can constrain the preferences 
of the professionals [Goode 19571. Coversely, the preferences of 
the professionals themselves can constrain the preferences of 
others [McKinlay 19731. The UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes are an important example of the way in which a 
profession constrains the preferences of others. 
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14.6 CONCLUSIONS 
The framework represented in the literature of 
professionalisatiou processes is almost virgin territory in 
respect of its relationship with the UK professional accounting 
standards setting processes. The literature does not address the 
role of standardisation of practices, Per se. In the most recent 
literature evidence can be found of extensions to the framework 
which might predict that professions possess mechanisms by which 
the preferences of non-professionals are constrained. The 
professional accounting standards setting processes are a major 
example of such mechanisms. 
At the very least$ the professionalisation process framework 
offers an alternative framework by which the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes can be explored. As such 
the framework offers much scope for future research. 
Additionally, the framework might perhaps be used to provide 
expalantory variables which can be integrated into a unified 
framework by which the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes can be explored. By either route, the 
potential appears to be considerable. 
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CRAPTER, 15 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM REVIEW OF LITERATURE FROM 
DISCE? LINES OTMM THAN ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
15.1 Conclusions 
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CEAPTER 15 CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM REVIEW OF LITERATURE FROM 
DISCIPLINES OTHER TRAN ACCOUNTING AND ECONOMICS 
15.1 CONCLUSIONS 
0 
A formal rationalisation for the adoption of a Political 
dimension to the investigation of professional 
accounting 
standards setting processes can now be stated. By characterising 
professional accounting standards setting processes as selections 
of accounting measurement scales$ then no recourse can be had to 
the formal scientific processes of choice between different 
alternatives. This result follows from , 
the finding that these 
formal processes are based on unique and determinate criteria. 
Such a criterion is not available to professional accounting 
standards setting processes because of the characterisation of 
preferences as multiple criteria. The corollary is that 
professional accounting standards setting processes are not 
strictly technical; a result already found in the accounting 
literature [Demski 19731 and reviewed above in Part II "Review of 
previous research in accounting and economics". 
In the political choice process literature, the Shepsle [1979J 
char'acterisation of a political institution as a committee system 
appears to be related to the description of the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes set out above in Chapter 3 
"The Accounting Standards Committee". In particular, the UK 
professional accounting standards setting processes are 
established as a committee system in which the various working 
parties of the ASC has its own jurisdiction based on a set of 
proposals contained in an Exposure Draft. Implied amendment 
control rules might exist whereby the governing bodies are 
constrained in the modifications they can make. Again, implied 
germaneness rules might exist whereby some 'alternatives are 
excluded completely fr= consideration. 
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The Shepsle committee system framework was characterised as a 
model of the way in which preferences are structured in order for 
stable equilibri= to exist. In particular, it was stated that 
equilibria of social choices are determinable by majority vote 
if the set of preferences over all logically possible orderings 
of the alternatives is constrained by an institution of rules 
allocating jurisdictions and amendment rules to sets of 
decision makers. 
so then, fruitful areas of research lie in the exploration and 
elaboration of this Shepsle committee system model. One area 
would be the refinement and formalisation of the description of 
the UK professional accounting standards setting processes as a 
Sbepsle committee system. Another area would be the exploration 
of the way in which majority votes are constrained within the 
processes. This can be made operational by determining how 
majority votes are reflected in the outcomes of the process. An 
exploration of this latter aspect constitutes the empirical part 
of the present study presented in Part IV "Evidence from the 
empirical study of UK data". 
Embedded in the political choice literature is Allison's [19691 
characterisation 
* 
of a political choice process as an 
organisational choice process. There are different sorts of 
theories of organisational, choice processes. Recent_developments 
have moved away from theories centred on a rational comprehensive 
decision process, with their implied model of scientific choice 
process, in order to capture some of the hitherto more perplexing 
features of organisational behaviour. In an environment of 
ambiguity concerning preference structures and causal 
relationships, choices become opportunities for re-interpreting 
the past; for re-defining or re-inforcing beliefs; for 
experimenting; or for asserting legitimacy;. or all of these 
things. Under such a choice process, action will not necessarily 
follow preferences and choices may be made without problems being 
solved. Such a view of the world has not yet led to a 
substantive consideration of how professional accounting 
standards are determined. Yet what is clear is that the choice 
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opportunity of the "garbage can" model could serve as a model f or 
an accounting standardq issue. Many of its features seem to 
match the UK professional accounting standards setting processes 
described above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards 
Committee", and the exploration of such a model offers itself as 
a potentially fruitful area of research. The professional 
accounting standards setting processes might be modelled as an 
organisational type of decision making process. 
The framework represented ill the literature of 
. 
professionalisation processes is almost virgin territory in 
respect of its relationship with the UK professional accounting 
standards setting processes. The accounting literature does not 
address the role of professionalisation processes in the 
standardisation of practices. Similarily, the 
professionalisation literature does not address the role of 
standardisation of practices, Rer se. In the most recent 
professionalisation literature evidence can be found of 
extensions to the framework which might predict that professions 
possess mechanisms by which the preferences of non-professionals 
are constrained. The professional accounting standards setting 
processes are a major example of such mechanisms. 
At the very least, the'Professionalisation process framework 
offers an alternative framework by which the UK professional 
accounting standards setting processes can be explored. As such 
the framework offers much scope for future research. 
Additionally, the fiamework might perhaps be used to provide 
expalantory variables which can be integrated into a unified 
framework by which the UK professional accounting standards 
setting processes can be explored. By either route, the 
potential appears to be considerable. 
I 
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In summary, then, four major disciplines of literature have been 
reviewed with the aim of elaborating thiir potential relevance to 
the UK professional accounting standards setting processes. The 
four disciplines are scientific choice; political choice; 
organisational choice; and professionalisation process. They 
have been reviewed because previous research has identified each 
as being of potential usefulness. Previous research has not 
undertaken any comprehensive review of. the disciplines with a 
view to exploring the limitations and potential benefits of 
theoretical constructs adopted. Rather, there has been a 
tendency to adopt isolated constructs naively. The present 
review sought to reduce that limitation. 
The four disciplines clearly offer four quite different 
frameworks by which professional accounting standards setting 
processes can be analysed. As yet the accounting literature has 
generated no rational basis for choosing amongst these 
frameworks. Rather, individual research studies are likely to 
adopt one framework to the ixclusion of others. Nevertheless, 
some contribution can be made in the present study by 
demonstrating the possibilities and limitations of an integration 
of, or selection from, the frameworks. 
Firstly, it has been noted that the scientific choice framework 
cannot be usefully adopted in the accounting environment* It is 
necessarily selected out. 
Secondly, the political choice framework seems to suggest two 
major sub-frameworks. These are the committee structure 
framework and the organisational process framework. These 
almost correspond to a structuralist/process classification often 
found in other disciplines. Againt no rational basis for 
selection amongst frameworks appears to exist. Even the present 
study, in the empirical sections presented below in Part IV 
"Evidence from the empirical study of UK data", can be viewed as 
having adopted either the structuralist or the process 
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frameworks. In the structuralist view, the results below provide 
evidence of the outcome of the preference constraint structure 
suggested by Riker 119801. In the process view, the results 
provide evidence of the outcome of just one stage of a multi- 
staged process. 
Thirdly, the organisational process framework seems to be 
dependent on the choice made at the political choice framework 
level. Selection of the committee structure framework seems to 
exclude any sort of process sub-framework or super-framework; but 
such an assertion could prove to be ill-founded if future 
research studies demonstrate this not to be the case, The most 
fruitful role for the organisational process framework seems to 
be as a sub-framework of the political choice framework along the 
lines of the Allison [19691 suggestion. Such a combined 
framework would app'ear to hold considerable scope for 
development. 
Finally, there is the prof essionalisation process framework. The 
implications of the various aspects of the prof essionalisation 
process for the understanding of professional accounting 
standards setting processes appear to be profound. For example, 
the Goode-McKinlay description of a complex inter-relationship of 
social and professional controls seems to match the description 
of the UK professional accounting standards setting processes set 
out above in Chapter 3 "The Accounting Standards Committee". The 
role of intellectual constraints described by Lubell seems to 
match some of the debate in the UK and the US about the role of 
a "conceptual framework". 
4 
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From these observations, it is possible to suggest a promising 
comprehensive framework within which to conduct future studies of 
professional accounting standards setting processes in general 
and the UK processes in particular. Such a framework would adopt 
as its primary structure the role of the accounting profession. 
This would provide, in particular, an history of the development 
of the accounting profession; so demonstrating the path which it 
seems most likely to be following. Within this framework of 
professional development, the role of a programme of professional 
accounting standards setting processes can be elaborated and, 
importantly., some objectives imputed. The structure of those 
objectives would most likely be complex and an interesting 
question would focus on the nature of any "rules of thumb" 
adopted by the key participants in seeking to implement those 
objectives. Conflict minimisation has already been proposed in 
the present study above in Chapter 7 "Other economic processes"; 
the role of conflict minimisation needs substantial development. 
Having elaborated the role of a programme of professional 
accounting standards setting processes within a framework of 
profess ionali sat ion process, research studies could address the 
specific nature of these professional accounting standards 
setting processes. The political choice framework thus becomes a 
sub-framework of the prof essionalisation framework, with either 
the Committee structure or the organisational process frameworks 
operating as sub-sub-frameworks. Such an outline would provide a 
suitable basis for a research programme and is charted in the 
following Figure 15.1 "Proposed framework for the study of 
professional accounting standards setting processes". 
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FIGUILE 15.1 PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS SETTING PROCESSES 
PROFESSIONALISATION PROCESSES 
Study the role and history 
of professional accounting 
standards setting processes 
within a professional framework 
POLITICAL CHOICE PROCESSES 
Select either a structuralist 
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